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PREFACE 
The subject of this essay is Structuralism, and 
the point of view, that of a student of literature. 
And this much the title conveys. However, there are 
points which need to be made by way of a preface in 
order to clarify what this essay attempts and what it 
does not. 
First, there is the problem faced by any writer on 
Structuralism - definition of his subject. This problem 
has been sufficiently talked about in the text, along 
with how a recognition of it generated the essay's form, 
and no more need be said on this matter here. But, 
second, it must be stressed that, though this is an 
essay in criticism of a style of thought, it has no 
pretensions to being an essay in philosophy. Rather 
than progressing by way of a rigorous analysis of a set 
of concepts, its motivating spirit is more justly 
characterized as that of a critical review. The hope is 
to illuminate and, as well, to suggest points of weak-
ness which, I believe, deserve the probing for soundness 
which rigorous analysis provides. However, though this 
is itself not an essay in philosophy, I have attempted 
to treat the abstractions I deal with, and the argument-
forms I deal with them in, with respect. The same might 
be said of my treatment of ideas belonging to the other 
disciplines - mathematics and linguistics - in which I 
could not be considered a specialist. 
i i 
I have tried at all times to express the special 
viewpoint of a student of literature. This leads me to 
the third point. The areas of thought this examination 
has led me into are not those usually familiar to <or 
interesting to> the literary critic. But as they are 
relevant to Structuralism in literary studies, and 
because they help expose more clearly the cause of any 
inadequacies sensed in this approach (and explai'n why 
they should exist), it was thought worthwhile that they 
should be entered into. This led to the problem that a 
large amount of background material had to be provided 
in order that the necessary points in description and 
criticism would have fu1l intelligibility, and this 
material may be felt irrelevant to purely literary 
concerns. This problem loomed prominent in Chapter 
Three especially, and the solution chosen led to an 
unavoidable imbalance. This chapter Con linguistics) 
i s ·by far the longest i n the essay <on the study of 
literature). But in order that detailed criticism 
could take place <and to be at all co~vincing, criticism 
had to be detailed), an equally detailed exposition of 
Chomsky's thought had to be offered. And resorting to 
placing it in yet another appendix would have been a 
solution more exasperating Cfor the reader> than honest. 
Finally, as so much background material appeared 
·.-y 
necessary, I dealt with each different area of thought 
separately, each chapter being a more or less self-
contained ·block". Any other design would, I believe, 
i i i 
have resulted in an unwieldy mass of cross-references 
and footnotes, and there would have been no gain in 
clarity. 
While this essay was being written, two books 
became available which, had they arrived earlier, may 
well have changed the shape and content of this essay. 
As it is, I have had the opportunity only of referring 
to them occasionally in the text where they seemed most 
relevant. Pettit (1975) deals with much the same 
subject-matter, and, too, makes use of the work of 
Black, Hesse, etc., in elucidating the Structuralist 
programme. He does not, however, appear to concern 
himself with a criticism of the Structuralist archetype 
in language-study. Robinson (1975) is perhaps 
potentially more interesting, being written by a 
respected English literary critic. Much of what he 
says on Chomsky could be related to the content of 
Chapter Three; it is unfortunate though that his style 
of approach to the subject makes most of Searle's 
criticisms CI believe) apposite. (See Searle <1975).) 
For the sake of neatness, I have used, as a mode of 
citation within the text and in footnotes, the "Harvard" 
system - see, for example, the University of the 
Witwatersrand's Style manual for Theses and Dissertations 
(Johannesburg, 1971), pp. 13 and 17. The form of the 
bibliographical entries follows the corresponding style. 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge a number of 
debts, of different kinds, to both people and institutions. 
iv 
First, I am indebted to the University of Cape Town and 
to the Trustees of the F. G. Cannock Bursary for financial 
assistance towards meeting the cost of the research 
necessary for the writing of this essay. Opinions 
expressed or conclusions reached are, of course, my own, 
and not to be regarded as a reflection of the opinions 
held by either body. It is the right moment now to 
express as well my sincerest thanks to Miss Q. Paine for 
the generous loan that made my years of preparatory 
undergraduate study possible. 
My greatest tspecifically "academic") debt is to 
Dr J. M. Coetzee, first, for opening up new and relevant 
areas of thought, and second, for providing the needed 
guidance through them. There are, I am aware, many ways 
in which I could have profited much more from his 
criticisms and insights. I would also like to thank 
Dr M. Beatty for the hours spent in informal discussion 
on issues, which, though not directly related to what 
follows, make a study such as the one that follows 
relevant. Special thanks also to my parents and Mrs 
P. Kitson for their invaluable assistance (under circum-
stances not the easiest> in the production of this thesis. 
And finally, I would like to express unql;l1alified 
gratitude to Carol Mizroch for giving the complete 
comradeship that helped make this exploration a joy. 
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LANGUAGE, METAPHOR AND ARCHETYPES 
It has been said of Existentialism that there is no 
such thing - that there are only Existentialismi. And 
the same may justly be said of Structuralism. For though 
the source of a significant number of ideas held in 
common by Structuralists (and by some who refuse that 
name) can be traced to the linguistics of Saussure, indi-
vidual writers tend to use one or more of the insights 
central to his work as points of departure for their own 
thought, rather than systematically develop his doctrine 
as a whole 1 • 
This is especially so when his ideas appear in dis-
ciplines other than linguistics; to which Structuralist 
1 But even this picture needs further qualification. 
For Structuralism has been found in an extraordinarily 
diverse number of places; not only in.§.!....!,_ the disciplines 
known as the "human sciences" (among which the study of 
literature sometimes finds itself placed), but also in 
the creative arts (taken to include mathematics), where 
Structuralists number Boulez, Mondrian, Beckett Cand 
Brecht) •••• Now, obviously, Structuralism cannot be 
distinguished by a debt to Saussure in all these cases. 
To account for this diversity, a history of Structuralism 
may perhaps conclude that it consists of a series of 
parallel developments <which would include Formalism and 
its inspiration - see, for example, Jameson C1972) and 
Erlich (1975)), all products of a Zeitgeist to which 
Saussure was particularly well attuned. But this question 
is of no urgency where Structuralism as an approach to 
the study of literature is concerned. In most cases, 
this approach draws inspiration from linguistics Cderived1 
mainly from Saussure>; and in cases where it does not 
(for example, in Goldmann's sociological analyses>, simi-
lar.ities are sufficient for what follows in this essay 
to be relevant. 
1 
2 
writers on literature provide no exception. Any attempt 
to discover the "Structuralism" in studies of literature 
so-labelled encounters an obvious and puzzling multiform-
; t y • Th e re i s , a s B a rt h es , t h e mos t s pa r k l i n g of S t r u CE_:;. 
turalists, acknowledges, no "school", no "movement", no 
awareness in Structuralist writers "of being unitedSby 
any solidarity of doctrine or commitment" <1964c, p. 
214). This would seem to make general criticism imposs-
ible, were criticism felt necessary. Each writer would 
have to be assessed according to the merits of his indi-
vidual achievement. Yet there does seem to be, even if 
this is not openly admitted and exploited, a common 
element, a common strain of thought that can be found in 
varying degrees of prominence in the work of writers such 
as Barthes, Todorov, Greimas, Genett~, Jakobson and 
L~vi-Strauss. Each has, in one way or another, been 
influenced by the most general of Saussure's slogans: 
that language is a system. In one way or another, each 
tends to view literature as if it were a system of much 
the same sort that Saussure beljeved language to be. 
And it is, I believe, in this influence that much of the 
dissatisfaction that migh~ be felt with their work would 
have its cause. 
Thus tho~gh individual writers may draw inspiration 
from Saussure's original idea in differenp ways, there 
remains, on quite a general level, the possibility of a 
criticism that, while ignoring individual differences, 
is~aimed at an important, if not defining, aspect of the 
3 
Structuralist approach to literature. Still, the problem 
persists: how can the common idea of system be approached 
if not by generalization from the particular ways in 
which it is put to use? To this problem, a remark that 
occurs towards the end of the preface to a recent criti-
cal study provides, I believe, a useful solution. 
We find ourselves ultimately before the conclusion 
that the attempt to see the literary work as a 
linguistic system is in reality the application of 
a metaphor. 
CJ ameson. 1972. p. vi n 
The point is essentially correct; and can be related to 
the recognition, that forms the basis of M. H. Abrams• 
excellent study of the Romantic tradition in The Mirror 
and the Lamp, of the role metaphor can play in literary 
criticism. In the preface to this work, he writes: 
[During the history of critical thinking] a number 
of concepts most rewarding in clarifying the nature 
and criteria of art were not found simply in the 
examination of aesthetic facts, but seem to have 
emerged from the exploration of serviceable 
analogues, whose properties were, by metaphorical 
transfer, predicated of a work of art. 
C1953, p. vi> 
If the Structuralist use of "system"is seen in the light 
of these i de as • a method of genera l c r i t i c i s m s.u g g est s 
itself. "System·, as a potential metaphor for the 
literary work, may become the subject of evaluation. In 
t h i s w a y • de s c en t i n to a w e l t e r o f pa rt i cu l a r d ~Jf f e r en c es 
and individual developments, of transformations and 
possible inconsistencies CBarthes, in a way mirroring all 
Structuralism, has well deserved the epithet "Protean"), 
is usefully avoided - usefully, for at the level of 
4 
general criticism particular details do not matter. The 
properties of "system" (and "structure") as "serviceable 
analogues" may provide a focus for attention; for it is 
one or more of these properties that would be involved 
in the metaphoric transfer. 
The analogue is, of course, to be found in linguist-
ics: the system of language that is the object of the 
linguist's study. But a moment's reflection suggests 
that in this use too not all is "literal". Language is 
a complex phenomenon; but i~ it obviously a "system"? 
The word in this context as well appears to be a metaphor -
at least, until proved otherwise. And its use in the 
Structuralist study of literature begins to look as 
though it is a metaphor itself based in turn on a meta-
phor which could usefully bear study. Any study of lit-
erature would, trivially, have, in some way or other, to 
take language (and metaphor) into account; and particular 
ideas about these would be ~mplied by a particular 
approach to literature. But the Structuralist approach 
appears to involve these ideas in a way beyond normal. 
For, beyond implying ideas about the nature of language, 
language, itself seen through a metaphor, becomes a 
metaphor for literature. 
From this opening onto Structuralism, the first 
question that raises itself is: what does it mean to say 
that "system" is being used as a metaphor? The idea is 
distinctively modern, and is related to a similarly 
mod~rn view of language in its meaning-bearing aspect, 
5 
one crucial to any study of a literary work. And as it 
is this same "language" that Structurali~ts claim is a 
"system", the question is worth going into in some 
detail. Furthermore, answering the question discloses 
related topics (the "static" Literalist view of language 
the modern view is opposed to, and the important role 
ideas of "context" play in this modern view) which will 
prove a useful introduction to much that follows in the 
later chapters. The remainder of this chapter, there-
fore, will be devoted to drawing out the strands of 
thought relevant to its answer. 
There is a distinction at a high level of generality 
commonly made between two ways of thinking about language -
the one, "prescriptive", the other, "descriptive" (see, 
for example, Lyons (1968), pp. 42-44, and Cohen (1966), 
p. 3 ff.). The generalization concerns cultural tenden-
cies under whose domination, admittedly, individual 
' opinions may differ. Nevertheless, the disparity between 
the two tendencies is marked enough for the distinction 
to be valid - and, for the particular purposes here, 
Cohen's development of it, for its concern with meaning, 
obviously relevant to any study of literature and meta-· 
phor, of interest. 
The study of language Wt!) until about the late 
eighteenth century, a normative discipline. Character-
istically it was thought either that words had certain 
meanings whose acknowledgement was obligatory on the 
part of the language-user, or that a particular dialect 
6 
within a language was a model for "correct" usage. Or, 
as in the oft-cited case of Hobbes, a particularly 
limited use bf words within one preferred dialect was 
considered reasoned speech, while all re~aining was 
r'·elegated to the realms of nonsense or falsehood. Moti-
vation was conservative. As in the realm of contemporary 
political thinking Cnot unrelated), the past provided 
standards of excellence. Linguistic change was, of 
course, noticed, but it was not unusual to find the con-
temporary state of language understood as providing evi-
dence of moral or social decay. 
The attitude to linguistic change at a more funda-
mental level links with the prevailing understanding of 
the relation of words to reality. From the Judaic trad-
ition came the idea of words as names. The Greek trad-
ition provided no different; for it is only with this 
idea affirmed that debate as to whether the names of 
things are assigned naturally or by convention could be 
' meaningful. Reality, different philosophical positions .\ 
aside, was truly "given", and upon this reality the sig- I 
nifications of words was dependent. However revealed, 
reality provided a stable arbiter on the question of 
significations, being a constant presence of "things" to 
be "named". With such a view, if change is to be allowed 
language, it can only be the inclusion of words on 
account of discoveries or inventions (and the exclusion 
of words on account of their loss of usefulnes~~. Thus, 
at any one time, language is in a stable state, a 
• 
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collection of words each of which, because of the 
uncomplicated relation of words ~o reality, being cap-
able o~ clear, exact definition. This view can, for 
this reason, be l~belled "static·. Cohen's comment 
apropos the thought of a seventeenth century grammarian 
is relevant, and points to what this view does not take 
into consideration. 
He conceived of linguistic change primari Ly as the 
appearance of new words or combinations of words 
and the disappearance of old ones, not as a comb-
ination.of this with a process of transformation 
in the meanings of continuously existing words. 
(1966, p. 7) 
It is this "transformation" (among other things) that 
the second view attempts to take into account. 
Specifically modern is the idea that language is a 1. 
phenomenon worthy of study in its own right. Interest 
turns from being normative to descriptive and analytic. 
Cohen, tracing the change, cites evidence of dissatis-
faction in the latter half of the eighteenth century 
with the normative approach for its being unrealistic, 
and even as harmful to the "strength" of the language. 
Slowly, and without much commitment at first, the idea 
was accepted that words in a language ~ad meanings that 
could change. Lexicography began to include the impar-
tial study of these meaning changes. A further develop-
ment occurred with the flourishing of evolutionary 
thinking in the nineteenth century. Historical linguis-
·hc:s took as i t s subj e ct l an g u age f . .a mi [ i es , the i r 
"origins" and "descendents", and traced the links in the 
organic continuum. It was against this exclusively 
8 
historical Cor "genetic") approach that Saussure 
reacted. Equal attention was now to be given to the 
contemporary exper~ence of language, and thus attention 
was again drawn - but without the normative bias - to 
the linguistic habits of the present. In Saussure's 
thought, a method, enabling significant discussion of 
the meanings of words at any one time, was devised that 
might allow, as the normative approach had not, for the 
fact that meaning-change was a natural process. 
There was a parallel change in metaphysics and the 
philosophical interest in language. One can pornt to 
the scepticism of Hume, to Kant's problem of the possi-
bility of scientific knowledge. The simple "givenness" 
of reality was doubted; and as a consequence the 
relation between reality and language was complicated. 
Allowance had to be made for the constitutive powers of 
the mind, and thus for its expressive medium, languag~. 
The Whorf-Sapir hypothesis is perhaps the most well- ~ 
known result of this trend in thinking - the central 
idea being that different languages produce different 
conceptual schemes in their users, different "world-
views". It is not surprising then that the philosophy 
of language has assumed a central importance in modern 
thought. 
This complicating ~f the relatedness between reality 
and language has its corollary in the relation between 
word and meaning. Words are understood no longer as 
simply names, but as having "sense and reference" -
9 
and the number of senses of a word can be multiple. The 
determination of these senses of a word is understood as 
being in considerations of both use and potential for 
significance 2; more specifically, of both situational, 
and linguistic, context (that is, the non-verbal, and 
verbal, context of a particular occurrence) and of its 
place in the larger context of the language as a whole. 
The meaning of a word is, consequently, thought of as 
being changeable in two senses. First, (accounting for 
the fact of linguistic change) the meaning of a word 
changes diachronically according to the word's place in 
the altering synchronic states of the language. Second, 
within each synchronic state, a word's meaning may com-
prise a number of senses, according to the different 
uses to which a word at any time is put. These two 
aspects of meaning-change are, of course, supportive, the 
first accounted for by the second. More important is 
the modern understanding of how words acquire new sense -
that is, via extended use - for it is from this view that 
metaphor derives its dew and considerable status. 
2 Again, it must be emphasized that this is a state-
ment of a general trend. And I am aware that I am 
treading over a philosophical minefield. Not only have 
"meaning" and "use" been differently interpreted, but the 
relative importance of each to semantics continues to be 
the subject of debate. Yet, however their definitions 
are refined, and in whatever proportion they are decided 
to be operative as factors, something such as "meaning" 
and "use" are important to deciding semantic questions. 
Thus different refinements of the subject are irrelevant 





A word more needs to be said about "context". The 
extent to which "context" is understood to be inf luen~ 
t'i'a.l in determining meaning ·can be indicated by quoting 
at length a passage from Lyons (1963) • 
• • • [[ T ]he situational context of an utterance 
cannot simply be identified with the non-verbal 
matrix of ,the "speech-event" •••• A much wider and 
more abstract notion of context must be adopted; 
one that brings the verbal and the non-verbal 
"components" together under one head. The context 
of the utterance must be held to include, not only 
the relevant external objects and the actions 
taking place at the time, but the knowledge shared 
by speaker and hearer of all that has gone before. 
More "abstractly", it must be held to comprehend 
all the conventions and presuppositions accepted in 
the society in which the participants live, insofar 
as these are relevant to the understanding of the 
utterance. In particular, the context of a sentence 
in a written work must be understood to include the 
conventions governing the literary genre of which 
the work in question is an example. 
(pp. 82-83) 
Lyons is, of course, talking here of only situational 
context, and not of the immediate verbal (linguistic) 
context (which would supply the relevant grammatical 
relations, and, broadly, the semantic universe of the 
utterance) or of the context which is the Language 
against which the utterance is significant. 
Yet a further distinction would appear to be illum-
inating. Situational context may be left to signify the 
"non-verbal matrix", and all the "wider and more 
abstract" remainder could profitably come under the head 
of "cultural" context. Some of what Lyons includes is 
(for present purposes) insignificant - conventions that 
merely serve to aid the process of communication. But 







3 two main groups 
12 
This is not coincidental; for it is 
possible to relate these two to the two ways of under-
standing language sketched above. 
The Literalist category is the ffrst , comprisini 
what have been called the Substitut~on theory and the 
Comparison theory. In both of these views, metaphor is 






simply reducible to its literal paraphrase. It is only ( 
once this explication in terms of the literal is done, I 
that a metaphor is understood, and a metaphor means no 
more, no less than this statement in literal terms. The 
only difference in the views is in the manner in which 
this reduction takes place. Faced with the lines, for 
example, 
Ask the Empresse of the night 
How the hand which guides her sphear, 
(Thomas Stanley, Poems, 1647) 
one who held the former view would understand by the 
phrase "Empresse of the night" simply "moon". The poet, 
instead of speaking plainly has merely substituted, for 
whatever creditable reason, usually delectation, a phrase 
rather more fanciful. The metaphor is thus transparent, 
its literal equivalent, for the intelligent reader, an 
easily apprehendible provider of meaning. 
For one who holds the latter view, analysis would ) 
be slightly different; but again the literal term (once 
3 For much in this section on metaphor, including 
the distinction and criticism of the various trends of 
thought, I am indebted, in particular, to Urban (1939), 






discovered) provides the ground of understanding. How-
ever, instead of talking in terms of substitution, what 
would be asserted is that a comparison is being 
presented. The moon is being likened to an empress. 
Metaphor is understood as a contracted simile. The 
meaning of the metaphor thus again becomes equivalent to 
its expansion in literal paraphrase. 
I t h a s of t en been p o:tfft e d o u t t h a t A r i st o t l e i s t he 
••;:)' ... "'.· 
founder of the Comparison view. His statement of it is 
precise and has continued to be essential to subsequent 
statements by other writers. But the great virtue of 
his statement is that by its very precision, the view of 
language that supports it is clearly exposed. He writes: 
Metaphor is the application to one thing of a name 
belonging to another thing. 
<Poetics, Dorsch , ch. 21) 
Aristotle conceives of language as being essentially a 
naming device. Language !BY have other functions in 
communication, but these are secondary to the naming 









prior to language, and is unchanged by metaphoric contact. 
The way is thus open to thinking of metaphor as decorat-
ive (Rhetoric, III, x-xi). An understanding of metaphor 
in terms of an extension of meaning is not provided. 
Meanings of words are considered fixed. For example, a 
few lines before offering the above definition of meta-
phor, Aristotle distinguishes between types of "noun". 
He does so in such a way as to make ·words in current 
use" and "metaphor" permanently exclusive categories. 
14 
Similarly, in talking of metaphor as analogy, he writes: 
I explain metaphor by analogy as what may happen 
when of four things the second stands in the same 
relation to the first as the fourth to the third; 
for then one may speak of the fourth instead of the 
second, and the second instead of the fourth. 
Cmy emphasis; Poetics, Dorsch, ch. 21> 
This can be feasible only if words are thought of as 
having clearly defined and unchanging meanings (the 
things they name>. For underlying the explanation is 
the analogy with numerical proportion. In the same way 
as the ratios between numbers are eternally fixed 
(2:4::9:18>, so the ·ratios· between meanings are comp~~ 
...,,_,...--
letely and forever determined Cmoon:night::empress:empire>. 
The Comparison view of metaphor is obviously superior 
to the Substitution view - at least the meanings of both 
terms are taken into account, and the poJnt about meta-
phor being a statement of similarity is plausible 4 
Nevertheless, with an understanding of language that 
does not view naming as basic, that does not see it as 
"static" Cin the sense offered above ,;:3.- pp. 6~?>'·>;;,\}::i:,t·ter­
alist thinking about metaphor is inadequate. Modern 
writers on metaphor have, in revision, provided theories 
~that fall into the second category, which, for convenience, 
4 There are however two points (apart from the view 
of language on w~ich it is based) where the Comparison 
view is weak. FjJBst, there is an important semantic 
difference between simile and metaphor. The latter 
asserts a .relation of ideritity between its terms, while 
the former asserts one only of similarity. Second, 
where a simile is "satisfied" by the first and most 
obvious respect in which the two objects may be similar, 
metaphor invites continued exploration of .2.l!. the poss-
ible senses in which the one object may be said to be 
the other. 
15 
I call the Interaction category. 
Yet even here, there is a group of theories that, 
while not seeing the understanding of metaphor in terms 
of a reduction to literal language, still assumes the 
clear distinction between ltteral and metaphoric typical 
of Literalist thinking. Two theories in this group, the 
Supervenience and the Emotive, are relatively uninterest-
ing, both stressing the unanalyzabi lity of metaphoric 
language. The Emotivist would degrade m'etaphor by 
assigning it expressive value merely, denying it any true 
cognitive function; while the Supervenience theorist 
would go to the opposite extreme in stressing unanalyz-
abi lity by exalting it as the conveyor of an almost myst-
ical insight that literal ("prosaic") language fails in 
any way to capture. More interesting, in its i lluminat-
ing problems with maintaining the clear distinction 
between literal and metaphoric, and ~l§o the assumption 
~ .... 
so important to Literal~st thought, that (literal) mean-
ings can be clearly defined, is the Controversion theory 
as set out by M. C. Beardsley. 
Metaphor for Beardsley (1958, pp. 122-164>, is 
created when two terms are joined in attributive relat-
ion such that the result, when taken literally <that is, 
at the level of primary meaning) is logically absurd. 
There is the further condition (for the above may be 
applicable to nonsense) that the modifier have connota-
tions (that is, instances of meaning at the secondary 
level> that apply to the subject of the attribution. 
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Thus, to call the moon an empress is metaphor in its 
stating something logically impossible; and, at the same 
time, for its allowing reasonable secondary meanings to 
be invoked. An empress can be thought of as "graceful", 
"splendid", "superior", etc., and these qualities can, 
without strain, be thought of as "fitting" the subject, 
moon • Beardsley further insists that these connota-
tions can be completely listed (p. 133), so that the 
meaning of a particular metaphor can, in analysis, be 
fully detailed. 
That these ideas are so unsatisfactory is a con~ 
sequence of a curious inconsistency·. Early in the 
discussion (p. 125), Beardsley remarks on the distinc-
tion between primary and secondary word-meaning that it 
• i s not sharp" • Never the less , i t i s th i s di st ii(l~jt i on 
which provides the starting-point from which the theory, 
emphasizing precision and accuracy, is elaborated. 
And that th'.t?distinction is not sharp is certainly ,_, 
true. What is the primary mea~ing of "rose"? Is it 
simply "flower" - which leaves "sweet-smelling" to be a 
secondary meaning? Or if "sweet-smelling" is included 
in the primary meaning, as surely it should, then this 
primary meaning is shared by, for example, "carnation". 
Can then two words normally assumed different in meaning 
be believed to share primary meanings? How far does one 
go in this addition till the primary meaning specific 
to "rose" is arrived at? There are places in Beardsley's 
account which seem to imply that the primary meaning of 
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a word is to be understood as the scientific descrip-
tion of the thing it denotes. But, if this is his 
intention, this attempt at precision, apart from unjust-
ifiably hypostasizing, in the case of natural objects, 
the language of the natural sciences, provides more 
problems than answers. What is the primary meaning of 
"freedom"? of "simple"? 
Because Beardsley understands "literal" in terms of 
primary meaning, the vagueness that attends the latter 
notion attends the former. And as the notion of 
"literal" is needed to be completely determined for his 
definition of metaphor, his view of metaphor too is 
unsatisfactory. 
The difficulty appears to stem from presupposing 
that literal and metaphoric senses of the word exist 
prior to the word's use in a particular context. Apart 
from the fact that the attempt to establish primary 
meaning does, I think, fail, it is from this presuppos-
ition that his mechanistic understanding of reading 
metaphor is derived. First the absurdity at the literal 
level is recognized; then "orbiting" connotations of the 
modifier (like electrons, separate and denumerable 
"entities") are discovered and precisely detailed; and 
those that are apt are then selected and applied to the 
subject, those not, rejected. But this is artificial. 
Apart from the question whether all connotations £..2..!l be 
listed, the subtle question of "weight" is ignored. Is 
each connotation in the interpretation of a metaphor 
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given equal value? Surely not - judicious discernment 
of relevance to a larger (and certainly not precisely 
defined> context is required in sorting out degrees of 
emphasis~ There is, in fact, a case that can be made 
for saying that the same word used as a metaphor but in 
different contexts, is understood in different ways. 
For example, consider the following: 
and 
The moon is empress of the. night, 
The central character in this picaresque novel 
is Margaret, gypsy, and empress of the highways. 
Although Beardsley, like those who ascribe to 
Emotive and Supervenience theories, avoids talking of 
understanding metaphor in terms of reduction, he is, as 
the criticisms above indicate, ung;.omfortably close to 
being a Literalist. For in order to stress the complete 
analyzability of metaphor he is forced to assume that 
the word-meanings in a natural language can be completely 
detailed; that each of these meanings can be divided into 
primary and secondary parts; and that the literal meaning 
of a word is its primary (central) meaning. This view 
comes close to thinking of metaphor as simply figurative. 
Further, it assumes, solely, t®at words bring their 
meaning to a context, thus ignoring the contribution 
contexts make. Consider the phrase "a green thought in 
a green shade" apart from its context; and its meaning 
is very thin indeed. Finally, its view of language, 
like the Literalist, discloses meaning as static. Little 
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provision is made for an understanding of extension of 
~ 
meaning. Nor does it take into account the fluidity and 
creative imprecision that, because of its multiple and 
ill-defined contexts, are a natural language's vital 
resources. 
Developing the insights of I. A. Richards, Black 
(1954) provides the last of the views to be discussed 
here, the Interaction theory. He borrows from Richards 
the -Wotion of the interaction of ideas; and develops it 
to arrive at. the position from which he regards metaphor 
as best understood in terms of the patterns of impli-
cations connected with each of the active terms. It is 
for the reader to discover and develop these implications, 
and in the process, to develop ways in which each term is 
seen in the light of the other. As the main drive in the 
interpretive process is toward the discovery of signif-
icance, it is those cases in which A fits •'s impli-
cations and B fits A's that loom immediately large. To 
make his points clearer and to provide tools useful in 
analysis of instances of metaphor, he introduces a new 
terminology Cthe status of which I discuss below). 
Taking a simple sentence easily recognizable as 
involving an instance of metaphor, it can be said to 
comprise a focus Cthe phrase that excites interest as 
being used ·abnormally") and its frame (the norm against 
which the deviance is judged, or, switching perspective, 
the abnormal context in which the word is being used). ) 
This frame will either contain or provide clues as to ) 
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the nature of the principjL subiect of the metaphor, 
while the focus provides the subsidiary subject. It is 
the function of the latter to revise or organize our 
view of the former. It does this by virtue of the 
semantic history it brings to the context, a "pattern 
implications" from which predicates applicable to. the 
principal subject can be selected. Black uses an analogy 
here. The principal subject is like a star-filled night-
sky at which we look through a "p~ece of heavily smoked 
glass on which certain lines are left clear· (p. 288). 
Only the stars that are visible through the portion of 
glass left unsmoked will be seen. And similarly, the 
pattern of stars revealed will be different when the 
glass is aimed at a different part of the sky. In an 
analogous way, the subsidiary subject determines what 
aspects of the principal subject will be considered prom-
inent, and the principal subject iupplies clues as to 
how the subsidiary subject is to be taken. But primarily, 
metaphor operates by providing a subsidiary subject the 
primary subject is ·~een through". 
If Thomas Stanley's lines are again considered, 
Ask the Empresse of the night 
How the hand which guides her sphear, 
it is the phrase "the Empresse of the night" that stands 
out as metaphorical. If this is ~onsidered the focus, 
then "Ask ••• how the hand which guides her sphear" is 
the frame; and while the frame does not provide explicit 
mention of the principal subject, it does provide clues 
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as to what principal subject is to be assumed. Cit is 
necessary to note at this point the mutual effective-
ness of both focus and frame in determining the unstated 
principal subject: were the phrase "the empress of the 
night" replaced by, "evening's herald", the principal 
subject would, obviously, be Venus, not the moon.) 
Out of context the phrase admits a number of inter-
pretations; but these the context limits. Nevertheless 
there is still an ambiguity (for which grammar is 
responsible) in the relation of "sphear" to "empress". 
While the "sphear" is certainly the moon, does it belong 
to some unspecified nocturnal deity, in the way that the 
orb emblematic of royalty would belong to an empress 
(which would mean understanding the empress as the 
goddess>, or does it belong to the empress in the sense 
t~at one possesses one's body <which would mean under-
standing both empress and sphere <=body) as the moon). 
While the first option is n~t too far-fetched 5 to be 
employed in a poem, the rest of the poem, and the rest 
of the stanza in particular indicates that the latter 
option is to be tak\~n. 
5 The prior reading of the whole poem has 
influenced my reading of these two lines in isolation. 
It is not too "far-fetched" to imagine them in some 
piece of exotic verse, with the empress identified 
with a fgreign potentate graced with mythic titles, 
the "hand which guides" with the destiny of nations, 
and the "sphear~ Cvia the emblem of power) with the 
empire. All it would need is a context suitable to 
activate these meanings. 
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Constant in unconstant light, 
Taught the waves her yoke to bear, 
And did thus by loving force 
Curb or tame the rude seas course. 
Ask the female Palme how shee 
First did woo her husbands love; 
And the Magnet, ask how he 
Doth th'obsequious iron move; 
Waters, plants and stones know this, 
That they love, not what love is. 
Be not then less kind than these, 
Or from love exempt alone, 
Let us twine like amorous trees, 
And like rivers melt in one; 
Or if thou more cruell prove 
Learne of steel and stones to love. 
Once the rest of the stanza is supplied, the need to 
identify the empress with the moon and the need to take 
physical qualities (beauty, splendour) into considera-
tion becomes apparent. In, for example, a Symbolist 
poem, there would be no need to press for a clear ident-
ification of the principal subject. But here the under-
lying analogy is foregrounded. Thus, not only is a 
precise evocation of the moon call'd for, but also the 
moon in its aspect of a physical body. 
But the phrase "Ask the moon ••• " is hardly normal; 
which points to Cin the context of the rest of the poem) 
another pattern of meaning at work in the stanza. To 
paraphrase would be out of place; the result, if accurate, 
would be cumbersome, complicated by almost endless qual-
ification. I wi LL rather indicate levels of meaning and 
their interrelation. There is first the obtrusive poetic 
convention within which the "reality" level is set. The 
speaker is persuading a woman to accept an erotic relat-
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ionship which he claims to feel as already binding. 
Then, there is the analogy, whose usefis bound to his 
intent to persuade, of the force she exerts over him 
with the natural phenomenon of the moon controlling the 
behaviour of the tides. Then, the natural phenomenon is, 
in its turn, present€d in anthropomorphic terms, a 
presentation that hinges on the similarity that both 
moon and empress control. But the choice of "empresse 
of the night" for "moon" has implications at the first 
level of meaning, being suggestive of how the speaker 
conceives of his mistress. 
Thus, even though the metaphor chosen appears to be 
simply explicable in terms of the Substitution view 
("Why bo-her with so-called Interaction views? It is 
>;\ .' ,.~ 
obvious that when he says Empress of the night he means 
the moon"), or Comparison view C"He 1..§. saying the moon is 
like an empress"), any Literalist understanding of meta-
phor cannot do justice to the subtle complexity of what 
is, after all, not a particularly "difficult" piece of 
verse. First, it can do little to establish the number 
of patterns of meaning the implicative resources of the 
language develop. To begin with, the word "empress" 
brings with it associations, developed in the later lines, 
that the word "moon" just does not carry. Second, though 
it is idle to ask whether the poet, if he had not been 
bound by the exigencies of meter, would or would not have 
used the appositive phrase "the moon, Empresse of the 
night", it is certain that, if he had, his effect would 
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have been lessened by the clumsiness introduced. The 
moon, as has been pointed out, does not operate on the 
literal level. To introduce the word into the surface 
of the verse draws attention from the fact that it is 
the "physical" woman, and the force she exerts over the 
speaker, that is the well-disguised object of attention 
on the level of "reality". 
It might be asked now that this complexity has 
been discovered, what the principal subject migh"t~,be 
exactly - that is, if it is not to be identified with 
the moon? But the answer is that no precise identifi-
cation can be made. Nor is this a fault. The termin-
ology is necessarily ad hoc, a heuristic device. Once 
it has provided an entry into the text, if it is no 
l on g er use f u l , i t i s s,si'.!!1 p l y d i s ca rd i b le • Th i s i s a 
natural consequence of metaphor being thought of as an 
interaction of ideas. No longer is it ~ relation 
between simply definable verbal entities, such that once 
the participating words have been defined, the relation-
ship can be easi Ly drawn, the "figure" traced. The meta-
phor Cor its significance> is to be located rather in 
the net-work of sense-relations the words with the aid 
of a sensitive reader develop. And as the stuff of these 
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net-works is gathered from contexts 6 which are imprecise 
and can certainly in no way be determined, the relation~ 
between the words can only be fluid; the categories used 
to pinpoint these relations necessarily an imperfect 
fH. 
Granted that the terms used to talk about metaphor 
are best considered arbitrary and useful, rather than 
necessary, it would seem that a strict definition of the 
'~ 
metaphoric/literal distinction is not possible. Black 
writes: "Metaphor is a loose word, at best, and we must 
beware of attributing to it stricter rules of usag~ than 
are usually found in practice" (1954, p. 276> - which is 
another way of saying that there are no general criteria 
for distinguishing metaphors. Alston says of the dis-
tinction that it is "not a black and white distinction 
of kinds, but a continuum of degrees" C1964, p. 101). 
Words enter a new ~;ontext and appear metaphoric; with 
continued use they are either absorbed into the literal 
~such as the Latinate abstractions>, or hover inbetween 
6 cf. Black (1954>, pp. 276-77. "Context" here, of 
course, refers to all its aspects - including cultural 
context, which seems close to what Black has called 
"systems of associated commonplaces", that is, if one 
allows for the fact that some of the "commonplaces" are 
likely to be quite esoteric. It is useful to mention 
here a point that Black has expressed well: ••• in a 
poem, or a piece of sustained prose, the writer can 
establish a novel pattern of tmplications for the 
literal uses of the key expressions, prior to using them 
as vehicles for his metaphors [my emphasis] •••• Meta-
phors can be supported by specially constructed systems 
of implications, as well as by accepted commonplaces; 
they can be made to measure and need not be reach-me-
downs", p. 290. 
26 
( such as " leg " i .n tab l e- leg) • . Sh i b le s ha s of f e red as a 
definition of metaphor: "To deny a commonplace is to l 
< 
create a metaphor" <1971, p. 152>; which seems to ) 
capture well (though I would prefer it expressed the 
other way round> two important aspects of the phenomenon. 
For what is commonplace to one, may not be to another. 
"Leg" in "table-leg" causes second thoughts to none but 
the proverbial Victorian prude. More seriously, much 
eighteenth century verse, as Professor Davie has shown 
<1952, ch. 3), relies for much of its effect on the 
reactivation of the metaphoric history (by the careful 
deployment of the controlling context> of words since 
become commonplace. Classification as literal or meta-
phoric depends bri~h upon context and the perceptions of 
the interpreter. And as, if the point is pushed far 
enough, every context is unique, so every word-use is 
"metaphoric" - which underlines the arbitrariness of the 
distinction. Ultimately, it is the l~hguage-user who 
decides (according to no fixed rules) what language is 
to be literal, what language is to provide a point of 
stability in the flux of experience <Cohen and Margalit 
<1972) are pertinent here, with their idea of the 
literal being atrophied metaphor). 
And, .in the last analysis, it matters little where 
a distinction is fixed - the process of understanding 
literal and metaphoric language is the same. In both 
cases, interpretation amounts to searching for the 






the expression makes sense. It is one of the virtues 
of Black's theory that it places an understanding of 
metaphor in this framework, seeing it in terms of a 
fusion of disparate contexts.· It is in this way that 
metaphor gains its cognitive value, for by it the sub-
ject under attention can gain new and fresh definition 7 
But it also has the virtue of being related to an imp-
ortant insight into language. 
As has been suggested, •etaphor is best understood 
as a transference of meaning effected by bringing a word 
or phrase with its attendant associations <derived from 
the contexts of past use) to a context in which its use 
/ 
\ 
is novel - or, in the case of conventional metaphors, < 
j 
once was novel. Moreover, it has been suggested that 
the only way to understand meaning-change in language is 
by acknowledging a perpetual and natural transference of 
meaning at work in a language - a perpetual and slow 
shifting of perspectives on the world. To this is opp-
osed a vj'.ew of language essentially static, in which 
7 Obviously not all ~etaphors are in this way 
valuable. The metaphors in Stanley's lines are subsid-
iary to {the foundation of) his ingenious turning on its 
head of a proverbial notion that a heart of stone descr-
ibes one who is unloving. There is analogy at work in 
these lines, and certainly not too much else. A Lit-
eralist account would not flounder - and it is reasonable 
to expect this, since there is no doubt that ~tanley and 
others of his time would be influenced by Classical 
thought on language and metaphor, and so create metaphor 
accordingly. The Interaction view is after all of 
Romantic birth (a plausible pedigree: Black - Richards -
Coleridge). 
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words are the labels of things, in which the literal 
and metaphoric are clearly distinct, and in which 
meaning-change can only be accounted for in terms of 
mistakes or misapplications. But, as Shibles, comment-
ing on Urban (1939), points out, 
••• words have no one fixed meaning but are and 
must be fluid and mobile enough to express a mean-
ing in many sentences and contexts. A word is a 
vague center of meaning and do~s not have a fixed, 
static meaning. 
(1971, pp. 76-77> 
And it is to this extent that dictionary definitions are 
abstractions in the final analysis not precisely regul-
able and hence controversial. 
Yet while metaphor is a form of transference of 
meaning, it would be futile to assert that all trans-
ference of meaning is metaphoric - in the sense that the 
language of poetry may be metaphoric. What distinguishes 
transference as it occurs in natural language is that it 
is spontaneous, or "unauthorized", whereas poetic meta-
phor ("poetic" in the broadest sense) is deliberate - to 
the extent that it is assumed that the writer chose the 
word, was satisfied with the choice. It is this q~~lity 
of being deliberate that allows metaphor to be used as a 
vehicle for insight. Moreover, because of the undefined 
quality of the metaphoric interaction, metaphor becomes 
the vehicle for an insight that is not "closed", that 
. allows, invites, continued exploration. 
These two aspects of metaphor have caught the 
attention of contemporary philosophers and critics, who 




writing. Metaphor has been found central to the 
intellectual activity of the natural sciences Csee, for 
example, Black C1962>, Hesse (1966), Harr~ (1970), and 
Ma c Co rm a c C 1 9 71 )) • I t w a s i n d i c a t e d ea r l i e r C p • g5 , f n. 6 
above) that metaphor does not rely solely on the assoc-
iations it brings to the context, but, to a greater or 
lesser extent, derives from the context in which it 
participates a selection of special associations. This, 
in a way, is what ttappens to words from ordinary 
language when drawn into the context of scientific 
discourse (for instance, the d•velopment of special 
associations of the word ·energy" that has taken place 
in contemporary physics>. But, more important, these 
terms, with the artificial set of associations and imp-
lications they have acquired via research and system-
atic theorizing in one branch of the sciences, may be 
transferred to another area of research, one whose 
character is still in need of ~apping. With them, of 
course, come the related terms and the precise descrip-
tion of the relations between them. The guess is (and 
initial, to some extent undirected, research provides 
hints) that this systematic body of te~ms and relations, 
when applied to the new area of research, will provide 
fruitful results. This, experiment either will or will 
not confirm. Should the guess have been insightful, the 
old terms are, with as much accuracy as is needed, 
mapped onto the new area. In this way, the new area is 








subject of a metaphor is "seen through" the "foreign" 
term applied to it. In physics, a simple and well-
known example of this sort of transference is to be 
found in the understanding of light in terms of waves. 
Roughly, this is what is meant by a "model" in science: 
wave-theory provides a model for the theory of light. 
But there is another way in which metaphor has 
been thought of as systematically guiding theoretical 
writing. Outside of the natural sciences, in other 
types of enquiry, the~e do exist, "submerged" in a 
writer's thought, basic metaphors of the type: "society 
is a field of forces·, "the mind is a mirror/lamp". 
And these metaphoric predications, when systematically 
de v e loped, have proved a use f u l · e l u c i d at i on of t he i r · 
principal subjects. In a seminal essay 8 "Models and 
Archetypes", BCack names such basic metaphors "arche-
types" <or "conceptual archetypes"), and writes of them 
that 
[they are J a systematic repertoire of ideas by 
means of which a given thinker describes, by 
analogical extension, some domain to which those 
ideas do not immediately and literally apply. 
(1962, p. 241) 
As Abrams points out, any area of experience needs, if 
it is to become the subject of investigation, a fairly 
8 "Seminal" in the sense that Black's systematic 
development of the topic appears to have been the most 
influential. His ideas are not however completely 
original. He acknowledges a debt to Stephen C. Pepper 
("root metaphors") and M. H. Abrams ("archetypal anal-
ogies") - whom Pepper seems to have influenced as well. 
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precise and co-ordinated terminology (1953, p. 31>, and 
the conquest of a new area will have to rely on the use 
of an "archetype". But archetypes apply not only to 
fields that a~e new; they are an important means to the 
provi~ion of a fresh perspective on subjects well 
studied. In this way, a new archetype may reveal 
aspects of a subject that usefully bear extended explor-
ation. I believe it is in this framework that the vit-
ality of Structuralism in both language and literature 
studies can be understood. 
But an important qualification needs to be made. 
Alston talks (as many do> of the necessary appropriate-
ness of (presumably successful) metaphor (1964, p. 
98-99). Without some prior (and ot>·vious?) similarity 
ex i st i n g between two th i n gs o r s i tu at i on s des i g n~·t e d by 
the terms used in the metaphor, it will not be meaning-
ful. Hesse makes a similar point, when she writes, "If 
I say <taking two words more or less at random from a 
dictionary page) 'A truck is a trumpet', it is unlikely 
that I shall communicate anything ••• " (1964, p. 164). 
But it takes only a slight exercise in ingenuity to 
construct a literary context in which some verbal form 
of this metaphor is, if not particularly memorable, at 
least meaningful. <The backwoodsman, say in Canada, on 
the run from Industrial society seen as an invading army 
with giant motor-vehicles in its vanguard, the roar of· 
their engines heralding their triumphant advance, etc •••• > 
At this point, a distinction must evidently be made 
: 
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between poetic metaphor, and the metaphors at work in 
scientific, or other forms of theoretical thought. As 
Hesse has pointed out, " ••• whatever may be the case for 
poetic use, the suggestion that~ scientific model can 
be imposed a priori on ~ explanandum and function· 
fruitfully in its explanation must be resisted" (1964, 
p. 161>. This is obviously the case. An· instance from 
the history of science of a model found to be inapprop-
riate is that ~f thinking of heat as a fluid. 
Though there is not the same control over confirm-
ation and disconfirmation of the appropriateness of 
basic meta~hors <models) outside the natural sciences, 
t h e q u e s t i on o f a pp r op r i a t en e s s , o f co u r s e , s t i l l .~ti s es 
for basic metaphors (archetypes) in other areas of 
thought. And rather than controlled experiment providing 
the environment in which judgements are made, it remains 
the task of critical reflection to pick over the feat-
ures of the "explanandum" that a cultural heritage 
provides, relating these to the "systematic repertoire 
of ideas" the archetype provides, and thus to decide 
wh~ther or not the perspective provided contradicts or 
ignores what may have been found valuable. Thus, aiming 
at a discussion of the merits of the Structuralist 
archetype for the study of literature, the following 
chapter isolates some of the most impot~ant associations 
of the ideas "sy~tem" and "structure"; it then traces 
their involvement in the thought of Chomsky Cwho 
appears, for ~easons I suggest later, to be the most 
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significant developer of Structuralist thought in 
language-study); and, finally, the archetype, by now I 
hope sufficiently illuminated, is traced in the study of 
lHerature. 
CHAPTER HJO 
SYSTEMS AND STRUCTURES 
Both words, "system" and "structure", have a long 
history, one which demonstrates the ease with which they 
have been widely applicable. They are more or less 
neutral in meaning - having a clear enough meaning out-
side of any partifular doctrine to which they may become 
affiliated 1 • "System", simply, characterizes a cluster 
of "things" - whether concepts, people, or planets, etc. -
which contains more order than is implied by aggregation. 
Thus there is little restriction on the contexts in 
which it may appear. The inner workings of a wristwatch, 
the physical universe, the economic life of a community, 
its principles of government are all, from one or other 
point of view, "systems". And, of course, similarly dis-
parate examples may be given of structures. 
An important exception to this freedom from id~o-
logical ass6ciation is connected with the role biology 
played in shaping much of nineteenth century thought. 
1 The 0. E. D. (1933) distinguishes nine different 
senses of the word "system", and seven of "structure·. 
The nine uses of "system" fall under two main heads: 
an organized or connected group of objects", and "a set 
of [correlated] principles, etc. : a scheme, a method". 
The seven senses of "structure" all relate more or less 
abstractly to the fundamental - "manner of building or 
construction". Of course, the words are related. While 
not every structure is evidence of a system, evet~ 
system may reveal its structure - the way in which the 
parts are interrelated. 
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The key notions of biology (including structure and 
system) were applied successfully in history, linguist-
ics, metaphysics and the study of social institutions. 
M. H. Abrams (1953, chs. 7 and 8, passim) has demon-
strated how organicist, evolutionary thought provided a 
new and valued way of looking at artistic creation. 
Questions of psyehological (and cultural) genesis aside 
(and these are an important aspect of organicist think-
ing>, the poem, in this view, is an object- analyzable by 
the critic in the way that a plant can be talked about 
by the biologist. Questions of value are not normally 
excluded however. A poem is valued as good if organic, 
possessing a unity indicated by the way its various parts 
(and kinds of parts) are interrelated. For, if the work 
is truly organic, all the parts are "assimilated" in the 
service of unity, to its essential part, all Cor a 
crucial number, at least) its details subsumed to a 
(few) structural principle<s>. It is this essence, this 
principle of organization that holds its parts together, 
that gives the poem its particular character and life -
in the way that the germinating principle held in the 
seed gives to the plant its particular character and the 
force that both causes its growth and holds its various 
2 parts together in mutual support 
2 Numerous passages in Coleridge's Biographia Lit-
eraria are of course relevant here; see also his Aids 
to Reflection, pp. 40, 266-68. 
36 
While "system." and "structure" are, no doubt, use-
ful words to employ in talking of the ii'i:t;errelation of 
parts organicist thinking focuses on, they are A6~ 
basic 3 ·Life", "growth", "process·, ·end", "form" -
such words gave biology its character in the nineteenth 
century, for it was predominantly metaphysical -
teleological and vitalist. (Mendel's work in genetics, 
though done in the nineteenth century was ignored until 
the beginning of the twentieth.) But Structuralism is, 
as has often been remarked, overtly ~pposed to an organ-
icist interest in origins, in process, and to its 
emphasis on formative forces. This can be seen, for 
example, in Saussure's revolutionary assertion of the 
primacy of the synchronic fact of language - for which 
the idea of language as system is the main support. In 
Saussure, the idea of language as system becomes the· 
foundation of a discipline. But not "system" in the 
sense of an organic system. With the decline of organ-
icist thinking in the twentieth century, and the ma,th-
ematization of biology, "system" tends rather to gat~er 
its associations, from various branches of mathematics. 
While this is apparent in the case of later 
Structuralists, it is not at all obviously the case with 
Saussure. Yet, though he seems to have been influenced ,; 
far more by the psychology and sociology of the time, 
3 And in Coleridge's thought, they often appear 
associated with the style of thought he is opposing; he 
talks, for example, of "mechanic system". 
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his conclusion that language is a formal system is rele-
vant (as is his related suggestion that language is a 
kind of algebra>. For it allowed a mathematical treat-
ment - either formal or informal - of language, and any 
other cultural phenomenon understood as analogous to 
language. The extent to which mathematics is looked to 
in linguistics is touched on in Chapter Three b'~'(Cow,. 
'• . '. .) 
Here it need only be pointed out that the idea of the 
formal system assumed central importance in the math-
ematics of the early nineteenth and late twentieth 
centuries, and, in the process, was the object of de-
tailed examination and refinement. Thus, even if Struc-
turalists do not make direct use of what mathematicians 
discovered, at least these discoveries may provide an 
insight into the implications of the use of the idea as 
an archetype. Hence it is w~th the associations and 
value that the idea of the formal system has gained in 
the context of mathematics that this chapter will be 
concerned. 
And as concern is with the use of this idea of 
system as an archetype, precise and specialist definition 
is not of particular importance. The archetype defines 
a perspective, a mental posture taken before the phen-
omenon which determines the sorts of features that will 
be discovered. What characterizes the attitude, what is 
formative, are the general features of the idea - the 
framework within which specialist distinctions are made, 
rather than the specialist distinctions themselves. 
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Niceties important within the discipline are not necess-
arily Cor usuall~·> of interest Cor possible) once ideas 
have been •plundered" for use elsewhere 4 And the ideas 
themselves may be fairly well disguised when they do 
appear in their new context. For example, when Barthes 
talks of reconstructing a literary work Cor experience) 
in terms of units whose content is not important, but 
whose mode of articulation is c•arthes, 1964c), the 
language is not obviously mathematical. Yet, submerged, 
"translated", is the idea of constructing a system of 
formal units and relations between them <necessarily 
"formal" as well) isomorphic with an area of reality, an 
idea whose genesis is to be traced in mathematics. Thus, 
the following account of the idea will not concern 
itself with "niceties", but will rather attempt to cap-
ture, informally, something of the "feel" of the idea -
both the context in which it can be understood, and its 
value within that context. "System" has a long history 
in mathematics, and it is via considerations of its 
development and changing value that the idea will be 
approached. 
At the beginning of its history, lies the Greek 
insistence on reasoned proof. Mathematics, as it is nj~ 
4 The exception is, of course, when an idea is used 
as a model rather than an archetype. It is, for example, 
Chomsky's claim that, in a way satisfying scientific 
conditions, the essence of language can be constructed 
as a formal system, that language is such a system 
precisely. This claim is discussed in Chapter Three 
Bte~t:aw:. 
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understood, began with the Greeks. Thales, living in 
the sixth century B. C., a figure standing at the origins 
of Greek philosophy and science, is traditionally 
credited with being the first to give mathematics its 
now distinctive character. There had, of course; exis-
ted prior forms of thought concerned with calculation 
and measurement. But the mathematics of pre-Hellenic 
times, of Babylon and Egypt, was only practical, was 
interested only in individual cases. There was general-
ization of a limited sort - sufficient for a mass of 
formulas and tables to be collected - but there was no 
search for general principles that might account for 
the observed regularities. There was thus no guarantee 
of certainty. It might be found, for instance, that on 
a number of occasions, the area of a four-sided piece of 
land might be calculated as the product of two adjoining 
sides. And there would be occasions on which this 
formula would be adequate. However there would be no 
way of accounting for an area bounded by a four-sided 
figure either non-recsangular or non-rhomboid. Each of 
these would have to be treated as a special case, unless 
by trial and error, by shrewd guesswork and continued 
checking against the facts, some formula might be found 
more or less acceptable. Moreover, there would be little 
understanding of .l:L!:!.l. these ought tp be treated as distinct 
cases; and, it is likely that, unless suspicions were 
aroused by discovered discrepancies, there would be 
little awareness of their distinctness. The Babylonian 
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and Egyptian achievement, which waa remarkable and 
influential, has certainly never been disparaged; 
nevertheless, while not primitive, pre-Hellenic math-
ematics possessed none of the intellectual brilliance of 
what was to follow. 
Pre-Hellenic mathematics may be termed inductive; 
that is, its generalizations - its formulas, its tables -
were obtained by reasoning from, and only from, a 
necessarily limited number of observed instances. Greek 
mathematics, on the other hand, developed as deductive. 
Associated with this development, and no doubt helping 
to foster it, was the birth and elaboration of the idea 
of logical discourse, an idea to prove the character-
istic guide in subsequent Western pursuits of knowledge. 
Simply, logical discourse may be understood as the type 
of discourse which comprises an ordered sequence of 
statements such that acceptance of the first statement 
of the sequence (or conjunction of statements> compels 
acceptance of alt through to the last. Attention is 
thus focused on the process of arriving at one state-
ment from another. Should the deduction be recognized 
as correct, ·reason" compels acceptance of the sequence 
Ca compulsion which, of course, may, with greater or 
less ease, be resisted>; should a flaw be detected in 
the chain, the discourse loses its logical value, and 
no reason exists to accept any statement not already 
self-evident. 
The most important feature of logical discourse is 
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that every assertion need not be self-evident. On the 
contrary, it may be, and very often is, the case that 
the conclusions reached, are the very opposite. It was 
this possibility of arriving legitimately at unexpected 
and perhaps disturbfng results that proved "reason" and 
"reasoned discourse" an effective tool for Greek phil-
osophy. Its value is clear when the central task of 
philosophical thought is conceived as the criticism of 
received knowledge and the search for truths contrary to 
mere myth and opinion. 
And it was the birth of the notion of logical dis-
course that helped elevate the study of mathematics, and 
provided it with an inspiring and guiding force. With 
its advent, mathematics was freed from endless pains-
taking empirical research guided solely by intuition. 
Insight, discovery could advance with the aid of reas-
oned reflection and an understanding of general princip-
les. But perhaps more important, mathematics was freed 
from the doubts contingent on the uncertain nature of 
claims inductively based. For it is a feature of logical 
discourse that any statement established in it is univ-
ersally true - within the limits of the discourse. (The 
qualification is important, since, in the terms of the 
above definition, if the initial statement is not 
accepted, there need be little impact in the subsequent 
argument.) An assertion in mathematics could now be 
proved (and, as has been pointed out, the Greeks insisted 
on proof); it could be shown to be true regardless of 
42 
time and place of application. The square on the 
hypotenuse in A!J.:t. right-angled triangle will always 
equal the sum of the squares on the other two sides. A 
case can no longer be conceived of which might contradict 
that assertion. There is thus no reason to doubt its 
truth. Unless, of course, one refuses to accept 
unconditionally the system of geometry the Greeks elab-
orated; and until as late as the nineteenth century, no 
good reason could be provided for doing so. But, before 
these events are touched on, it is necessary to enlarge 
on the idea of a system of geometry. As, for the Greeks, 
geometry proved the foundation of other mathematical 
thought, it was in the context of geometry that the idea 
of Msystem~ developed. 
The Greeks had introduced the notion of the 
abstractness of mathematical objects Ccf. The Republic, 
Bk. VII, sections 525, 527). The square was no longer 
merely a characterittic of a particular plot of land; it 
was an object in its own right, with its own distinctive 
properties. In a way that further assured the ideal 
nature of the mathematical entity, they insisted that 
the truth of an assertion be demonstrated deductively, 
rather than empirically Ccf. The Republic, Bk. VI, 
section 510>. It seems a natural development that there 
should follow the desire to see the relatedness of these 
abstract entities, and thus the logical unity of their 
subject. It seems obvious that the question of the 
relation between the various deductively, but separately, 
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proved theorems would in time arise, and that this 
would lead to questions about the relations between the 
relevant postulates. The attempt to place theorems Cin 
other words, mathematical propositions, or assertions) 
in order of logical priority, and to identify the 
necessary postulates is the attempt to systematize. 
Indispensable for the systematizing Ptocess, for 
the search for logical unity, is the search for concept-
ual coherence. Faced with a corpus of theorems, of 
proposed postulates, all would have to be sifted_through 
for the basic terms of the discourse to be discovered. 
Once this has been done, they would be used in the 
restatement of the proposed postulates, and, thus, via 
the deductive process, and the addition of an occasional 
further, yet appropriately stated, definition, in the 
simpler restatement of the whole body of geometry. For 
it is only once this reduction to a few basic terms has 
been achieved, that the limited number of logical 
~elations that comprise the machinery of logic, can 
operate. 
The value of the coherence implied by systematiz-
ation is obvious. First, it provides certainty. There 
would always have been, attached to an isolated theorem, 
a degree of uncertainty, and this its placing in a 
cohe,~)ent scheme would eliminate. For if each theorem 
can be shown to be related logically to each other, and 
each in turn d~rivable from self-evident postulates, 
there is no room for doubting its truth. Second, it 
44 
helps present the subject with an extreme clarity. For 
each of the theorems, even the most complex, is, in the 
final analysis, stated using the same few basic terms. 
Each part is absorbed into the whole, and the relation 
of part to part is exactly presented. 
But, perhaps more dmportant, is the recognition 
that the process of reduction involved in the provision 
of coherence merely continues a process that is the life-
blood of mathematics - deliberate, orderly abstraction. 
In its very roots, the mathematical sty le of th.o:ught 
approache~ experience in order to select from it a 
limited number of its properties, which it ~hen uses for 
the purposes of exact definition. And this abstraction 
.;.:, 
is "orderly" in that the properties selectea are drawn 
'j 
from a certain chosen type (as, for example, in Euclid-
ean geometry, it is properties of form, of shape, that 
are chosen). Kline (1954) has described well this 
aspect of mathematical thought (and, crucially, why it 
is of value), and is worth quoting at length. 
0 Out of the medley of experiences proffered by 
nature, mathematics isolates and concentrates on 
particular aspects. This is abstraction in the 
sense of delimiting the phenomenon under invest-
igation. For example, the mathematical straight 
line has only a few properties compared to thoseijo'f 
the straight lines made by the edge of a table or 
drawn with pencil. The few properties the mathemat-
ical line possesses are stated in the axioms; for · 
example, it is determined by two points. The 
physical lines, in addition to this property, have 
color and even depth; moreover they are built up 
of molecules •••• Part of the secret of mathemat-
ical power lies in the use of this type of 
abstraction. By this means, we free our minds 
from burdensome and irrelevant detail, and are 
thereby able to accomplish more than if we had to 
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keep the whole physical picture before us. 
(pp. 464-465) 
Together with the drive towards the discovery of 
an internal coherence in its subject, systematization 
implies as well (and necessarily) a complementary drive 
towards comprehensiveness. As many objects as possible 
that can be considered within the range of the subject 
are to be brought into the system. And, importantly, it 
is by being placed within the system that their essence 
is revealed. For each object is defined by the system's 
basic terms (and the exactly stated relations between 
them>. And these basic terms, as has been pointed out, 
are chosen to name properties which, after sufficient 
abstraction0, are seen to be common to all the objects 
encompassed by the system. 
This, very simply, is the nature of a system of 
geometry. And as a very rough outline would hold good 
of mathematical systems to this day. But there are some 
features of contemporary systems that are not brought to 
light in this account. To elucidate these, further 
particularizing and the tracing of historiial develop-
ment is necessary. 
The greatest Greek work of systematic geometry is, 
of course, that by Euclid. Very little of the content 
o f h i s m a j o r w o r k , t h e E l e m e n t s , i s c o n §)ii c:t~, r e d o r i g i n a l 
(cf. Kline C1972), "Euclid's work is actually an organ-
ization of the separate discoveries of the classical 
Greeks·, p. 56>; but what made it so· impressive to his 
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contemporaries was his arrangement, his systematic 
processing of his subject. I will not describe the 
work (which is in thirteen books, and deals with far 
more than just plane geometry), but will outline his 
strategy. An indication is provided by the title. 
Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, says of "elements": 
"Among geometrical propositions we tall those 'elements' 
the proofs of which are contained in the proofs of all 
or most such propositions· (quoted in Eves and Newsom 
<1965>, p. 32>. That is, the first principles and rules 
of deduction involved in the proof of the elements 
provide the necessary tools for the derivation of all 
<or mQst) theorems. These elements do not offer them-
selves immediately to the intellect; their discovery 
has to be earned by a careful sifting through the corpus. 
It is a measure of Euclid's success that his work was 
immediately considered definitive, superseding ~thers on 
lr 
the subject. 
Proclus (A.O. 410-485), an early commentator on 
Euclid, ·provides a way of understanding the product of 
such a strategy: 
The compiler of elements in geometry must give 
separately the principles of the science, and, 
after that, the conclusions from those principles, 
not giving any account of the principles, but only 
their consequences. No science proves its own 
principles, or even discourses about them; they 
are treated as self-evident. 
(quoted in Eves and Newsom (1965), p. 36) 
The notion of discovering and "separating out" the first 
principles, and then deducing the theorems as consequences 
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of those principles, has already been described. What 
is important about this passage is that it alludes to 
the self-evidence of those principles. For it is on 
this notion that the his~orical change in ·system"'s 
value and character hinges. But before drawing out the 
implications of such a belief, a distinction tradition-
ally drawn among the principles themselves m~st be 
mentioned. 
First principles were considered to be of two 
types - postulates and ~xioms Cor common notions>. The 
latter were Cas the alternative name indicates) propos-
itions immediately, or intuitively, acceptable, and of 
such a kind as to belong to no particular science, but 
rather to a common fund of knowledge from which all 
sciences could draw. An example Cone used by Euclid) is, 
"The whole is greater than the part". The postulates, 
on the other hand, are directly related to the science 
concerned, as an example from Euclid shows, "A straight 
line can be drawn from any point to any point". There 
has been some dispute over whether the mathematicians of 
t h e H e l l e rli s t i c p e r i gld ( p 0 s t - 3 0 0 B • c • ) I E u c l i d i n c l u d e d , 
treated the postulates as they understood the axioms to 
be - self-evident. Certainly Aristotle, and perhaps 
others <including Proclus in the above passage), can be 
interpreted as believing they should not. However, the 
belief, if held, does not appear to have been explicitly 
acknowledged, and certainly does not seem to have been 
carefully thought out Ccf. Kline C1972), pp. 52, 59). 
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Perhaps the most reasonable response to the problem can 
be found in Langer <1937). She writes: 
Euclid himself does not draw the distinction 
between axioms and postulates very sharply; ••• 
[he] applied the standard of self-evidence to 
postulates too, though perhaps within the vague 
and wide boundaries of a "safe" assumption rather 
than the strict limits of immediate truth. 
Cp. 185) 
And as ejperience appeared continually to confirm the 
theorems, there seemed little reason to doubt that the 
' 1,.1., • "assumptions" from which they were drawn would r~m~~~ 
"safe". Aristotle may have adopted a contrary view; yet 
till the nineteenth century, the self-evidence of the 
postulates was unanimously believed 5 
In fact, geometry came to be regarded as the para-
digm of natural sciences, capturing the essence of 
physical space <which was conceived of as something a 
single geometry could be true of). It was founded ~n a 
very small number Cin Euclid's case, ten) of principles, 
apparently self-evident, their truth guaranteed by 
intuition. On this foundation was erected, following 
principles (again apparently> strictly logical, a vast 
number of propositions Cin Euclid's case, 4'6~·~(;>. While 
some were of a high order of complexity, it appeared 
that the truth of all was confirmed by experience. 
Geometry thus seemed to provide certain truth about the 
5 The "parallel postulate" provides the exception. 
But even so, dissatisfaction was with its postulate 
status and was ,expressed in attempts to either restate it 
so it W-Ould appear acceptable, or demonstrate its deriv-
abi lity. 
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world of physical reality. So it was to geometry 
<remembering that geometry was thought of as providing 
a base for number theory) that the Alexandrian and 
Renaissance scientists turned to revive the experimental 
sciences. And, as late as the eighteenth century, Kant 
could argue that the mind was especially fitted to 
perceiving physical space as Euclidean. 
But, as I have intimated, the nineteenth century 
saw radical changes in thinking about geometry. The 
"parallel postulate" had from the start worried geo-
meters. During the long period when first principles 
were required to be self-evident, there had always 
seemed somethirg unsound about the assertion, "That if 
a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the 
interior angles on the same side less than two right 
angles, the two st~aight lines, if produced indefinitely, 
meet on that side on which the angles are less than two 
right angles". First, the complexity alone is enough to 
raise suspicions; compare the neatness of the postulate 
quoted above Cp. 47>. Second, as Proclus pointed out 
Csee Kline (1972>, p. 864), there is no reason to belil~e 
that th• lines will not be asymptotic; that is, while 
tending towards each other, they may never actually 
intersect. Third, the postulate does imply the possibi l-
ity of knowledge about the behaviou6 of lines which are 
produced indefinitely; and knowledge of the infinite 
(for this is what it amounts to) is far from self-
evident. These are some of the objections that can be, 
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and have been, brought against the statement as 
6 postulate • 
It was in the nineteenth century that the possib-
i lity of a consistent geometry without Euclid's post-
ulate occurred to a number of mathematicians; that is, 
they discovered that the parallel postulate was indep-
endent of his other nine axioms. This meant that a 
system of geometry could be created that denied Euclid's 
postulate. To illustrate the possibility, consider the 
geometry of a sphere; then using the language of geo-
desics, consider two longitudinal great circles. These 
lines are cut by the equator, and, at each point of 
intersection, a right angle is formed. Yet these two 
lines extend to meet at the poles. The triangles thus 
formed contain angles of sum greater than 180 degrees. 
This contradicts a theorem within Euclid's system, that 
the sum of the angles in a triangle will equal 180 
degrees. The source of the inconsistency is simply 
pointed to. For the longitudinal lines that me~t at a 
finite point Cone of the poles) form, when cut by the 
equator, two interion angles that are right angles and 
not angles each less than one right angle. This dis-
covery that logically consistent geometries could exist 
with their own distinctive theorems {and each 
6 
For a detailed account of work on the parallel 
postulate prior to the nineteenth century, and the 
creation in that century of non-Euclidean geometries, 
see Kline (1972), pp. 863-874. 
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characterizing and clarifying different conceptions of 
space), had important implications within mathematics 
and neighbouring disciplines 7 , and provided the notion 
of "system" with new value. 
The change in importance the notion of "system" had 
in mathematics may be suggested by drawing out the 
metaphysical assumptions of pre-nineteenth century 
geometry and those of the nineteenth century and after-
wards. In pre-nineteenth century geometry, the theor-
ems were true of an accessible material reality. More-
over, this reality was rational, existing in such a way 
as to be clearly apprehended by reasoned thought. To 
systematize a body of theorems (each of which being on 
its own true of a portion of that reality) was thus to 
lay bare reality's rational structure. However, with 
most of the theorems confirmed individually by exper-
ience of physical reality, systematizing tended to play 
a secondary role - usually that of being merely an aid 
to easy comprehension. And it was possible in the 
eighteenth century to create mathematics with little 
regard and even scorn for the .systematizing activity 
(see Kline (1972>, pp. 617-621). 
With the nineteenth century, these assumptions 
were discarded. Questions understandably arose as to 
which of the geometries was the true one. There were 
7 
For a fuller account than can be given here, see 
Kline (1954), chs. 25, 26. 
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attempts to test each of the systems in experiment, but 
no conclusive evidence could be arrived at <see Kline 
(1954>, p. 418, and Eves and Newsom C1965>, p. 77>. 
Questions of the "truth" of any one or other system 
began to appear idte. There was no one geometry true 
of a monolithic material reality. Nevertheless, 
geometry, in some way, still seemed to "fit" aspects ot 
the external world. And not only Euclidean geometry, 
which was still the "best" geometry for everyday 
purposes, for it was not long before a use was found 
for a non-Eu~lidean geometry in astronomy and Einstein's 
theory of relativity. The word "use" is indicative: 
geometrical systems were no longer considered as being 
either true or not, but rather as possessing potential 
pragmatic value. This, of course, shattered the belief 
that an assumption could be justified by empirical 
experience of the "correctness· of a theorem. Contra-
dictory theorems could prove equally applicable, though 
in different areas of experience. Thus the need for 
the self-evidence of the basic assumptions of the 
system was abandoned. Axioms could be counter-intuitive, 
and yet prove, via the derived theorems, profitable. As 
Boyer <1968) remarks, "one of the definitive contrib-
utions of the nineteenth century was the recognition 
that mathematicst~and this included geometry] was not a 
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natural science" Cp. 649) 8 • Mathematics thus became 
even more abstract. To an even greater extent, 
attention was now focused on the logical workings of 
the system; and the possible "truth" of the theorems 
they contained was, to the "pure mathematician", 
secondary, if not irrelevant. As a theorem could only 
be "true" within a system, and systems were of pr~§matic 
value only, systematization became of prime importance; 
for it was only a flawless system 9 that could guarantee 
the truth of a theorem. 
There was a similar development, in the same 
century, in the field of algebra. Until the 1800's, 
algebra had, in Europe <the Greeks had not developed an 
algebra, which came to Europe from India and Arabia), 
been considered as merely generalized arithmetic, a 
.useful tool with which to calculate and solve problems. 
8 A qualification needs to be made at this point. 
There is no contradiction in denying that mathematics is 
a "natural science", and asserting its "hypothetico-
deductiv~ nature, as, for example, Eves and Newsom do 
<1965, p. 93, passim). The former implies that the 
mathematician need feel no allegiance to material real-
ity; the latter allows that "hypotheses" are of interest 
only if some successful application is found for some 
part of the derived system. 
9 
An indication of how recognition of this need 
provided a stimulus to acquiring a more sophisticated 
understanding of logic, can be suggested by quoting a 
not unjustified (.)k~~9r(oclastic passage from Bertrand 
Russell: " [Euclid's] definitions do not always define, 
his axioms are not always indemonstrable, his demonstrat-
i on s r e q u i re ma n y a x i oms of w h i c h h e i s q u i t e \\(r;l;c on s c -
ious. A valid proof retains its demonstrative force 
when no figure is drawn, but very many of Euclid's 
proofs fail before this test •••• The value of his 
work as a masterpiece of logic has been very grossly 
exaggerated". Quoted in Kline <1972), p. 1005. 
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Moreover, numbers were understood only intuitively; 
there had been little attempt to systematize as there 
had been in geometry. The first important developments 
occurred in the work of the English mathematicians, 
Peacock and de Morgan, with their discovery of 
structural properties in the algebra of real numbers 10 
These properties they stated as axioms, and claimed that 
the remaining laws of algebra could be derived deduct-
ively as in geometry. Yet though this perception of 
structure was an important step, the ties of algebra 
with ("natural") arithmetic remained firm in the way 
that geometry had been inseparable from description of 
a single "natural" physical space. 
But in 1843, an Irish mathematician and physicist, 
William Hamilton, as a result of years of pondering on 
problems in physics, invented a type of number he called 
a quaternion, and later developed an appropriate algebra. 
Without going into any detail about the nature of these 
numbers, it is sufficient to say that in the resultant 
algebra, the commutative law for multiplication does not 
hold. As this algebra proved comprehensible and useful, 
the idea was sown that many further types of algebraic 
structure were waiting to be created and explored. The 
1 0 
For example, the commutative law (for addition, 
a + b = b + a ; and for multiplication, a • b = b • a ) 
and the distributive law ( a(b + c) =a • b +a • c ). 
Kline <1972) lists the eight then generally accepted 
axioms on p. 775. 
55 
development of Galois's ideas on the "group" (see Eves 
and Newsom (1965), p. 140 ff., and Barbut (1970) for 
Lucid explanation of this concept) proved of central 
importance as a unifying concept in geometry, and added 
impetus to this interest. 
In this shift from the algebra of real numbers to 
the study of general algebraic structures, there was, 
as in the parallel development in geometry, a tendency 
away from the intuitively clear, from foundations in 
common-sense or tradition. (This, of course, raised 
the question that if common-sense did not supply the 
foundations, what did? Attempts to provide an answer 
occupied much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.) It meant that mathematicians were free to 
create systems, not only discover systems among existing 
material 11 The only constrain~~ upon the creator was 
that his system be consistent; that is, that his set of 
axioms do not result in a contradiction within the 
system. Of course, a s~stem is required to be "inte~est-
ing"; that is, that it should produce non-trivial results, 
11 To provide an,;t:awareness of the sort of activity 
that can be involved in this sort of creation, I quote 
from Eves and Newsom <1965): "By developing algebras 
satisfying Laws different from those obeyed by ,common 
algebra •••• by weakening or deleting various postulates 
••• or by replacing one or more of the postulates by 
others, which are consistent with the remaining post-
ulates, an enormous variety of systems can be studied" 
(p. 137). They continue by Listing some of the most 
important structures created in this way, and conclude 
by remarking that "it is probably correct to say that 
mathematicians have studied well over 200 such structuresG. 
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results not immediately obvious from the axioms. But 
this is not a formal constraint, and involves a number 
of uncontrollable, though important, factors, such as 
the level of experience of the mathematician, his 
ability to perceive relations with other areas in math-
ematics, his ability to perceive possible applications 
12 outside mathematics, etc. • 
Thus with the transition in thinking marked by the 
acceptance of non-Euclidean and non-arithmetical algebras, 
it came to be realized not only that systematization was 
of cruci~l importance, but also that the first principles 
of a mathematical system need not be self-evident. A 
result of this latter realization was that the old 
distinction between axioms and postulates was discarded 
as irrelevant:. all initial assertions are equally . 
"arbitrary" and to be called axioms. And as a further 
consequence, there occurred the idea that not only need 
the axioms not be self-evident, they need not have mean-
ing at all. What matters solely is their logical form. 
For if what is important is the logical correctness of 
the system, the correct relation of theorem and theorem 
to axiom, then all that is of concern regarding the 
12 
Cf. Gandy C1972), p. 144, who provides an 
~xample of what is meant. 
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13 axioms is their logical form, their logical syntax 
It is at this point that the specifically modern 
idea of the formal system makes its appearance. Funda-
mentally, little is changed of the idea of system as 
developed by the Greeks and discussed above. Yet it 
did, in the transition of thought just detailed, undergo 
subtle but extensive modification. In attempting to 
suggest something of the character of the result, I will, 
for convenience, quote a passage from Bourbaki C1948), 
and then expand on it in the form of a commentary. 
"He" 14 writes of the "axiomatic method" Cthe modern 
systematizing process> that, 
it will try, in the demonstrations of a theory, to 
separate out the principle mainsprings of its 
arguments; then, taking each of these separately 
and formulating it in abstract from, it will 
13 To illustrate the extent to which this formalism 
~was carried, the example of Peano's revision (following 
Pasch) of Euclid's geometry may be cited. For it was 
constructed simply as a calculus of relations (whose 
names were unimportant) holding between variables. On 
this venture, Eves and Newsom comment: "Here we have 
the mathematician's ultimate cloak of protection ••• 
[against] overfamiliarity with his subject matter. We 
have seen that Euclid, working with visual diagrams in 
a field of study with which he was very familiar, 
unconsciously made numerous hidden assumptions which 
were not guaranteed to him by his axioms and postulates 
The derivation of theorems becomes an algebraic 
process in which only symbols and formulas are employed, 
and geometry is reduced to a strictly formal process 
which is entirely independent of any interpretation of 
the symbols involved" (1965, p. 92). Russell's remarks 
quoted above Cp. 53 ) are,of course, relevant. 
14 Bourbaki is a "polycephalic" mathematician. 
Fang (1970), among others, provides biographical detail. 
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develop the consequences that follow from it alone. 
Returning after that to the theory under consider-
ation, it will recombine the component elements, 
which had previously been separated out, and it will 
inquire how these different components influence 
one another. 
(pp. 223-224) 
The first point needs no discussion: it describ~s 
what any systematizer since the Greeks would have to do. 
It is the second part of the procedure that is distinct-
ively modern, and which will need elucidation. Obviously 
these "mainsprings" will contain a number of different 
terms. And it is the mark of modern mathematics that 
these terms are treated as primitive terms; that is, 
terms not explicitly defined in the discourse. (This 
must, for logical reasons, necessari Ly be so for any 
rigorous system - or circularity will result.) They may 
be talked about in_ an informal way so as to provide them 
with intuitive content; yet this content will play no 
part in the logic, the systematic nature, of the theory. 
The informal explanation serves merely as a stepping-
stone to the implicit definition that is given the terms 
by the way they are used within the system, and, initially, 
within the axioms. It is their use within the larger 
mathematical context that provides them with the means 
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15 to be understood, with the relevant meaning 
But though a term's meaning is only implicitly 
defined, it is not for that indeterminate - in the way 
that meaning in language to a large extent is. For the 
formal system provides a carefully controlled context 
for the term. In any non-technical use of language, 
words bring associations derived from contexts of past 
r 
use w h i ch prov i de a core of mean i n g the 1 mm e d j;~·t e 
context to a greater or lesser extent modifies. And 
there is no strict definition to such contexts, either 
past or immediate, no saying exactly how much of each is 
relevant. This is not the case in any formalized branch 
of mathematics, where the required intelligibility of a 
15 For example, in Peano's axiomatization of the 
real number system, three of his undefined terms are 
"number", "zero", and "successor of". They appear in two 
of his five axioms as follows: 
1> Zero is a number 
2) If a is a number, the successor of a is a 
number. 
These three terms would, of course, need no informal 
introduction - their intuitive content is common property. 
But the meaning they gain - all and only what can be 
precisely asserted of them - the developed system 
provides. Of this system, it is perhaps useful to stress 
here that, in the last analysis, no terms other than the 
undefined terms in the axioms are used in its develop-
ment. And of the axioms, as can be readily seen, that 
they wear, as it were, their logical form on their 
sleeve. In this form, they are ready to be manipulated, 
in the generation of the system, according to the rules 
of a logical calculus. <Mathematical ~ or symbolic or 
formal - logic was developed in the nineteenth century 
partly to satisfy the need for a logic to cope with the 
stresses within mathematics itself. The resulting 
calculi have proved a more powerful tool than the 
previous Aristotelian logic. Kline (1972, pp. 1187-92) 
provides a succint account of its history.) 
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term is solely a function of its immediate context of 
use. As this applies to every term in a system, and as 
the rules that combine them are the basic rules of an 
exact formal logic, such a context is necessari Ly 
explicit. And, like its context, the term's meaning is 
thus ·public and fixed" (Langer, 1937, p. 79>: 
With this accent on the undefinability of primitive 
terms, and on their characterization solely in terms of 
the i r be ha v i o u r i n th 'e i r i mm e d i at e context , i t seems 
obvious that the next stage should be the realization 
that the primitive terms could be replaced, without loss, 
by variables ("x", "y", etc.). For the rules that 
govern the terms' behaviour within the context that 
gives them intelligibility are rules (of formal logic) 
which disregard meanings, and operate solely upon logical 
form. Having thus substituted the primitive terms for 
variables <what Bourbaki in the passage above calls 
"formulating in abstract form") the axioms are now 
ready to play their role in the reconstruction (the 
"recombination") of the theory; the variables are ready 
to be manipulated in a quasi-mechanical, accurate way 
in generating the system, and thus revealing its logical 
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kernel, its structure 16 • 
In the final analysis, it is possible (though not 
probable) to create interesting mathematical structures 
with nothing but a set of variables and a formal logic 
in mind. It is this high degree of ab~tractness 
allowed, or rather encouraged, by the (formal) axio-
matic method, that allows Gandy C1972) to remark apropos 
mathematical structures, 
[that] firstly, the nature of the objects [their 
terms might refer to] is of no importance; the 
objects are simply what the relations are between 
••• [and] ••• secondly, the nature of the relations 
is also irrelevant; they are to be considered as 
given in extension [that is, the permissible 
16 
By way of brief (and simplified) illustration, 
the axioms from Peano's system (quoted above, p. 59 , 
fn. 15) may be looked at. The primitive terms "number" 
and "zero· represent elements of the structure, while 
"successor';'of" represents a relation that may hold 
between them. For both elements and relations, algeb-
raic symbols may be substituted. CSo that the elements 
and relations are kept distinct in the formalizirig 
process, different types of symbols are used: for 
example~ in this instance, "a", "b" can be used as 
symbols for the elements, and "R" or ·s· for the 
relation.) As is obvious, the axioms determine how the 
elements "number", "zero" may or may not combine with 
respect to this relation. One theorem derivable from 
the set of five axioms Cand its converse is not) is 
that "If a is a successor of b , then b is not a 
successor of a This is obviously the case. But 
what is important is that, when translated into a state-
ment containing only symbols and logic~l connectives -
"If aSb , then not bSa • it is derivable strictly 
from the axioms when they too are expressed in the same 
way. The logical form of the axioms and the explicitly-
stated rules of the logical calculus guarantee this. 
Ideally, all theorems can be generated in this way. And, 
of course, should there be an alteration in the logical 
form of any one of the axioms, the result would be a 
change in the theorems generated - a system with a 
different structure. 
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concatenation of elements and relations are to be 
listed, or defined such that it is possible in 
theory for such a list to be drawn~. 
(p. 142) 
But it may be asked of the axiomatization of 
existing branches of mathematics whether it is creative 
in any way other than providing an explicit demonstrat-
ion of the implicit logic of these branches. Is it thus 
little more than a form of elegant pedantry? Kline 
(1972) raises this question himself, and answers: 
The rigorization of mathematics may have filled a 
nineteenth century need, but it also teaches us 
something about the development of the subject. 
The newly founded logical structure presumably 
guaranteed the soundness of mathematics; but the 
guarantee was somewhat of a sham. Not a theorem 
of arithmetic, algebra or Euclidean geometry was 
changed as a consequence •••• In fact, all that 
the new axiomatic structures and rigor did was 
substantiate what mathematicians knew had to be 
the case •••• All of which means that mathematics 
rests not on logic but sound intuitions. Rigor, 
as Jacques Hadamard pointed out, merely sanctions 
the conquests of intuition. 
Cp. 1026; cf. Fang <1970> for a more 
vitriolic polemic against "rigorization"> 
But explicitness, as Kline C1972> elsewhere recognizes, 
did, and still does, have its value, being in a number of 
respects conducive to mathematical creation. 
I have already indicated Cp. 51 ff.) that the 
clarification of axiomatic notions provided an intellect-
ual environment in which the creation of diverse new 
abstract structures was stimulated. Moreover it played 
another important role in the late nineteenth century in 
leading researchers into mathematics' foundations. It 
hasalready been pointed out that once axioms need no 
longer be self-evident, intuitive acceptance of a 
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particular branch's axioms could no longer provide a 
foundation for that branch. The search was thus for 
unity (and certainty) by way of generality; for a set 
of axioms from which all Cor most) of mathematics could 
be derived. These would not need to be self-evident, 
only informally comprehensible. For some time the 
search, which occupied many of the greatest ma'thematical 
minds of the time, looked as though it would be success-
ful. Geometry was discovered to rest on t~e axi-0ms of 
the real number system; the latter was found to rest on 
the system of integers. This in turn could be reduced 
to the natural number system, the system of simple arith-
metic. Further attempts, such as that to rest mathemat-
ics on set theory proved less satisfactory Cset theory 
was found to gen e rat e a numb e r of unwanted <~,g1ti)t rad i c ".f;,> 
i~f b}cys - s e e K l i n e C 1 9 7 2 ) , p p • 11 8 3 - 8 5 ) • R u s s e l l a n d 
Whitehead's attempt to reduce all of mathematics to the 
concepts and laws of logic found even less acceptance. 
Hope seemed to remain though for the natural number 
system. All that was needed was a proof derived within 
the system that the system was consistent and complete. 
But in 1931 Kurt Godel published his monograph demon~'_:,-) 
Sl~)Jing that this was impossible. Not only could 
consistency not be formally proved in the above manner, 
but also, if a set of axioms .!'.:!..2..§. to be considered 
consistent, it would necessari Ly be incomplete; that is, 
it would be incapable of generating at least one accept-
. '· 
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bl . . h.. h 17 a e assert1on w1t 1n t e system • 
The hope of encompassing mathematics and even one 
br~nch of it seemed dashed. Mathematics did not, of 
course, at that point cease. Yet, while flourishing as 
perhaps never before, that branch of it that dealt with 
foundations ass~med less importance. Still the axiomatic 
method was not t~r,nished by that larger failure, as is 
evidenced by the work of the "structuralist" mathematic-
ian Bourbaki. Again axiomatization is not treated as an 
end in itself; nor does it serve merely to "rigorize". 
It must be stressed that again it serves as a means to 
further mathematical creation. For it is harnassed to 
provide perceptions of unity - perceptions, at a high 
level of generality, of the relation between structures 
of well-explored branches and those lesser known, .2.Q. 
that these in turn may serve as an aid to further 
d
. 18 1scovery • Mathematics, in its privileged position 
of not being entirely "earth-bound", thrives on the 
extreme abstraction the formal system exemplifies. 
In conclusion, I provide a few brief, general 
remarks on the modern conception of ·system" in math-
17 I refer the reader to the excellent explanation 
for the non-mathematician of Godel's work, and the back-
ground that made it significant, provided by Nagel and 
Newman (1959). 
18 For a fuller (and technical) account of how this 
perception of unity is achieved, see Bourbaki (1948). 
In this article reference is made to the "mother-
structures" and "multiple-structures· for which Bourbaki 
has become well-known. 
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ematics. Some of what has preceded will be repeated, 
but all, I hope, of this brief summary account will. gain 
significance by being seen against the background of 
that historically organized delineation. What follows 
does not, of course, aim at completeness; only detail 
believed significant for the characterization of the 
archetype has been chosen. 
1. Mathematical systems are ·forms of extended 
logical discourse, the rules of the logic used being 
precisely determined. Any mathematical statement is 
"true" (valid would be more correct> only within a 
system. It is the system's consistency that guarantees 
truth, not correspondence with an external reality. A 
system may be applicable, but not absolutely true of a 
reality that allows of on~y one true representation. 
2. "System" can <loosely) be identified with 
either the initial or end state of the systematizing 
process; that is, either with the initial body of axioms 
and generating logic Cor set of elements and operations> 
or with the final set of derived propositions. "Struc-
ture" can be applied in a similarly loose way on the 
analogy that every system has a structure. More pre-
cisely, however, system often implies process - for 
example, derivation, addition, etc. - where structure 
implies simply the static quality of being constructed 
out of relations. Systems can, of course, in this sense, 
be converted to structures {their structures can be 
explicitly revealed>; for the derivation of one state-
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ment from another, for example, can be reduced to the 
relation "derived from" holding between them. Likewise, 
the addition of two numbers can be reduced to the 
relation "sum of·. 
3. The terms of a system need have no meaning, and 
ought, for accuracy, to be treated as variables. What 
counts is the logical form of the axioms, and the 
distinctive structure of the assertions derived from 
them. Terms, as variables, may be assigned meaning. 
This process is known as providing an interpretation of 
the structure. The same structure may have a number of 
different interpretations (cf. Gandy C1972), p. 144; 
Barbut (1970), p. 375, talks of "representations", by 
which he intends the s•me thing). Alternatively, this 
point may be understood from the opposite perspective by 
saying that different sets of "objects" (not necessarily 
physical objects in the sense of "tables") may display 
the same structure in their relations to one another • 
. 4. When meaning-content is assigned to a variable 
(and' it is important to note that this meaning is 
unitary), it loses all traces of meaning that are not in 
-
accord with what is assigned in the process of implicit 
definition. Thus in an illustration from Peano's axio-
matization of the number system, "zero" means, basically, 
nothing other than (informally), "the number which, while 
possessing a successor, is not itself the successor of any 
number". (Of course, something similar occurs to words in 
the physical sciences. The word "energy" may usually 
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carry with it a number of disparate associations, but, 
in Einsteinian physics, its meaning is completely 
restricted by its immediate context.) Moreover, when 
terms are introduced into the discourse by explicit 
definition, their definition is merely a string of terms 
already existing in the discourse; the new term being 
thus a kind of "shorthand" for the collection of terms 
it "replaces" Ccf. Nidditch (1960), pp. 290-291>. In 
this way there exists no semantic ambiguity within the 
19 system Similarly, because the statements within the 
system are expressedGin such a way that their logical 
form is apparent, there is no possibility of syntactic 
ambiguity. Precision is further acquired by having the 
laws of derivation explicitly stated in such a way that 
derivation becomes quasi-mechanical. 
5. There remains the final point of the value of 
such systems.· First, there is what might be called 
their "intrinsic" value. The system has to be consi.st,en.£~ 
that is, derivation from its axioms must not lead to a 
contradiction in the development of the system. And it 
ought to be complete; that is, all possible propositions 
ought to have been derived from the axioms, and the 
system ought to be such that the addition of one more 
19 This, of course, applies to words appearing within 
a patticular system. The same word may have different 
meaningsin different systematizations of the same branch 
of mathematics, and in different branches. 
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axiom would result automatically in contradiction 
within the system. With these values, consistency and 
completeness, satisfied, the particular system achieves 
definition, and its propositions gain value accordingly. 
Apart from the shee~ clarity earned, the refining of a 
branch of mathematics to fit the mould of a formal 
system has acted, and continues to act, as an aid to 
inspiration in the creation of new mathematics. 
This, then, is an indication of the reservoire of 
ideas from which a Structuralist might draw in his 
perception of a phenomenon. No other developed idea of 
·system" (and "structure") seems in the twentieth 
century to have the same power Cor sense of appropriate-
ness - mathematics in this century more than any other 
being the ubiquitous servant guiding the exact sciences 
and the technology they give rise to). And even if a 
Structuralist were to ignore the mathematician's refine-
ment of the id~a, and develop his own model, it is hard 
to believe that the development would not run parallel, 
that, in broad outlines at least, their ideas would not 
be translatable. 
It was pointed out at the start of this essay that 
the literary Structuralists turn to linguistic~ for 
their archetype, and that, in turn, structural linguis-
tics founds itself on the idea of language being a 
system. Obviously, if language can be successfully and 
satisfyingly thought of as being a system, the use of 
the archetype in literary studies. is virtually justified. 
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All that would then be necessary would be the clarifi-
cation of the relation between language and literature -
which, the medium of literature being language, should 
not be too difficult - and the archetype would be 
plausible. The point is crucial, and examination of an 
attempt to see language as a system, illuminating. Thus 
the next chapter will devo~e itself to an examination of 
the adequacy of the archetype in language-study. 
CHAPTER THREE 
SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE 
As I mentioned earlier Cp. ~>, it was Saussure's 
thought at the beginning of the twentieth century that 
proved the ground for the subsequent revolution in 
linguistics. From studying the change, over a long 
period of time, in a few isolated features of a language, 
he insisted that linguistics regard the state of a 
language at one moment as the prior object of study; 
further, that this 'state itself be regarded as a system 
of interdependent elements. Of course, this demand for 
a change in orientation need not have produced signifi-
c a n t r es u l t s C" s y s t em " w a s not a w o rd new t o 'lafi;g u a g e -
study - cf. Lepschy (1970), p. 34, and Robins C1967>, 
ch. 7 - having been important in organicist thought), if 
he had not introduced a number of distinctions that 
clarified his vision and provided useful analytical 
tools for further research. I will discuss three of 
these briefly, three that may be considered central 
both to his own thought and to the thought of alt 
different types of structural lingui~tics that followed 
him. 
The first is between synchronic and diachronic 
study. As has been pointed out, research into language 
was, in the nineteenth century, predominantly historic-
ally oriented, concerned with tracing the development 
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of selected features of particular languages. In 
searching for the true object of linguistics - and it 
is perhaps significant that a search is necessary - he 
emphasized the institutional nature of language, seeing 
it as a body of interrelated conventions permitting 
communication, which not only admits, but requires, 
study at any one point in time. This study ~f a single 
state in the historical existence of a language, each 
state conceived of as an organic whole, he gave the 
name "synchronic". The study of the relation between 
such states, he termed "diachronic" {to be distinguished 
from the earlier form of historical linguistics, which 
did not presuppose prior synchronic studies>. 
The second important distinction supporting this 
one, and clarifying and giving content to the idea of 
momentary states in the existence of a language, is that 
of langue and parole. Briefly, parole (translated by 
Baskin as "speech·) is the aspect of language which 
involves the individual communicative act. Inherent in 
the world of experience, it can, as Saussure pointed 
out, be sorted into further aspects, the "physical, 
physiological, and psychologicalM <1916, p. 9). It is 
essentially the activity of individuals, the production 
of utterances in communication. And underlying this 
activity, making it possible, is the system, lanque. 
Unlike parole, langue is, in Saussure's terminology, 
"homogeneous", having psychical existence alone. But it 
does not have complete existence in the psyche of any 
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individual; its existence as a totality is collective. 
There is obviously a close relation - one of mutual 
influence - between langue and parole. Saussure (1916> 
writes: 
[ Langue] is both a social product of the faculty of 
speech and a collection of necessary conventions 
that have been adopted by a social body to permit 
individuals to exercise that faculty. 
( p. 9) 
Parole, with its regularities that allow for communicat-
ion, both implies the conventions of langue and deter-
mines their natu~e. As ·social product", lanque is a 
·~torehouse filled by the members of a given community 
through their active use of speaking" Cp. 13), a "store-
house" of signs which are regarded as "associations 
between sound-image and meaning which bear the stamp of 
collective approval" Cp. 15). It is this association of 
sound-image and meaning which constitutes a part of the 
conventional aspect of langue. The remainder is canst-
ituted by, the relations the signs themselves enter into. 
For lanque is not simply a "storehouse"; it is also a 
system. And it is this systematic nature of lanque, 
the associations and relations its elements enter into, 
that is, for Saussure and the Structuralists after him, 
the proper object of linguistic study. 
The relations the signs themselves enter into were 
to be understood in the light of a further distinction, 
one between "syntagmatic" and "associative" (the word 
that usually takes the latter's place in post-Saussurean 
writing is "paradigmatic", and it will be used here). 
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Speech is a linear phenomenon, the elements involved in 
its composition occurring sequentially. In what Saussure 
(1916) calls "the chain of speaking" Cp. 123), these 
elements are apt, or have the potential, to occur in 
certain contexts and not others. This ~ombination of an 
element with its immediate linguistic context, he called 
a "syntagm· (p. 123>, and the relation between element 
and context, "syntagmatic". An example can be given from 
elements at word-level: "fell" in the phrases, "the rain 
fell heavily", and, "the child fell", contracts syntag-
matic relations with "the", "rain", "heavily" and "the", 
"child", respectively. On the other hand, the paradig-
matic relations a linguistic element contracts are those 
relating it to elements of the same type that can occur 
in the same context. For example, in ~~;he sentences 
above, "fell" is related paradigmatically in the first 
case to "splashed", "poured", etc., and, in the second, 
to "laughed", "skipped", etc •• Within these two types of 
relation, others can be distinguished. For example, 
within the class of paradigmatic relations occur contrast 
and equivalence; and within the second class, occur the 
types of relations that bind an element to its neigh-
bours (cf. Lyons (1968), ch. 2 .3). 
Thus, while never using the word "structure" him-
self, Saussure gave direction to future language study -
setting it the goal of defining the structure of 
relations that comprised the system Ccf. Benveniste <1966), 
ch. 8). There is no need to devote any attention to the 
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development of Saussure's ideas, into the details of the 
remarkable volume of work they inspired. Sufficient has 
been shown to suggest the affinities of his idea of 
langue with the mathematics that had been developing in 
the nineteenth century - the insistence on the purely 
formal nature of langue, the idea of its being a network 
of relations, the assumption that, in the final analysis, 
the elements these relations hold between are distinct 
"units•, and that they, without substantial content, 
have no other existence than that of marking the ·nexus 
of different relations (cf. on this point, Saussure 
(1916), "but in language there are only differences 
. - -
without ~ositive terms·, p. 120). Saussure did not 
develop any systematic connection between linguistics 
<or language) and mathematics; yet he did, at least once, 
explicitly draw the analogy. He is occupied Cp. 122) 
with discussing the "grammatical fact" exemplified by 
the relation nacht:nachte, and continues: 
Each term present in the grammatical fact (the 
singular without umlaut or final "e" in opposition 
to the plural with umlaut and "-e") consists of the 
interplay of a number of oppositions within the. 
system. When isolated, neither rl~cht nor nachte is 
anything: thus everything_is opposition. Putting 
it another way, the nacht:nachte relation can be 
expressed by an algebraic fQrmula a I b in which 
a and b are not simple terms but result from .a 
set of relations. Language, in a manner of speak-
ing, is a type of algebra consisting solely of 
complex terms. 
Thus he not only provided an indication of what sort of 
analysis was required to isolate the structure of a 
language; he also provided the pregnant suggestion that 
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since language was "a sort of algebra", it might perhaps 
be best represented mathematically. 
This is no place to enter into an account of the 
development of structural linguistics, or into its 
relation to the concurrently developing mathematical 
1 linguistics Not all structural linguists have taken 
an interest in the related mathematical branches - of 
which two main types can be distinguished: statistical, 
concerned with quantifying data, and algebraic, concerned 
with formalizing, systematizing grammatical knowledge 
(cf. Lepschy <1970), p. 140>. Nevertheless, from what 
has been pointed to in the writing of Saussure, math-
ematical ("algebraic") linguistics can, whatever differ-
ence in historical roots, be reasonably seen as a 
logical culmination of the original Structuralist vision. 
Evidence of Structuralist hopes for mathematics can be 
found in the interest taken in the subject by, among 
others, the patriarchal figure, Roman Jakobson (see 
Jakobson C1971a), pp. 568-569). It is, however, Noam 
Chomsky who has extended the influence of mathematics 
into general linguistics most authoritatively. In the 
language, the strategy and aims, the conceptual model of 
the formal system is prominent in Chomsky's theories 
1 
For relevant histories, see Lepschy (1970) and 
Robins (1967); for the mathematics of formal grammars, 
see, for example, Kasher (1975), Hockett <1967) and 
Brainerd <1971). 
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Chis psychological "metatheorizing" excluded). In what 
follows, I wi LL outline, in simplified form, Chomsky's 
h l 
2 . . h l approac to anguage , po1nt1ng out, w ere re evant, 
some links with what has been shown of Saussure's thought. 
And as Chomsky appears to be the most influential exemp-
lar of Structuralist thinkers about language, problems 
with his approach that limit its value and, certainly, 
its persuasiveness as to the claim to its being 
"scientific", may thus usefully ~e glanced at. The 
objections do not aim to be conclusivi; but enough room 
for dissent is shown to exist suggesting that the 
success of Chomsky's undertaking to uncover the ·real" 
structure of language may reasonably be doubted. And, 
finally, having thus considered Chomsky's structural 
~ 2 Though there remains a fundamental allegiance to 
the idea of the formal system, there have been develop-
ments in Chomsky's thought that this outline, in its 
schematic nature, has ignored. It has also been, 
necessari Ly, somewhat selective in its interpretations. 
Many of Chomsky's terms are not well-defined: in the 
sense of being provided a definition at the outset of a 
work which alone guides its subsequent use. This in 
itself is not a fault. But it points to the fact that 
Chomsky's "science· has not yet been formalized, that it 
remains at the "suggestive" phase. It is as a consid-
eration of these suggestions that the remarks following 
the outline are offered. Furthermore, there has been no 
mention of the "deep structures" for which Chomsky is 
perhaps most well-known •. Apart from the fact that 
Chomsky himself has advocated avoiding the term - as it 
has proved easily misunderstood (1975, p. 81 ff.) - it 
has been avoided for the same reason "transformations" 
do not make an appearance. Both are particular details 
of the logically prior "generative grammar", and it is 
with the outline of this idea that I am concerned and 
not any of its particular refinements. 
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approach in its own terms, pointing out how many of the 
reasons for doubt may be traced to the archetype, I 
briefly discuss, from the viewpoint of an int~rest in 
literary language, some of the limitations attendant on 
any attempt to think of language in terms of formal 
systems. 
Chomsky, in his important early work, Syntactic 
Structures, offers a neat (and programmatic) definition 
of language and of grammar! 
From now on I will consider a language to be a set 
(finite or infinite) of sentences, each finite in 
length and constructed out of a finite set of 
elements ••• [as, for example,] the finite set of 
"sentences" of some formalized system of math-
ematics can be considered a language. The funda-
mental aim in the linguistic analysis of a language 
L is to separate the grammatical sequences which 
are the sentences of L from the ungrammatical 
sequences which are not sentences of L and to study 
the structure of the grammatical sequences. The 
grammar of L will thus be a device that generates 
all the grammatical sequences and none of the 
ungrammatical ones. 
(Chomsky, 1957, p. 13> 
I quote at length because this passage remains crucial 
to Chomsky's thinking, and so provides a useful starting-
point to the drawing of the outline. To this end a 
number of points may be made in comment. 
First, there is the explicit statement of the 
analogy between language and mathematics - more interest-
ingly, a particular type of mathematical product, the 
formal system. For there are other ways of conceiving 
of a relation between language and mathematics - as in 
the statistician's endeavour to quantify the probability 
of an element's occurrence, or in the idea that math-
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ematics is a refined continuation of language CHockitt, 
1968, p. 75, ch. 6) or a schematic revision of language 
in the service of clarity (Quine, 1951, p. 5). But it 
is an assertion of the analogic relation with "system" 
(typically Structuralist) that Chomsky chooses to make. 
The second point is that he talks of the sentence 
as being "constructed out of a finite set of elements". 
The language is that of the branch of mathematics known 
as "set-theory". It is a feature of this language that 
its discourse concerns objects collected into sets, or 
classes, according to a common property. <For example, 
from the set of all positive integers, one may specify 
the set of all positive integers that are even.) Objects, 
which may be equivalent to a complex of properties, and 
the properties themselves are both considered unitary. 
While, in the case of language, component units are 
easily distinguishable at the level of orthography, and, 
perhaps also, of phonology, at levels less obviously 
physical problems must arise which may or may not admit 
satisfactory solution. Can, for example, meanings be 
thought of as distinctive combinations of component units 
in the way that written words can? Is there an "alphabet" 
of semantic pf,1'operties? This "building-block" idea of 
language (sentences "constructed" with "units") can be 
seen to operate implicitly at a higher level as well. A 
language is defined as a "iet of sentences", each of these 
being understood as units permitting study in isolation. 
This view, implying language to be a sum of discrete 
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<albeit systematically related> sentences, has problem-
atic consequences, as will be seen later. 
The third point concerns the idea of "generation". 
The word is used in this passage solely in its math-
3 ematical sense In1)a format system, as the preceding 
chapter has shown, the "theorems" are derived via 
precisely specified derivation (or transformation) rules 
from its particular set of axioms. Equally, one might 
say that the axioms and transformations generate the 
theorems. And, as was pointed out, since the rules are 
precisely given and the axioms stated using symbols to 
be conceived of simply as "counters", simple manipul-
ations of substitution, deletion, etc. are possible, and 
this generation is, in principle (and ideally), mechanical 
<hence Chomsky's use of the term "device", which recalls 
the abstract machine studied by automata theory). 
Similarly, the numbers 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, etc. are said to 
be generated by the form 2n <where "n" is a natural 
number). That is, giving "n" a value from the natural 
numbers allows each of the above numbers <and no other) 
to be calculated. The calculation is, of course, done 
according to rules precisely specified so as to permit 
only one answer, and so again may be thought of as 
mechanical. 
3 Cf. Katz (1972), who also demonstrates that this 
use has become orthodox: • ••• a generative grammar is 
generative in the sense ••• [that] ••• the grammar 
itself must be a formal system, and the assignment of 
readings [ in the semantic component] must be computable 
in the grammar", p. 389. 
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This notion of "generate" characterizes Chomsky's 
grammar and the way in which it sets out to order the 
details of language. A language (for Chomsky) consists 
of its elements ordered into correct (grammatical) 
sequences. <Incorrect sequences are, of course, possible, 
but they, as it were, "fall outside" the language.) If 
all the correct sequences are collected (assuming for 
the moment that this can be done> and analyzed on the 
basis of perceived regularities into various sets of 
component elements and rules of combination, then 
beginning with the component elements and operating with 
the rules, the correct sequences (the sentences> of the 
4 
language may be said to be generated • The problem of 
analysis (apart from the methodological problem of how 
best to go about analysis> is thus of a dual nature: 
how are the component units best characteri,zed, and what 
types of rule Cas well as which individual rules) are 
best utilized in the generation? These two questions 
may be said to have occupied Chomskyan linguistics from 
4 Cf. Langer (1937): "When a system is completely 
stated, its propositions may be listed in such a way 
that each list shows a marked internal regularity", 
p. 107. This provides an indication of the motivating 
idea. From the listed propositions Cor, in this case, 
grammatical sentences), one works "backwards·, through 
analysis, to discover the system that generates them. 
And, cf. Lepschy (1970), p. 29. Of course, Chomsky's 
grammar is "mentalistic". His system, unlike the system 
outlined above, incorporates "underlying" regularities 
(deduced from cases of "sentence-synonomy"). But this 
does not alter what has been said of the principle of 
the approach. 
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incomplete, the appearance of a grammatical sentence not 
used in the selection will be either confirming or dis-
~onfirming evidence Ccf. Chomsky (1957), p. 49), 
. ....;· 
depending on whether or not the new sentence is gener-
able within the system. In this sense, then it is under-
stood that the postulated system helps predict the 
occurrence of grammatical sentences in a language. Any 
oddness sensed in this formulation is the result of an 
ambiguity Cto be discussed below, pp. 105-106) between 
grammatical, as generable in a formal grammar, and 
grammatical, as accepted intuitively as such by a 
native-speaker. What in fact the linguist "predicts" is 
the overlap of these two senses. 
So C~omsky inherits, and, to a certain extent, has 
modified, Saussure's idea of language as being construe-
ted from a ~,ollection of related elements. He, also, in 
his later works, makes explicit use of Saussure's lanque/ 
parole distinction. His early works had shown traces of 
the influence of the American "structural" linguists -
against whom he was reacting. For example, Chomsky 
talks of working with a "corpus" of sentences, a body of 
empirically acquired material that provides the linguist 
with the sole object of his enquiry. American "structur-
al" linguists, determined to avoid any intrusive psycho-
logizing, ~ere "corpus"-oriented in this sense. (And, 
it is interesting to note, they thus qualified for 
"excommunication": European Structuralism regards these 
so-called "structuralists" as a temporary aberration in 
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the history of structural linguistics, using, but with 
different evaluative overtones, the name Bloomfield 
adopted for the group - the "mechanists". See 
Jakobson (1971a), p. 716, and Barthes C1964a), p. 39.) 
But this "anti-men~alist" trace disappears when, in 
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, C1965), Chomsky intro-
duces the distinction between "competence" and "perform-
ance", and, while doing so, draws the parallel with 
Saussure's langue/parole. Like langue, competence is 
pinpointed as the underlying reality of language, and as 
such has prior claims o~ the linguist's attention. But, 
unlike lanque, competence is a system of generative 
rules, and has psychological reality, not in the 
community, but in each individual 6 • 
Accordingly, the linguist's task is no longer to 
sift through a "corpus" in the search for significant 
patterns. As competence is not only the system of rules, 
6 
See Chomsky (1965): "The distinction I am noting 
here is related to the langue - parole distinction of 
Saussure; but it is necessary to reject his concept of 
langue as merely a systematic inventory of items [a 
"storehouse" ] and to return rather to the Humboldtian 
conception of underlying competence as a system of 
generative processes", p. 4. Despite repeated assertions 
that the word "generate" is being used in the mathemat-
ical sense alone (see, for example, the sentence, quoted 
above, from Katz (1972), p. 389, and also Chomsky (1965), 
~P· 9), a~biguities involving a sense of psychological 
process are definitely noticeable. The passage just 
quoted is an example; further evidence can be found in 
Chomsky (1972>, pp. 28-31 and p. 38, and C1975), 
pp. 36, 41, passim. Moreover, I have been unable to 
find any statement that sets oµt to clarify the relation 
between the two senses, and between the two contexts, 
the mathematical and psychological, from which they are 
derived. 
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but also (as the name is intended to suggest) the ability to 
produce grammatical sentences and recognize them as such 
without deliberation (that is, intuitively), the linguist, 
manifesting this ability as· a native-speaker himself (but 
perhaps more sophisticated than most), can act as his own 
informant. There is now no need to talk of having to 
collect a ·corpus" of sentences for study; the linguist 
has, in the form of his own grammatical intuitions, a 
considerable body of data at his disposal. And the 
system of rules constructed will, it is asserted, be a 
representation of this "inner" (and generally shared) 
competence. 
Appropriately, performance classifies observable 
featu~es of the speech-act, of the way sentences are 
distorted and limited by the normal conditions of utter-
ance. Thus, while competence is identified with an 
implicit knowledge of a language, performance is 
concerned with "such grammatically irrelevant conditions 
as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention 
and interest, and errors <random or characteristic) 
(Chomsky, 1965, p. 3). Like parole in its relation to 
langue, performance is a secondary phenomenon, one that 
provides insight (once the "irrelevant conditions" are 
abstracted away) into the underlying competence that 
makes performance Cin its grammatical aspect) possible. 
It is this grammatical aspect, and not the shape of 
actual utterances, that ought to occupy the linguist's 
professional attention, when faced with the data perform-
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ance provides. Of course, "performance" as an object of 
study is not ignored; but Chomsky sees it as best done 
against the background of a prior study of competence 
(cf. Chomsky (1965), ch. 1.2). 
Perhaps it would be an advantage if at this point I 
recapitulate on the general trend of what has been dealt 
with so far of Chomsky's thought. To this end; I will 
use a "quilt-quotation· constructed from Chomsky (1965). 
"A grammar of a language purports to be a description of 
the ideal speaker-hearer's~[an idealized figure with 
perfect knowledge of an idealized uniform language whose 
knowledge is not distorted by the other factors that 
contribute to "performance"] intrinsic competence:[p. 4) 
[which is] the underlying system of rules that has 
been mastered by the speaker-hearer [ p. 4] ••• a system 
of rules that in some explicit and well-defined way 
assigns structural descriptions to sentences [p. 8] ... 
With the introduction of the competence/performance 
distinction, a number of other related distinctions 
follow. There was certainly a need for a change in the 
ideas on grammaticality. In Chomsky C1957), he wrote of 
utterances being "actually grammatical, i.e., acceptable 
to a native speaker" (p. 13). This is obviously inad-
equate if "acceptable" is understood Cas is reasonable) as 
something like "playing its part in the various forms of 
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linguistic behaviouu countenanced by the community" 7 
And of all the sentences "accepted", for example, in 
special contexts <such as poetry), or in the context of 
the immediate contingencies (sometimes critical) of 
social co-operation or other forms of personal inter-
action, not all w,ill find their place in the grammarian's 
'List of "correct" sentences. So Chomsky draws a distinc-
tion between grammatical and acceptable, and character-
i s t i c a l l y : ifo, t h e s am e way t h a t c om pet en c e i s j u s t one 
of the many factors involved in performance, grammatic-
ality is but one of the factors influencing an utter-
ance' s acceptability (Chomsky, 1965, p. 11). (That a 
sentence can be acceptable without being grammatical, 
yet that there can be no performance without competence, 
Chomsky would not deny and is of no importance here.) 
At the same time, Chomsky, significantly, made the 
requirement a successful grammar would have to meet less 
rigid as well. Instead of having to generate all and 
only the grammatical sequences (see the passage from 
Chomsky (1957) quoted above, p. 77), it need rather 
7 This is a wider definition than the one Chomsky 
gives (1965, p. 10). His definition is determined to an 
extent by his idea of performance, and to that extent is 
not atheoretical (or, pretheoretical). The same might be 
said of Chomsky's ,~';dea of grammar. It ts not unreason-
able to conceive of a grammar as a guide to the use of a 
language - indicating model sentences and the rules of 
construction generalized from these, exceptions to the 
rules and idiomatic expressions. Chomsky, of course, 
uses "grammar" in a more ambitious (and certainly 
questionable) sense of something a native speaker has 
internalized, of a representation of his linguistic 
competence, an actual mental possession of a speaker. 
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"correspond to the Linguistic intuition of the native 
speaker ••• ~only] in a substantial and significant class 
of crucial cases" (Chomsky, 1965, p. 24; my emphasis). 
More important though is that with this emphasis on 
competence, Chomskyan Linguistics becomes overtly a type 
of psychology (cf. Chomsky (1972,1975), passim); and the 
distinction that may best elucidate this transition is 
the one he makes between descriptive and explanatory 
adequacy. Considering the model' of grammar presented so 
far, it is conceivable that the sentences of a language 
ffiay be "broken up" into elements in different ways, that 
different rules could be employed in the systematic 
"reconstruction" of the Language. Obviously, a principle 
of economy would be at work; but beyond that there would 
be no external- constraint (apart from "descriptive 
adequacy") in the design of the system (cf. Chomsky 
(1965), p. 37; and Hockett (1968) makes asimilar point 
when discussing pre-Chomskyan linguistics in America, 
p. 35). Of two such "descriptively adequate" grammars, 
both more or Less equal in economy of conceptual 
resources, is there any way of deciding which is "truer", 
which is the most accurate representation of the native-
speaker's competence? 
Chomsky's answer is to establish a criterion in 
knowledge of "the form of Language as such" (1965, p. 35). 
And it is his claim that this form is revealed by a 
search through the grammars of particular languages for 
the properties they have in common. It is important to 
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remember that Chomsky thinks .Q.!1.1.l. in terms of generative 
grammars: for it is only they that explicit~Y demons-
trate a language's coherence, the interrelationship~ of 
its sentence~structures. The properties will be those 
of generative gramma~s, and these Chomsky calls 
"linguistic universals" (1965, p. 28). <Thus "linguis-
t i c u n i v e r s-:~w,s " , w h a t e v e r o t h e r a s s o c i at i on s i t may c a l l 
to mind, does have, in Chomskyan linguistics, a clearly 
delimited meaning - "general properties characterizing 
generative grammars for all languages".) These univers-
als may logically, if one bears in mind the underlying 
idea of the formal system, be of three kinds. They may 
be statements about the "vocabulary" - expressible 
formally - of a generative grammar. An example would 
be the claim that the "verb" category may be found in 
grammars for all languages. These are called substant-
ive universals. They may also be statements concerning 
the types of rules used in the manipulation of this 
vocabulary. An obvious example is the requirement that 
the grammar contain rules of a type known as "trans-
formation" rules. These are ~alled formal univers~(s. 
·...-''<!· 
And finally, there is the possibility of a thiB~ kind: 
organizational universals, which specify the order the 
rules may have to be applied in. And as the grammar 
consists of a number of components <see above, p. 81 
fn. 5), they also specify the way in which those compon-
ents are to be related. (For a fuller discussion, see 
Chomsky C1965), pp. 27-30, and Katz <1972), pp. 29-34.) 
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With common properties such as these discovered, a 
start has been made in constructing a positive criterion 
for the selection of one grammar over another <where both 
account successfully for a language's grammatical 
sentences). The grammar that conforms most with the 
system of linguistic universals <known as a ·universal 
grammar·, and equivalent to a "theory of language"; see, 
for example, Chomsky (1972), p. 126) is the grammar truly 
descriptive of the language. True descriptive adequacy 
is only possible if the grammar is at least in part 
defined by hypotheses about the "form of language as 
such"; that is, if it provides, as well as correspondence 
with the set of grammatical sentences of a particular 
language, a measure of explanatory adequacy. Thus, for 
Chomsky, the linguist's task is to give content to this 
idea of a universal grammar, to search for linguistic 
universals; for till this is done, no grammar is entitled 
to claim true descriptive adequacy <see, for example, 
Chomsky (1965), pp. 6, 35, 36, 41, and 46). 
One important link in this outline remains to be 
·made. For the question arises: "In what sense can 
discovered details of the form of language provide an 
'explanation' of the phenomenon of language?· This may 
be put another way: "What ontological status can be 
granted the universal grammar?" For until questions such 
as these are answered the taint of arbitrariness remains. 
Chomsky's answer ia of an intricate complexity which can 
only be suggested here - but I refer the reader to 
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Chomsky <1975), which is, in the main, a development of 
this aspect of his thinking. 
The answer is contained in Chomsky's idea of 
competence. If the competence of a native-speaker is 
understood as being specified by a system of rules he 
has internalized, by the generative grammar for his 
particular language, then universal grammar, or the 
schematism that defines the form of all particular 
grammars, must specify features of a competence that all 
humans share. Universal grammar thus specifies a 
uniquely human possession, the faculty of language, and 
in so doing" ••• contribute[slto the study of human 
mental processes and intellect4al capacity" <1965, 
p. 46). (That the ability to use language suggests a 
separate faculty of mind which operates alongside other 
separate but interacting faculties suggested by other 
mental activities, is something Chomsky claims repeat-
edly; see, for example, (1965), p. 56, and (1975), 
ch. i, and pp. 43, 54, 142-143, and 159.) Linguistics 
becomes concerned with accounting for one faculty of 
mind, while, at the same time, being part of a general 
"science of human cognitive structures" (1975, p. 143). 
Of course, his thought does not rest there. The 
regularities pointed to by universal grammar require to 
be accounted for. Analysis of competence is "followed 
by attempts to determine the nature of systems capable 
of attaining these states under given conditions of time 
and access to data, and investigation of the physical 
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basis for these achievements, whatever it may be" C1975, 
p. 160>. This indicates the linguist's further concern 
in the attempt to achieve explanatory adequacy - the 
attempt to provide an explanation for language acquisition. 
Chomsky's hypothesis is that the regularities indicated 
in universal grammar areDthe product of innate mental 
properties. This idea is argued for not only on the 
basis of such regularities, but also as this idea alone 
seems to allow for the fact that the complexity of 
competence acquirid is achieved rapidly, uniformly, and 
in spite of the "degenerate" nature of the language the 
learner is exposed to. "In other words, we can ask the 
question, What initial structure must be attributed to 
the mind that enables it to construct such a grammar 
from the data of sense?" C1972, p. 79). And support 
for the idea that such "initial structures" are actually 
a natural endowment of the developing human mind, or, to 
use Chomsky's o~n term, the "mental organ" (1976, p. 36) 
that is the language faculty, is supplied by his 
"naturalism". He quotes approvingly a remark by Gunther 
Stent that "Darwinian considerations offer a 'biological 
underpinning' to a kind of Kantian epistemology" (1975, 
p. 124), and elsewhere quotes a passage in similar vein 
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by Konrad Lorenz 8 • 
Of course, the introduction of biology to linguis-
tics does not relegate linguistics to being a mere sub-
branch of biology. The facts of language cannot be 
deduced from facts of the brain. But it seems possible; 
and remains the ideal, that a detailing of a correspond-
ence between brain structure and linguistic structure 
could be made. The neurophysiologist is in this sense 
another potential supplier of evidence confirming the 
hypothesis of the innate schematism. To conclude, the 
paths Chomsky has been led along in the search for 
explanatory adequacy (and thus, descriptive adequacy) 
may be succintly indicated in the following two 
quotations from Chomsky (1975). 
And . 
Linguistics is simply that part of psychology that 
is concerned with one specific class of steady 
states, the cognitive structures that are employed 
in speaking and understanding. 
(p. 160) 
••• psychology is that part of human biology that 
is concerned at its deepest level with the second-
order capacity to construct cognitive structures 
that enter into the first-order capacities to act 
and to interpret experience. 
(p. 38) 
8 "Adaptation of the a priori to the real world has 
no more originated from 'experience' than adaptation of 
the fin of the fish to the properties of water. Just as 
the form of the ~in is given a priori, prior to any 
individual negotiation of the young fish with the water, 
and just as it is this form that makes possible this 
negotiation, so it is also the case with our forms of 
perception and categories in their relationship to our 
negotiation with the real external world through exper-
ience." Quoted in Chomsky (1972), p. 95. 
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As will have been noticed, the ideal investigator 
of Chomsky's thought would have to have a range of 
interests and information matching Chomsky's own - in 
linguistics, philosophy; mathematics, and current science 
and philosophy of science. And ideally this background 
knowledge would be used in interpretation~ and criticism 9 
Yet it is possible, I believe, to locate without dis-
tortion a crucial problematic area in the use of the 
Structuralist archetype <or, in Chomsky's case, model). 
H e n c e , i n w h a t ;f jO l l o w s , t h e f i r s t s e c t i o n p o i n t s t o t h e 
problems faced in seeing language as a system, specific-
ally, in constructing a generative grammar. The second 
deals with a few of the problems confronted when the 
grammars, for reasons mentioned in the outline above, 
are attributed with being representations of a mental 
reality. And as Chomsky uses the idea of the formal 
system not merely as a means to a useful perspective on 
9 Because of the number of disparate areas that form 
a background to Chomsky's thought, misinterpretations -
and consequent flawed evaluations - are not uncommon. 
Witness, for example, the strange ideas about the role of 
intuition in science in Botha (1968), pp. 69-78; and the 
failure to take into account the submerged mathematical 
model in Chomsky's notion of grammar in Hiorth C1974). 
Robinson (1975), perhaps for similar reasons, appears to 
misinterpret what Chomsky means by "language-independent". 
A "language-independent" explanation of a particular 
language is not an explanation in terms of another 
discipline. ~ianguage-independent" in Chomsky's work is 
shorthand for ~independent of any particular language". 
Such an "explanation" is thus carried out in the terms 
of universal grammar, of a set of hypothesized linguistic 
universals. The link with biology, say, remains potential 
and inessential. 
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language, but as revealing the underlying reality of 
language, the ultimate concern will be with the validity 
of the claim that Chomskyan linguistics is entitled to 
the designation "scientific". For the question, as will 
become apparent, is not "merely" terminological - Searle 
(1975), following Chomsky (for example, <1965), p. 20) 
would have us believe. 
But first, following from the adoption of the basic 
metaphor, there is t~e defining assumption that language 
can be represented without loss as a formal system; that 
the sentences of language may be dissected into constit-
uent segments and then reconstructed according to a 
finite set of explicitly stated rules, thus revealing 
language's prime reality. Now this is by no means 
obviously the case; as is shown in a comparison with an 
activity which .i.§. defined by rules which 9;ian be explicitly 
stated - chess <the comparison is suggested by Hockett 
C1968); for Hackett's criticism of Chomsky's idea of 
language as a well-defined system - a criticism closely 
related to the present one - see Hockett (1968), ch. 3 
ff.). The rules of chess are such that they can 
:(~enerate" a vast number of possible games. But each 
variant is played according to rules that have been set 
down in advance. If a move is made that appears 
illegitimate (if there is a "failure in communication"), 
there is recourse to the available explicitly-stated 
rules. Thus guided~ a game may progress to its clearly-
defined conclusion. As Hockett (1968) points out, the 
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game is, in this sense, mechanical. The moves of the 
game are computable: hence the ability of camputers to 
"play chess· - or at least run through the moves that 
constitute possible games. Moreover, these explicitly-
stated rules are usually deliberately learnt. Both in 
this, and in the fact that the rules remain accessible 
guides to the performance ·9;:p the game (and are char19ed, 
if at all, on the decision of a select group of experts), 
and in the fact that a move not taken accordingJro these 
explicitly-stated rules is not "chess" and would need to 
be retaken before the game could proceed, it seems that 
the parallel between linguistic activity and chess is 
slight indeed. Whereas this is not the case in a 
comparison between chess Cand other games) and certairi 
aspects of mathematics. There is nothing lost in the 
translation of chess into mathematical terms - as the 
successful operation of "chess-playing" computers 
suggests. 
Thus, intuitively, one feels there is something 
wrong with the approach and the basic metaphor that 
guides it. And these intuitions may be f\,'efined. To 
this end, a different version of the chess analogy will 
be illuminating. Consider an investigator Canalog;.ous 
to the linguist) presented with, say, a series of films. 
In each of these films is shown a game in progress from 
its initial state through to its end-state: it is the 
investigator's task to discover the rules that allow 
each performance. It is likely that with patience he 
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will be able to sort out behaviour that is essential 
(functional) from behaviour that is peripheral and 
idiosyncratic (though he may have difficulty persuading 
a fellow investigator that exactly where he has drawn 
the line is correct). The investigator will, surely, 
with skill and perseverance produce a set of rules 
adequate to accounting for the procedure of the game. 
And the guess can be made with a certain amount of 
confidence because ~:ie know beforehand Cun like the 
investigator) that the essence of the game is amenable 
to that sort ~f description. Whether language is, is 
open to doubt. Moreover, methods used in the attempt 
to ascertain whether or not it might be, reveal inhe~ent 
difficulties 10 
But before these are discussed, there is an 
inaccuracy in the analogy a~ so far told - the invest-
igator is not Chomskyan. To make the conversion, 
h~wever, one need only redefine his task as attempting 
10 I ought perhaps, at this point, emphasize that 
though I question the plausibility of believing that 
language has an essence that may be represented as a 
system of generative rules, I am not suggesting that 
language is not in some sense "rule-governed". "Rule" 
is a word with a number of crucially differing shades 
of meaning - as Black (1962, pp. 95-139) has exhaustively 
demonstrated. There is surely a sense in which linguistjc 
usage is "rule-governed"; but the search for exactly ~ihat 
sense is not helped by assuming CI believe, implausibly) 
that the rules are those associated with a formal system. 
This point is related to the point made concerning the 
different senses of "grammar", p. 86 below. 
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to describe the "chess-playing competence" of the players. 
But again, we. are entitled to presume that (in one sense, 
anyway) he \-Ji LL succeed, a,'pd' for the same reasons. We 
know t~at the "knowledge" that allows the player to make 
"grammatical" moves is grounded on his having learned 
explicit rules. The player's "competence" 1..§. clearly-
defined to begin with - which allows it to be "clearly-
definable". His "grammatical intuition" is f~rm: each 
move is to be assigned one of two values - correct or. 
incorrect - and there is no ambiguity in the rules 
governing the assignment. <Evaluations of strategy are, 
of course, a different case: what is important to note 
is that in games like chess the line between the two 
types of evaluation is clearly, uncontroversially drawn.) 
One would expect, then, were language a clearly-defined 
system, that a similarly clearly definable competence 
would be indicated by intuitions of grammaticality 
equally firm. 
Such intuitions, however, show a marked lack of 
1 1 uniformity A number of linguists have pointed to the 
11 Chomsky would, of course, agree that the sentences 
of a language cannot be divided simply between two 
categories (cf. the quotation on p.87 above). He has 
proposed a formalized <necessarily, considering the 
model) theory of "degrees of grammaticalness" to account 
for sentences acceptable, comprehensible but not strictly 
grammatical (cf. Katz's "semi-sentences"). However, the 
introduction of these ideas does little to solve the 
initial problem; for ·semi-grammatical" sentences (or 
·~emi-sent~ri~~s") are in both theories defined in terms 
of deviation from the strictly grammatical. Whatever 
problems there are in accurately locating grammaticality 
are automatically transferred to the notions dependent on 
it. See, for example, Chomsky (1961) and Katz (1964). 
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Rmistakes" in Chomskyan literature, mistakes made, when, 
in arguing for the existence of a particular rule, the 
status "grammatical" or "ungrammatical" is "incorrectly" 
assigned to a sentence (see, for example, Bolinger 
C1968a), Hill (1961), Lightner <1976). Robinson (1975) 
too has a section devoted to "Chomsky's mistakes"). 
What the differences signify, of course, is that even 
among those who devote their time to study of language, 
intuitions of "grammaticality" remain irregular. By way 
of illustration, Hill (1961) records testing Chomsky's 
claims on the Cun)grammaticality of a number of sentences 
on a select group at his university. One of hiJ findings 
was that two of the ten informants accepted "furiously 
sleep ideas green colourless" as grammatical. This I do 
not find su~prising. I~ Chomsky (1957, p. 17) this 
sentence was compared with its "mirror-image", "colour-
less green ideas sleep furiously". The latter was found 
grammatical, while the former was not. It seems that the 
grounds for the distinction were based on the idea of 
sentence-forms <or, more accuratej~~y, sentence-structures>; 
the one being English, the other not. For example, 
"colourless green, etc." is matched by, say, "portly old 
men wheeze heavily". Yet with not much ingenuity, a bit 
of verse can be concocted: 
Si lent Ly swim stars, bright, serene; 
Shoaling at the feet of the deep sky's queen. 
That one would not .!:Lfilli to say anything like it is beside 
the point. What i.§. important is that it can be said, 
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that the sentence is part of the English language. It 
is a stylistic variant of the "plainer" sentence, "bright 
serene stars swim silently", but no less English for 
that. CI refer to the question of stylistic variation 
below.) Not all the examples are as bizarre. Bolinger 
C1968a), for example, cites "the girl was turned to" as 
qualifying for ungrammatical. 
Bolinger, in the same article, points to an 
important reason for this irregularity • 
••• Differences in opinion are generally ascribed 
to differences in dialect, but other factors weigh 
more heavily. One is allied to literary imagin-
ation; many people are unable to conceive of what 
they might say except under the most banal circum-
stances. A sentence such as "It wasn't dark enough 
to see" is put down as semantically deviant without 
considering what things lead to visibility ••• 
C1968a, p. 35) 
The idea of "context" is important here: context-in the 
range of senses suggested in Chapter One. Situational, 
verbal, and cultural context all ~~ntribute to making a 
sentence acceptable as English. And literary imagination 
is, among other things, the power to conceive the 
potential use of a sentence in possible contexts. That 
linguists do not always exercize this power is evident; 
and, as Bolinger puts it, "parsimony with context leads 
to error". The attitude that leads to these errors is, 
moreover, not accidental (cf. Lyons C1968), p. 420); it 
is rooted in the assumption (noted above, p. 78) that 
sentences are "units" (from which a "language" is 
constructed) ~hat are capable of being studied in 
isolation from not only the larger verbal context, but 
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a l s o t h e s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h t h e y a r e l j]k e l y if:o o c c u r a s - v' 
utterances. That this assumption does lead to a 
situation in which errors can be made is crucial. In 
short, if sentences can only be wholly understood by 
reference to actual or possible contexts, in what sense 
can the "units" the linguist studies comprise language? 
CI will return to this point when mentioning Katz's 
semantics.) Or, to return to the chess analogy, chess 
may, after legitimate abstraction, be identified with 
' 
the rules that govern the moves, for in isolation each 
move is clearly defined. Granting for the sake of argu-
ment the legitimacy of the linguistic "competence" 
abstraction, can one still talk of identifying this 
competence with a system of rules, if, as appears to be 
the case, the units, on which the construction of the 
system is based, are not clearly defined in isolation? 
Nor do I think it possible, given obvious differences 
in literary imagination and experience, linguistic and 
otherwise, that a band of "ideal" linguists could take 
into account considerations of context, and arrive at 
some unanimity regarding which sentences do belong in 
English. For could this happen, the idea of a clearly-
defined grammatical intuition would be reasonable, and 
the archetype plausible. Yet, were i£ possible, this 
would entail accepting a large number of hitherto 
excluded forms. For instance, the forms embodied in 
"silently swim stars, bright,serene" and ·~dam walked to 
the door and Adam trembled in his shoes" would have to 
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be accounted for. Katz <1972) invokes the idea of 
"stylistic variation" (which seems intuitively acceptable), 
and suggests adding a fourth component to the grammar, 
the "rhetorical component" (pp. 417 ff.). Apart from 
the feeling that the grammar is being over-complicated, 
there are reasons for suspecting this theoretfcal 
dtstinction. Transformational rules (such as passiv-
ization) which transform semantically interpreted base 
strings into surface structures, are traditionally 
understood as being semantically neutral, or meaning-
preserving. But Katz introduces the idea of the 
component simply because he wishes to account for the 
fact that speakers, when faced with the choice of two in 
some way synonymous sentences, choose one, for the sake 
of a certain "effect" or "emphasis", rather than the 
other. Which means that, in his own terms, the 
"rhetorical transformations" too are meaning-preserving. 
The sharp distinction between the syntactic and rhetor-
ical transformations (and components, .5!.!J.!;!, therefore, 
~ 
wgrammatical" and "stylistic variant") appears to fall 
away - which seems good sense. For one chooses, for 
example, the active or passive <without suggesting that 
one is "derived" from the other) mostly for the sake of 
12 "effect" or "emphasis" 
12 The difficulties Katz experiences stem from the 
problems inherent in attemptirig a definition of "style". 
Moreover, his "component" is unable to clarify the 
distinction between what is style and what is not any 
further, because it is derived solely f~om a particular 
way of making the distinction. It can only do as much 
as the prior definition allows it. 
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If one ignores as artificial this distinction Katz 
introduces, and combines the components, it would appear 
that he has taken Chomskyan linguistics a significant 
step towards that ideal state mentioned above - in which 
all sentences acceptable as English would be accounted 
for by the system of rules. But there is an obvious 
obstacle to any formal statement of this "extended" 
grammar - complexity. Even in the present "limited" 
grammar, with the "gaps" in its description 13 , the 
syntactic component <not to mention the other two -
three), when stated with formal accuracy, is enormously 
complex (as a glance at the literature will show). 
Progress towards complete inclusiveness can only mean a 
corresponding increase in complexity - and there is the 
danger t6~t, under the burden of continued qualification, 
systematization would become either impossible or 
irrelevant 14 But this is not the goal Chomsky has set 
13 For the syntactic component alone, descriptive 
adequacy is far from achieved, even when only rather 
ordinary and obviously grammatical sentences are dealt 
with. See, for example, Jacobs and Rosenbaum (1968). 
14 Chomsky's retort to complaints about the present 
state of complexity is: can one expect a faculty of mind 
to be any less complex than, say, a little finger? See 
Chomsky (1975>, pp. 43 and 92. But to give an idea of 
the sort of crippling complexity that may be required, I 
refer to the work of M. Gross (cited in Lightner (1976), 
p. 189 fn.). Working with a corpus of obviously gramm-
atical simple sentences only, he studied a sample of 3000 
French verbs in terms of a hundred syntactic properties -
of which no two verbs were found to share the same set. 
There are, he found, 2000 different verb-classes for the 
3000 verbs. And as generative rules operate on word-
8lasses, there are going to have to be sufficient rules 
to reflect the behavioural properties of each class. One 
has to seek assurance from the grammarians that their 
complete grammar will not be forced to contain one rule 
per one word and a half. 
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linguistics. For as has been pointed out (p. 86 ,above), 
he maintains the distinction between grammatical and 
acceptable. And this raises the initial question of 
whe'thE!'r "grammatical .. is_clearly-defined, whether it can 
adequately (for the purposes of a formalized science> be 
"factorized out" from ~acceptable". 
Reasons for being sceptical about a positive answer. 
have been indicated. Contexts, in their contributing to 
the acceptability of sentences, cannot be ignored -
contexts that are ill~defined, not capable of being 
described with mathematical exactitude, and which cert-
ainly ·contribute to the irregularity of intuitions of 
what is to be considered as belonging tp a .language. 
Given this irregularity and unpredictability it seems 
impossible that the "acceptable" sentences in a language 
could ever be systematized. But more important, ~here 
do not seem to be any non-arbitrary criteria for 
distinguishing sentences grammatical from acceptable -
and intuitions are no guide, as these ate again not 
clear. But leaving problems associated with context 
aside, there is a related.question - how are exceptions 
to be treated? - that ~ppears to undermine from within 
the attempt to represent a langu•ge ~s a formal system. 
I quote a revealing statement of Chomsky's: 
If someone says of my description that th.is doesn't 
fit, and this, and this, I would 'say that it is not 
a very interesting comment. If on the other.hand, . 
he says that· 'the exceptions can fit"into a different 
pattern without sacrificing a corresponding degree 
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of coverage elsewhere in the system, that is of the 
highest importance. 
(Quoted in Oerwing (1973), p. 39; for a similar 
statement, see Chomsky (1964), pp. 54-55) 
The idea here is that the discovery~of an exception is 
to be the spur to finding_a different and more complete 
pattern. The go~l appears to be the formulation of one 
that is totally comprehensive in its embracing ill. the 
syntactic facts -~f a ~anguage. Even if the influence of 
contexts is ignored, given what is known of the develop-
ment of languages, a development to a certain extent. 
haphazard and influenced by "extta-li~guistic" factors 
(suggesting that a language at any one stage of its 
existence is not homogeneous or autonomous), this goal 
appears unlikely. And Chomsky may never have meant it. 
For in Chomsky <1964), he does admit it most likely that 
there will always be exceptions to a grammar <i!D.Y. 
grammar). But this admission exposes a further weakness 
that has an important bearing on t,he notion of evidence 
so important to linguistics as a formalized science. 
He writes: "It is necessary to distinguish between 
exceptions ~o a grammar, and C?unter-examples to a 
proposed general theory of linguistic stru¢ture" <1964, 
p. 54>. The "theory of linguistic structure" is, 
' 
presumably, t~e ~universal grammar" 15 , to which I will. 
15 Chomsky uses the term "theory" in a number of 
ways that may at first be confusing. The theory of A 
_language is its generative grammar; the theory of 1lab~'':) 
g u a g e i s u n i v e r s a l g ram ma r ; t h e t h e o r y t h at p r op o s e s '-' ·~•· '" 
those two theories is ••• ? I have called~it above Chom-
sky's "metatheory", though he n6where uses that term. 
Perhaps "linguistic theory" would be adequate, though 
not all linguistic theory is, of course, Chomskyan. 
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be returning below. But_ what needs also to be mentioned, 
is that any ixception to a grammar is, if the ideas of 
"evidence" and "prediction" (see above, pp. 81-82) are 
borne in mind,. a counter-example to the grammar. If 
exceptions are to be count~inanced (as, no doubt, they 
ought), then some precise statement of the distinction 
between exceptions and such counter-examples Cat the 
level of grammar) must be made. In other words, at 
what point is the linguist to stop searching for further 
patte~ns? It is difficult to conceive of any line of 
demarcation that is not arbitrary - which indicates a 
crucial flaw in the crucial notion of "evidence·. And, 
if this is the case, then the same point may be made 
about the dependent distinctions b~tween. "grammatical" 
and "acceptable", "grammatical" and "stylistic variant", 
and "grammatic'al" and "semi-grammatical". 
To conclude, the root of the problem appears to lie 
in the metaphor; for Chomsky, by attempting to fit 
language into the mould of a formal system, is attempting 
to characterize precisely notions that cannot be so 
characterized. Or, in other word5, formalization makes 
the notions traditionally used in talking about languag~ 
sharper than they are in fact. This recalls the main 
point suggested by the chess-analogy, a point which 
Itkonen (1976) has detailed explicitly. As was mentioned 
above, there are two senses in which "grammatical" is to 
be understood in formal gramm~r. The following sentence 
may be used to illustrate the difference: A formal 
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grammar is to generate as "grammatical 1" those sentences 
the native-speaker intuitively accepts as "grammatical
2
". 
As Itkonen points out, the analogy' here is with formal 
logic. A system of formal logic Con the mathematical 
model) is constructed to formalize intuitions of logical 
validity. But, again as Itkonen points out, the analogy 
does not hold. First, there is a difference in purpose. 
In formal logic, "it is precisely the purpose of axio-
matization to transcend the inevitable limits of intuit-
ion: axiomatization offers a way to extend the intuit-
ively known rules to cases where intuition as such is 
powerless" Cp. 193). But there is no sense in which 
one could say that formal grammars are constructed to 
extend our intuitions of what is grammatical. The 
monsters of language that Chomsky occasionally produces 
and (correctly) claims are "grammatical 1 " are a case in 
point. In fact, if one wishes to extend one's intuit-
ions of what can be said in a language, one turns to 
its good creative writers (the stylists: which suggests 
a useful way of conceiving style - as the escap~ from, 
and so development of, the grammatical). But, second, 
and more important, the notions each attempts to account 
for are of a different order of precision. In logic, 
whether or not a formula is a theorem of a system can be 
decided in two ways. First, it may be checked to see 
whether it is derivable within the system; and second, 
and independently, its validity may be calculated by 
methods independent of the system, yet based on the same 
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rules of thought the system is intending to formalize~ 
In other words, there are both formal .~ind. i.pforrqal 
methods (truth-tables, truth-trees, for example) of 
checking the validity of a formula. What both have in 
common is a basis in a few self-evident rules of ~hought. 
There is no analogous situation in linguistics. A 
sentence may be show~ to be generable in a particular 
•I • 
formal grammar; but there is no analogous informal 
(independent) method of checking whether the sentence 
generated corresppnds to a correct sentence in the 
,~-· 
natural language (cf. pp. 199-200). All that can be 
relied on to do the checking is grammatical intuition, 
and this is imprecise and non-uniform in the speakers 
of a language. And the reason appears obvious: there 
is no small set of exact and pre-existent rules <as 
there is in, say, chess or constructeq systems of logic) 
that governs the production of sentences in a natu~al 
language. A third point at which the analogy does not 
hold Cone which Itkonen does not mention> is that formal 
logic may proceed efficiently because there is ~o harm 
in thinking of propositions, predicates and other 
., 
properties of logical form, as units. And the fact that 
sentences cannot be so thought of has long been recognized 
.. I • "J '• 't 
by logicians. It was this "haziness" of language (~hich 
~ ' . . 
is, in. some .. of its uses, its st.re_n_gt_h) th':3t_ led them to 
construct their <for their purposes> more accurate 
16 artificial languages 
108 
Logicians are correct when they 
claim that sentences may often conceal or distort an 
underlying, unitary logical form. But it is hard to 
know what anyone would mean if he claimed that sentences 
concealed their underlying, unitary sentence form <which 
is what Chomsky by way of the competence/performance 
distinction in effect does). 
What has been said till now in criticism of the 
attempt to fit language into the mould of a formal 
system, may be related to questi?ns of descriptive 
17 , . . . 
adequacy • And while the crucial notion of evidence 
has been shown to appear flawed, it is in dealing with 
problems encountered in the attempt to establish explan-
atory adequacy, to establish the psychological reality 
of the system in the form of language, that the plaus-
ibi lity of Chomskyan linguistics as science is most 
debatable. So I turn now to deal brief Ly with two 
points related to "explanatory adequacy". ~h~re are, of 
course, more that could be glanced at. On the other 
ha~d, it could reasonably be argued that discussion of 
16 See, for example, Langer (1937>, pp. 52, 61. 
Quine <1953) has an excellent aicount of the ·dilution" of 
natural language that the formulation of a system of fo~m­
al logic entails, a "dilution" that allows precision and. 
control. See especially, pp. 438, 443-445. 
17 - -
What has not been talked of is the semantic 
component, which, while peripheral ~o the argument of 
this section, would not be irrelevant to an account of 
language in literature. Appendix A provides a brief 
survey of some problems that are encounte~ed in the 
attempt to establish this component. 
1 
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Chomsky's ideas on "explanatory adequacy" is premature 
if the objections to his conception of "descriptive 
adequacy" are not satisfactorily answered. For as has 
been seen, all his further thinking is based on the idea 
that language ~ capable of being represented as a 
generative grammar. , Chomsky, however, would not agree. 
He writes, "although even descriptive adequacy o~ a 
large scale is by no means easy to approach, it is 
• 
crucial for the productive development of linguistic 
theory that much higher goals than this be pursue~·­
(1965, p. 24). Again I emphasize t~at this se~ms highly 
• 
questionable - if the pursuit is in the form Chomsky has 
decided on. To illustrate how the "generative grammar" 
assumption influences his further thinking, his ideas on 
language-acquisition, which, as has been pointed out, are 
intended to provide confirmatory support of universal 
grammar, can be glanced at. <For a full discussion, see 
Derwing (1973); for further valuable remarks, see Cohen 
<1966~ pp. 47-56>, Putnam <1967> and Margolis <1973>.> 
Chomsky (1975, p. 22> writes of humans that they 
"construct a complex and intricate intellectual system, 
rapidly and uniformly, on the basis of degenerate 
evidence". What first attracts attention is h~s use of 
the word "degenerate". Admittedly, the utterances one 
is in contact with are often not impeccable, and never 
in any sense "clearly-defined"; a moment's observation 
would confirm this. But what if they are not much like 
the sentences produced by a generative grammar? Is this 
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sufficient teason to call them degenerate? The word only 
makes sense if one believes that "competence" il a 
generative grammar. If this belief is d~sposed of, one 
is left, as Chomsky recognizes and rjjects (see, for _., - - -
example, (1972), p. 118 and (1975), p. 142), with 
discussing language-learning in terms, for example, of 
mimicry, gestalt-perception, creative analogy and 
generalization - ideas which take into account <and 
accept) the imprecision of the data. But Chomsky would 
18 be unwilling to discard generative grammars , and 
hence the "competence" intended to supply his grammars 
with psychological reality. So he posits a "univer,al 
grammar" - ~he system of principles, conditions, rules 
t h at a r e e l em en t s o r p rope r t i es _ o !1 a l l human l an g u ages 
not merely by accident but by necessity - of course, I 
mean biological, not logical, necessity" (1975, p. 29). 
To make the idea plausible, he talks of the "uniformity" 
and "rapidity" of la~guage-learning. But until the 
actual conditions and features of language~~earning are 
accurately known, and other alternatives, however slight 
their success may be at present, are known to be 
18 ' h I have not touched on the reaso~ why C omsky 
believes generative grammars necessary; this may be 
suggested by his calculation "that the number of word 
class sequences associated with [normal sentences] is 
far larger than the number of seconds in a lifetime" 
(1964, p. 54 fn.). I see no reason, though, why 
discussion in terms of the manipulation of forms, of 
analo~y and blending, Ciee Hockett (1968), pp. 88-99,~ 
for example)-, could not account for this. Far more 
compelling evidence is needed before one is to be 
persuaded that generative grammars {with their already-
noted attendant problems> are necessary to account for 
the shape of actual sentences. 
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inadequate, there is no reason to accept the "universal 
grammar" (with the idea of the generative grammar on 
which it rests) proposal. For the claims of "uniform-
ity" and "rapidity" have, till then, rhetorical value 
only. And the same may be said of the similarly 
supportive assertion, "Language is not really taught, 
for the most part. Rather, it is learned, by mere 
exposure to the data.~· <1975, p. 161) ~ . In Cten\jative) 
evaluation, the problem may be at root that Chomsky is 
attempting to deal with one stroke questions that could 
perhaps be more usefully kept distinct: how a child 
comes to learn its language (and .ihJul; why); the nature 
of the linguistic ability that is finally acquired; and 
grammar, the ideal~zed guide to the forms and patterns 
in use in a particular lan~uage. 
As the remarks above suggest, the assumption that 
language is best represented as a generative grammar 
leads, in the search for explanatory adequacy, to further 
assumptions, apparently as empirically unjustified, about 
language, and specifically, its acquisition. Of course, 
this in itself would be admissible were a measure of real 
support to be found for the idea of an innate "universal 
grammar". There is an obvious test, as Chomsky has 
admitted (1975, p. 208). If "universal grammar" specifies 
the necessary form of language, then the sentences 
produced by a grammar that violated that form would be 
impossible to learn. But, linguistics here (as Chomsky 
further admits) founders on the moral difficulty faced by 
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most "human sciences" - that the subjects of any experi-
ments are human. To subject any child to the "experi-
ment" noted above would be morally reprehensible. While 
this sort of "direct" evidence may be difficult to 
obtain, Cohen <1966) has suggested a further requirement 
that a "universal grammar" hypothesis would have to meet; 
one that would appear to escape the moral problems of 
experimentation. This is that the hypothesis have 
"consequences that are testable independently of the 
language-learning facts it purports to explain" Cp. 52). 
Th . . bl 19 1s requ1rement seems reasona e • Thus one would 
have no reason to accept an outrageous claim that the 
water that is gulped, slurped, splashed, that sparkles, 
quenches and floods was a thin bundle (ninety-nine per 
cent space) of microscopic molecules, unless it could be 
shown that there were consequences of this hypothesis 
outside the "theory of water"; that closely related 
hypotheses could be used to explain similar phenomena in 
similar substances. There do not as yet appear to have 
been any important discoveries in this regard in 
l i n g u i s t i c s , d i s c o v e r i es t h a t w o u l d c on f i rm t h e p s y;c ho -
~ogical fact of a "universal 9rammar". 
19 
Chomsky's reply (1975, p. 207) I find unsatis-
factory; it ~ppears to miss the point of C9hen's argument. 
The fact that "SDP" was not violated in any known 
language, would tell us (perhaps) about the .f.Q.r.m of the 
languages studied, but nothing about innateness; hence 
nothing about "universal grammar" as he conceives it. 
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Thus given the problems associated with the notion 
of "evidence" at both the level of "descriptive adequacy" 
(problems following from difficulties with the idea of 
"grammaticality"; see above pp.103ff .) and that of 
"explanatory adequacy", one may, I believe, rightly 
question the viability of Chomskyan linguistics as a 
science. 
In other words, how much of Chomskyan linguistics 
is "knowledge about some aspect of the real world", and 
how much "supposition and speculationi;p Ccf. Derwing 
(1973), p. 3; it is at this point that one feels the 
lack in the available literature of a careful comparison 
of scientific reasoning as expressed in linguistics and 
in the natural sciences, and thus also a study in the 
differing uses of terms such as "evidence", "confirm-
a t i on" , "em pi r i ca l " , "theory" , etc • • N e;v er the less I do 
believe sufficient problems with "evidence" have been 
exposed to provide reason to doubt the eff~cacy of the 
remaining terminology, and thus Chomsky's linguistics 
as a science. Chomsky has conceded that "it is 
unfortunately the case that no adequate formalizable 
techniques are known for obtaining reliable information 
concerning the facts of linguistic structure"( 1965, 
p. 19). Yet this, as we have seen, has not in any way 
deterred Chomsky, or his associates; nor does it seem 
important to him on the question of whether linguistics 
is a science~. His answer (which Searle (1975> echoes) 
is that the question is "essentially terminological ••• 
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[having] ••• no bearing at all on any serious issue" 
' 
(1965, p. 20). Regardless of the force with which this 
is stated, there are, I think, sufficient grounds for 
disagreement. The most important derives from the 
special .status bestowed, by present culture at least, 
on scientific knowledge. The natural sciences have, 
successfully, developed techniques that allow for the 
claim that they have "discovered facts" about the 
natural world in which we discover ourselves, techniques 
which can be reasoned as countering scepticism about the 
claim. And this knowledge is characterized by its being 
more confirmable than debatable. Of course, at the level 
of selection and modification of interpretations true to 
phenomena, debate plays an essential part. There is 
nothing mechanical about scientific creation. But it is 
the criterion of a good theoretical concept that it is 
provided, via the notion of "evidence" <where what is to 
count as such is agreed on), clear indication of how it 
20 may be confirmed To use the designation "science~; 
20 Derwing's point is relevant here. "What is 
more, given the proliferation of uninterpreted theoret-
ical a:p.paratus associated with any generative grammar, 
it is clear that a great deal of manipulation of the 
model need not affect the output appreciably ••• • C1973, 
p. 287). One may cite the continuing disputes among 
transformationalists as to the best internal organization 
of the grammars, and the claims that differing proposals 
are merely notational variants" - which is usually 
denied by the proposer. We here touch on problems that 
talk of "explanatory adequacy"was meant to solve, but it 
seems instead that matters of internal organization are 
decided on the grounds simply of what makes sense to the 
investigator; that is, that reasons are adduced from 
reflection on language rather than from empirical 
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in any area of enquiry is to imply the adequacy of 
science's terminological apparatus (evidence, etc.> to 
deal with the phenomena in question. And so is to imply 
the special status of knowledge so acquir:~d - that it is 
knowledge of confirmable facts, and not knowledge (meta-
physical) which is the product of an insightful inter-
pretation of experience or of dialectic, and nor is it 
knowledge <wisdom) which is the product of accumulated 
practice and reflection on the experience it has provide~, 
or any other kind of knowledge one might care to 
distinguish. Without wishing to evaluate these various 
kinds, one may insist on the necessity of maintaining 
distinctions that have been found culturally valuable. 
Thus, in reply to whether it matters what label is 
given a discipline, so long as it "delivers the intellec-
tual goods" (cf. Searle (1975)), one is entitled to insist 
that it does. If there are problems in applying the 
defining terminology of science to an aspect of 
experience under inquiry, then one is entitled to 
question the status of the knowledge provided. And 
apart from a concern for "honest advertising", there is 
a deeper reason. If the knowledge provided is not of 
the confirmable scientific type, then one may ask the 
investigation. One wonders whether once the scientific 
style of presentation is removed, there is much differ-
ence between Chomskyan linguistics and, say, St. Thomas 
Aquinas' theory of cognition, which involves a similarly 
ingenious and elaborate complex of concepts to account 
for what is after all an "empirical" fact that people 
"know", "hold in memory", "make mistakes", etc •• 
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point of any accompanying scientific paraphernalia. If 
it is the ta~k of language-study to provide insight into 
language (rather than objectively verifiable knqwledge -
cf. Chomsky C1965), p. 20; though careful empirical work 
in the form of case-studies ~ have its place in the 
fields of~language-acquisition, language-disorders, etc.>, 
then surely a neatly-turned aphorism, a telling metaphor, 
may serve as well, if not better. In thinking of 
language, it seems that it is this sort of thought, 
whether it be carefully reasoned or brilliantly insight-
ful, that is fundamental 21 One appeals persua~~ipl~I 
to reflected experience, not to a body of available 
facts, when drawing theoretical distinctions. Even the 
"facts" that underly grammatical classification are 
argued for, and not defined according to characteristics 
under observation. There seems little reason to believe 
that the "intersubjective space" that language occupies 
is susceptible to analysis in terms of the sort of 
algebraic "language" that forms the backbone of reason-
ing in the sciences. 
Finally, if it is doubted that Chomsky's grammars 
~ell us anything significant about the natural world 
21 Pettit C1975> makes a similar point when he 
remarks "that the framework of concepts underliyng [sic 
the linguist's empirical or scientific analysis is the 
product of phi loSq:>hical argument ••• [which] is not the 
appeal, typical of science, to what the facts are like" 
Cp. 3). Though Pettit does, as this statement indicates, 
accept the scientific validity of Chomsky's work. 
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(anything more than a sort of freewheeling speculation 
could), then it might be asked what function, as 
"intellectual goods", the grammars it supports serve. 
For they certainly are not pedagogically useful: there 
is little point to presenting a language-learner with 
"laws" and techniques of an abstraction that would be 
kept from those beginning to learn physics. Th'~' 
extraordinary complexity, too, counts against them, a 
complexity that is to be expected to follow from an 
ideal of total explicitness. And on this ideal, it is 
perhaps worth pointing out that, as mentioned above 
Cp. 64>, formalization for its own sake is of no 
interest or value in mathematics. So unless some task 
other than merely "making explicit the native-speaker's 
intuitions" is made convincing, the need for formalized 
grammars is certainly debatable 22 
I have discussed Chomsky's thought ~t length 
because it seems to represent the most advanced attempt 
to reveal an actual structure in language, to place 
Saussure's "system" uniquely in the natural world. The 
22 For reasons I have not space to go into, I do 
not believe the ideas of "deep structure" or "trans-
formation" to be of much value to pedagogical gra~mars, 
even if they are imported without their formalized 
notation. Formalized grammars are, of course, necessary 
tools for research into machine-transl~ti6n and data-
retrieval systems, research which does not, though, 
concern itself with the more ambitious task of devising 
a "theory of language" or achieving empirically accurate 
descrip~ion of a language. 
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desire to escape the charge of arbitrariness, the desire 
for completeness in the description of the believed 
uniformity of language, together with the conceptual 
tools ~o make the desires seem feasible, make him the 
most interesting of the structural linguists. With 
Chomsky, it seems, Saussure's ideal of a ·science of 
langue" could be realized - m~~ified certainly, but not 
altered essentially. That there are grounds to suspect 
the possibility of success is of interest. It suggests 
that perhaps al_l that is possible in linguistics is the 
accurate but relatively informal presentation of 
regularities perceived in each of the many aspects the 
23 phenomenon of language reveals ; and that the search 
for an over-arching system of language, able to be 
described in the way the archetrpe demands, in unitary 
terms, explicitly and completely, is unrealistic_. This 
is not to deny the value of Saussure's insights - or the 
value of much _of the work of subsequent linguists. 
"System", as outlined roughly above (pp. 70-75), has 
proved, in many ways, a fruitful idea, and, with its 
associated notions, has helped sharpen intuitions about 
language. But adopted rigidly, or as refined in math-
ematics, it does not appear to be, if the criticisms of 
Chomsky's work are kept in mind, an altogether approp-
~iate import into the field of language~study. The 
23 This tentativeness can be found reflected in the 
work of two prominent linguists; see, for example, 
Hockett (1968) and Bolinger (1968). 
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description of language in its terms does not fit well 
w i th our i 1n tu i t i v e understand i n g of how l an g u age works -
which would not matter were it possible to ground the 
idea of language as a formal system in fact, but this, 
as has been suggested, does not appear to be the case. 
Of course, it is possible that, in time, a more or 
less adequate formalized descript~on of the syntax and 
semantics of language will be achieved and agreed on. 
The objections that have been raised are not, as I have 
said, conclusive; and the current research programme 
appears to be extensively and vigorously participated 
in. Yet, even if the modest goal of description, 
approximate but t~ue at a significant number of points, 
is arrived at, this will not mean·that all aspects of 
language as it is ased will be accounted for. The 
following paragraphs point briefly Cas Chapters One and 
Four deal with them more fully) to aspects, of particular 
interest to the study of literature, that formal grammars 
could say nothing about - or deliberately would not. 
Firstly, language would be viewe~ as "static" - in 
the sense suggested in Cha~ter One above. That is, its 
history would be viewed as successive transformations of 
synchronic states (presuming that these last may be 
successfully delimited - cf. Bohnert (1969), p. 268, and 
Hockett C1968), pp. 83-85), and its syntactic rules and 
- - ~- ··- - -~ ... -
its meanings would, for each syntactic state, be clearly-
defined. But, as was pointed out .earlier (Chapter One 
above), words in use, especially in creative use, are 
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involved in a complex interplay with the words that form 
their context. The meaning a word,i\':.l:t"V ~.~,:~n;:fue'~)tD 'fJ<~C~;.'J.) 
of its place in a semantic component's "dictionary", may 
well be clearly-defined on entering a context, but jt is 
unlikely that it will remain that way. A comparison will 
illustrate this point. In formalized discourse, as 
mentioned above (Chapter Two>, a word is assigned an 
unambiguous meaning at the outset of the discourse. It 
is this meaning that it carries with it to contexts out-
side its context of definition. But as the words it 
contracts new relations with are themselves clearly 
defined, and as those relations are understood in terms 
of a given logic, the word, no matter how far its use is 
extended within the discourse, will remain clearly 
defined. This is obviously not the case in non-formalized 
contexts. When a word enters into relations with the 
words in its contexts, it does not do so according to 
the rules of a formal logic. And, as, no matter how 
clearly defined the initial meaning of each word is 
believed to be, there is no way of charting precisely 
its relations with its neighbours, there can be no way 
of determining the influence they would have on its 
meaning. All that could be relied on would be what has 
to be relied on anyway when words are recognized as 
being naturally imprecise of meaning - a developed 























h f . . 24 ave or 1nteract1on • 
Related is the fact that no indication could be 
provided by a grammar of the "weighting" a word would 
have on its use in a particular context. Each meaning, 
on arrival into the context, would have~ as in formal 
discourse, an equal status. There would be no guide as 











which were to dominate and provide the focus of interest 1 
in the discourse. For this again, intuition Cof which 
the analyses in Empson C1951>, for example, provide 
excellent evidence) would have to be relied on, a~ 
intuition fed by the memory of actual daily discourse, 
of the ways, for example, rhythm is used in emphasis, 
but, more important, of a literary tradition that 
provides a store of themes, of central attitudes and 





have nothing to say about rhythm on a larger scale. For \ 
sentences, like individual words, are not given equal 
"weight", or_ serve the same function, in discourse. 
< There could be no guide to the way sentences are used in • 
' 
the expansion, modification and conclusion of a topic; ( 
f 
nor to the effects of juxtaposition and 'S::imi lar devices. \ 
Simply, it would not ~ave anything informative to say 
about the rhetorical forces at work in a passage. 
Perhaps more important than its inability to 
24 Chapters One and Four do, I hope, provide some 
sense of what I mean here. 
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illuminate the creative interplay of unit and context, 
is the inadequacy of any idea of language as a formal 
system to deal with language as a specifically cultural 
phenomenon. Perhaps the best way of approach to this 
aspect of language is by pointing out that a language 
~ 
i~ .. lived, that it is inextricably a part of the 
experience it organizes. Learning a first language 
Cand to a lesser extent, subsequent languages) is 
equivalent to entering a culture, learning the discrim-
inations and evaluations it makes, the attitudes it 
maintains, and, among all these, the choices it offers -
and none of these terms belongs in the vocabulary of 
"formal systems·. 
This feature of language can usefully (for present 
purposes) be regarded from two points of view. First, 
from that of the language-user, a language may be a 
cultural inheritance, but it is only breathed life into 
by an individual's spiritual existence, by his partici-
pation, enforced by life, in the distinctions bequeathed 
by previous generations. Language (working in coltab-
oration with immediate experience and memory) is thus 
the shaper of "the content of consciousness" CJ~rgensen, 
1962). And it is also the field of its activity in its 
personal, and other, encounters, and, qf course, the 
v 
prime means of its expression. It is this relation of 
the physical manifestation of language with the individ-
ual's "content of consciousness" ("e.g. a feeling, a 
need, a perceptual content, a thought, an attitude, etc.· -
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J0rgensen, 1962, p. 29) which indicates that one is 
dealing with language as patterns of symbols rather 
25 than a system of signs Symbols are, as Mrs. Langer 
has neatly phrased it, "repositories of experience" 
<1942, p. 288), more or less replete with the traces of 
both "sensuous and emotional" experience Cp. 283) - an 
experience of both object or event and the response or 
attitude towards it. Learning to understand these 
symbols, living through them, selecting from the 
conflicting evaluations they may offer, is to situate 
oneself within a culture, to take a stance against the 
"background of closely woven multiple meaning~ against 
which all conscious experiences and interpretations are 
measured" (p. 285). From this point of view Cone 
undoubtedly relevant to the study of literature, to the 
study of an art-form devoted to the verbal organization 
of experience and therefore indexical of personal eval-
uations and cultural expression), language is, rather 
th~n a system of signs <abstract entities outlining the 
form of language in its material and psychological 
aspects>, more accurately understood as the crucial 
means, to be explored with delicacy, of personal 
orientation in life which, for humanity, cannot be 
correctly conceived of but as characteristically culture-
,created. 
25 Barthes, interestingly,· admits this distinction 
and the limitation that the current emphasis on signs 




Second, there is the view-point of the analyst of 
cultural history - or the history of literature. 
Language, from this view, rather than an object of 
clear formal definition, is a densely patterned tapestry 
of symbols, each a vaguely-defined gestalt of meaning 
capturing all the elements of the related experience. 
These symbols are, of course, not private (though they 
may have private elements) - or commu~ication would not 
take place. Charting the relations between these 
symbols, entering into the experience they give form to, 
is to discover the intellectual and moral life of a 
culture. And as received ideas, received attitudes are 
continually~transformed under the pressure both of 
changing circumstance and the creative mind's perception 
of as-yet-unseen connections in experience, these changes 
are recorded in the language. Language thus provides an 
index of this change, and the means to its study. The 
same may be seen in the language of a creative writer -
his transformation of the interpretations and evaluations 
derived again from the differing features of h~s 
historical circumstance and his particular genius. And 
as these "languages" with their implicit interpretations, 
assessments, and attitudes confront the reader as. 
possible languages with which to organize his own exper-
ience, the differences in them, the different circum- , 
stances from which they grew (and which in turn they 
helped to mould), and the quality of mind they signify, 
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worthy of the closest attention. And again it is one 
that a grammar, whether formal or not, or any view of 
language through the filtering idea of "system", is not 
designed to deal with. 
~ 
Of course, this aspect of language as a cultural 
phenomenon can be viewed in terms of context - cultural 
context, in the sense suggested in Chapter One. Language-
learner and cultural analyst alike are concerned with 
the cultural meanings of words, and, in the quest for 
understanding, it is the experiential backgrounds giving 
words their meaning that needs to be searched through. 
And as this background is certainly not discovered "raw", 
but is rather experience as filtered through the 
discriminations created in a culture, understanding of 
language is effected in the exploration of the discrim-
inations the language embodies. (The essay cited above, 
p. 96 - Black (1962, pp. 95-139), is an excellent 
example, on a seemingly unfruitful topic, of the sort of 
sensitive exploration understood here, illustrating the 
dependence of analysis on considerations of related 
words and the events and institutions that give this 
portion of language life.> On this view~ then, it is 
the "tapestry of symbols" (with, as has been pointed 
out, dimensions not only obviously "linguistic", but 
experiential as well) which provides the contexts for 
understanding - which is reasonable, as poetry is not 















language is supplemented by work in the laboratory <or 3 
its equivalent). 
This leads to a point that may be made in 
conclusion to this chapter, before the effect of the 
use of the analogy in the study of literature is 
described. While the obviously physical manifestations 
of language may be understood as otganized as a system, 
and so represented formally, it seems impossible that 
meaning, dependent on fluid, indeterminate contexts of 
experience Can indeterminacy heighte.ned by the fact that 
language lives in different experiencers) ca~ be 
organized in the same way. And having seen the extent 
to which syntactic acceptability is conditioned by 
context, the same may also be said, with the above 
criticisms of Chomsky's attempt in mind, of ~yntax. 
This point can, of course, be related to the criticism 
made of Chomsky's attempt to construct his over-arching 
system representative of language, and _the charge that 
the commitment to the idea of system also makes language 
seem more precise and clearly defined than it in fact is. 
As is to be expected, and as the next chapter will 
demonstrate, both of these problems recur with the 
Structuralist use of system in literary studies; along 
with the fact that accent on system ignores the important 
aspect of language as a confrontation with the intelli-
gence, a confrontation that demands interpretation and, 







SYSTEM AND STRUCTURE IN LITERARY STUDIES 
When Roland Barthes writes: "I t~ink that the name 
of structuralism should today be reserved foo a method-
ological movement which 'specifically avows its direct 
link with linguistics. This would be to my mind the most 
precise criterion of definition" (quoted and translated 
in Culler (19~5>, p. 255), Culler dghtly comments: ::,, "The 
definition is apt, but ••• is scarcely precise. The 
approaches which it might include are extremely varied, 
both in their conception of criticism and in their use 
of linguistics". It must be conceded however that Barthes 
is perfectly aware of individual variations and that 
the definition <or criterion of definition) that he 
provides is perhaps as precise as can be made under the 
circumstances. Whichever way on~ decides however, it 
will be agreed on that Structuralist writing on literat-
ure Cas on other subjects) is far from homogeneous; 
nevertheless, that amid the somewhat bewildering variations, 
certain features in common can be detected - if not with 
perfect clarity. What follows is not concerned with 
examining these variations; this has been done Cin 
English) in a number of recent studies <Culler (1975), 
Pettit C1975) and Scholes C1974) are comprehensive>. The· 
. point is rather to state what I believe to be the most 
important "common factor" in structuralist writing and 
then ~o suggest grounds for believing that any study of 
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literature that is centred on it is either inadequate or 
mistakenly limits the nature of its subject. 
As was suggested at the beginning of this essay, in 
turning to linguistics for guidance or inspiration from 
its methods or its concepts, the idea that is invariably 
ab so r bed i n some f o rm o r o t h e r i s l i n g U :i;.s t i c s ' p r i me 
assumption that language is a system. As has been 
pointed out, this is Saussure's 'legacy: that the 
essence of language is a system, autonomous and under-
lying the fultiform phenomenon, constituted by inter-
dependent units, where each relation between them is 
differential and each difference is functional. It is 
here at this high level of generality, that the most 
important link with linguistics is made. For, put very 
briefly, the Structuralist endeavour is the analysis of 
literature according to this predication of language. 
In other words, the use of "system· is e~tended from its 
"literal" domain in linguistics to the domain of literary 
studies in the belief that it will prove useful and 
illuminating, or more strongly, that it will reveal, as 
it is supposed to do in the case of language, the 
essence of its subject. 
But t o i n v o k e l i n g u i s t i c s and t a l k o f an ;_g;t}id)~:;z:,m)ttC/J 
"underlying system" is to raise at least two important 
. - . 
questions; for the relation between langue(or competence) 
and literature is not immediately obvious. Is linguist-
ics to provide a scientific model (in the sense described 
in Chapter One above) for literary studies? And second, 
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what aspect of literature reveals the "system"? In 
answer to the first, it must be pointed out that 
Structuralism has not yet adequately Cas the chapter on 
Chomsky is intended to indicate) established linguistics 
as a science. Chomsky does appear to represent the most 
advanced thinker involved in the attempt to "discover" 
the system of language; and there remains reasonable 
doubt as to his success; Even were he eventually to 
succeed, it ~ould be at the price of an abstraction that 
deliberately ignores Cor, perhaps, in some cases, "leaves 
till later" ••• but~? if, as now, the first step is 
not successfully taken> the mental processes involved in 
interpreting and creating language in actual situations, 
and the life of language in a community of active and 
reflective individuals. Thus, even in the original 
domain the idea of "system" is not totally convincing. 
The matter is further complicated by the fact that the, 
concepts and techniques of analysis used in linguistics 
in the attempt to establish the "system" stand even less 
chance of successful application in literary studies. 
There is no "discovery procedure" Cof any kind) that will 
lead investigators to the same revealed essence of 
literature, or of a group of works, or of a particular 
work (cf. Culler C1975), pp. 20-24, 53, 57, 94-95). Nor 
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1 is there (.2.S.£..f! Culler ) a "competence" to be investigated 
1 Culler (1975) suggests the usefulness of the idea 
of literary competence. The analogy is with Chomsky's 
"linguistic competence", but, as Culler admits, is 
inexact Cp. 114). One is not dealing with competence in 
the technical sense of an abstract system of formal rules; 
there seems little point to talking of "construct[ingTJ a 
model to account for ••• the facts of interpretation in 
reading" Cp. 128). But though Culler's emphasis ("Reading 
is not an innocent activity", p. 129) is important, little 
seems lost if "reading strategies", for example, is 
substituted for "competence" - which suggests that the 
credibility of his ideas is afforded by the non-technical 
sense of the word, gaining little by association with 
Chomsky's. The same might be said of Culler's use of 
·explicitness". Explicitness is, no doubt, a professional 
virtue - in the sense of carefully making one's meaning 
clear, bringing connections to the surface and employing 
a measure of self-awareness (though perceptive and creative 
thought may be equally successful in aphoristic form). 
This is a sense which Culler continually employs. But he 
also invokes "explicitness" as understood in the context 
of formalized scientific discourse, of formal systems; 
and this is unconvincing and unnecessary, as he does not 
show himself concerned with attempting to develop the idea 
of a system of explicitly stated rules constituting 
literary competence. This invocation of linguistics is, 
however, not altogether harmless. No doubt as a result 
of the analogy, he posits a distinct literary competence, 
an idea that suffers from the same faults as Chomsky's 
original • .!..§. there a distinct literary competence apart 
from the general modes of interpretation1 When he writes, 
"The identification of sunset and death is further just-
ified by the convention which allows one to inscribe the 
poem in a poetic tradition" Cp. 115), he is surely wrong. 
Meaning-shifts, metaphors, "mythic correspondences" <such 
as the one he is pointing to), all such phenomena poetry 
makes use of are used and understood outside of poetry -
though in poetry they are of course in relief. The 
relation between literary and non-literary language (and 
experience) is no doubt of interest Cand importance, if 
the value of literature is to be affirmed>, but to post-
ulate a specifically literary competence, without first 
clarifying the complexity of this relation, is to invite 
oversimplification. Similarly, resort to an abstract 
competence in understanding reading processes turns 
attention from the role played by ideology and its 
implicit values. Why is it not "acceptable" to comment 
on the lines Empson has quoted: "Swiftly the years 
beyond recall. I Solemn the stillness of this spring 
morning." by beginning, "I see a river, willow trees 
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analogous to the object of Chomsky's study. Without 
going any further into this question, it would seem that 
linguistics provides <most reasonably and most often in 
fact) an archetypal analogy rather than a model - as, in 
the past, biology had already done. 
However, whether one attempts a "pure" Structuralist 
study, rhgidly applying the concepts and techniques of 
the linguistic model, or whether one uses, with greater 
or less emphasis, ideas drawn from linguistics as a 
means of creating a perspective, there <still> neverthe-
less remains the choice of what in literature involves 
the underlying system. Put briefly, three choices seem 
to be open. All literature may become the object of 
study - as can be noticed in the work of Todorov, Barthes 
<in one of his phases), and Culler. For example, 
Todorov writes: "Literature itself has to become the 
subject of an autonomous scientific study", where 
"scientific" indicates the use of a "coherent body of 
concepts and methods aiming at the knowledge of under-
lying laws". Another alternative is to seek system in a 
grouping of works - according to criteria of classification . 
such as authorship, either personal, or, as in the case 
trailing their branches through the rippling water, a 
man stands, head bowed, etc." - a style of explanatory 
fantasy that school-children, for example, are prone to. 
It seems that in "analysis", "objectivit~", "moral 
stance", etc., we are dealing with a cultural imperative 
that discussion of literary competence on the Chomskyan 
analogy does little to illuminate. Different styles of 
reading are entangled with different cultural values, 
and any account of reading processes would have to take 
this into account. 
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of Goldmann, "societal", and genre. Barthes' and 
Goldmann's studies of Racine, Todorov's study of Henry 
James' short stories, and the Structuralist studies of 
narrative fall into this category. Finally, there 
remains the option of searching for system in particular 
works. Greimas' research into methods of discovering 
the semantic coherence of a text and.~akobson's 
grammatical analyses fall into this last category. 
But to enter into a discussion of these variations in 
exploiting the Structuralist idea of the relevance of 
linguistics is, as has been noted, not of concern here •. 
If it is the case, as is suggested, that the link between 
linguistics and literary studies is most commonly the 
appropriation of the idea of "system", then it matters 
little how the idea functions in an analysis, or to 
which facet of literature it is applied. What is 
important is the body of associations the notion "system" 
brings to the understanding and analysis of literature, 
and their adequacy in the face of an undeniable complexity 
in the phenomenon. Thus it is of little importance what 
emphasis a particular writer gives the notion - the 
implications will always be there, only more or less 
prominent. Similarly, whether a writer chooses to think 
of one work, a group of works, or all literature as a 
"system" is irrelevant at this level of criticism - the 
commitment to a particular mental stance remains more or. 
less the same. In brief, it is the set of implications, 
the network of associations, which travel with the notion 
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from its original contexts and which contribute to the 
definition of an attitude towards the literary work, 
that wilt be the focus of attention. These associations, 
as they have been refined in mathematics, have been 
traced in Chapter Two, and how they characterize an 
approach in the study of language has, I hope, been 
sufficiently demonstrated in Chapter Three. This chap-
ter, then,wi ll be concerned with sketching the manner of 
the archetype's involvement in literary studies and with 
drawing out and criticizing some of the consequences. 
To give substance to the comments that will be made, 
I have chosen, as illustration, an analysis by Roman 
Jakobson (and Lawrence Jones>. An entry into the arena 
of Shakespeare criticism, it is an obvious choice (but, 
as it has understandably attracted attention in the 
English-speaking world, little can be said of it that is 
new>. Further reference will be made to other works, 
both by Jakobson and by other authors, but in the main 
this work will be focused on. 
As has been mentioned, Jakobson specializes in the 
analysis of individual works, usually poems. In the 
theory .that he has developed to govern his analyses, 
perhaps the prime distinction is between literary studies, 
"the objective scholarly analysis of verbal art", and 
criticism (Jakobson, 1960, p. 352>. With the accent on 
"verbal art~, attention is thus turned to verbal structure, 
the format properties of the poem's language, and their 
artistic arrangement. Jakobson is fond of making an 
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analogy between poetry and painting - particularly the 
geometric aspects of pictorial composition. He writes: 
"Poetics deals with problems of verbal structure, just 
as the analysis of painting is concerned with pictorial 
structure" C1960, p. 350), and, developing the analogy 
in Jakobson (1968): "There is ••• a remarkable analogy 
between the role of grammar in poetry and the painter's 
composition based on a latent or patent geometrical 
order or on a revulsion against geometrical arrangements" 
Cp. 605). What is significant in these passages is the 
formalist attitude: in the way that the analyst of 
painting is to reveal compositional configurations <the. 
necessary skeleton of the work), their type and relative 
density, so the analyst of a poem is to reveal its 
artistic manipulation of grammar - where "grammar" 
includes word-classes, classes of the various sub-
divisions of the word, and their types of arrangement. 
It is at this level of the formal features of the 
poem's language that Jakobson locates the system. For 
he maintains that the fundamental characteristic of 
poetry is its reliance on a distinctive function of 
language Cthe_"poetic"), which manifests itself as 
language controlled by "similarity ••• superimposed on 
contiguity", by "equivalence ••• promoted to the 
constitutive device of the sequence" (1968, p. 602). Of 
course, with the idea of similarity, of equivalence, 
enters that of contrast; the reiteration of a grammatical 
unit serves to mark a contrast between that unit and 
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other units similarly reiterated. Thus ideally, the 
unit on its own is unimportant; it is only in reiter-
ation that it gains functionality. But Jakobson makes 
a necessary but damaging Cas will appear more fully 
later> admission when he writes: "However effective is 
the emphasis on repetition in poetry ••• a phoneme that 
appears only once, but in a key word, in a pertinent 
position, against a contrastive background, may acquire 
a striking significance· (1960, pp. 373-4). This is 
surely so, but with the introduction of "pertinence"the 
domain of the purely formal is left. Either the system 
is constructed from units located purely distributionally 
or its claim to being "underlying" and determinate 
(operating subliminally on the reader - quoted in Culler 
(1975), p. 68> is pointless. The admission can be seen 
as an inconsistency (but a significant one) when the 
following statement of the aim of the analysis is 
considered. The analyst is to engage in the "unbiassed 
'[= uninfluenced by questions of pertinence?] , attentive, 
exhaustive, total description of the selection, distri-
bution and interrelations of diverse morphological 
classes and syntactic constructions" C1968, p. 602). As 
is evident from his analyses, this statement is incomplete. 
To remedy the deficiency, it can be said that the 
Jakobsonian analyst is to take into account a further 
set of "interrelations": those holding between relations 
on the grammatical level and those on the level of the 
formal units of versification - line Cand hence metre), 
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stanza, etc •• Thus his vision of a poem can be 
summarized as language organized into a balanced, 
symmetrical system of relations holding between a 
selection of the language's formal properties and a 
selection of versification's traditional units. 
This "Euclidean" understanding of poetry <that 
there exist determinate essences expressible schematic-
ally) is neatly captured in the following statement: 
"The abstractive power of thought, underlying ••• both 
geometrical relations and grammar, superimposes simple 
geometrical and grammatical figures upon the pictorial 
w o r l d o f pa r t i cu l a r ob j e c t s [ i n pa i n t i n g].] and upon t h e 
concrete lexical 'wherewithal' of the verbal art ••• " 
Uakobson, 1968, p. 606). That the status of "content" 
is relegated to a subordin~te role is obvious. And ·to 
an extent, Jakobson's emphasis is valid: the how of 
expression .i.§. what sets poetry apart <Culler's setting 
out as poems of two sentences, one from a newspaper, 
another from an essay by Quine, the logician, is a 
minor indication of how a statement is taken differently 
when cast as poetry (1975, pp. 161-163)) •. But there 
are problems with the way Jakobson develops this truism, 
as will become apparent in the following analysis. 
In the approach to Sonnet 129 (Jakobson and Jones 
<1970); the version used in their analysis is reprinted 
in Appendix B below), it is immediately obvious that 
the expected mental attitude has been brought to bear -
an attitude defined by acceptance of the original 
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Structuralist analogy. There is the initial definition 
of the constituent units, the naming of the existent 
relations, the drive toward precision and explicitness 
(the accent on formalism), towards the comprehensive 
description of the object and the demonstration, via 
this description, of its <underlying, essential) 
coherence. Briefly, an attitude that aims at the 
reduction, via that comprehensive description, of 
surface differences to a network of relations holding 
between the chosen units. The obvious question is 
wh~~her a literary work is either successfully or fruit-
fully approached in this way. Certainly difficulties 
and inadequacies can be pointed to relating to each 
component of this attitude. 
The choice of~ of constituent unit in Jakobson 
is relatively uncontroversial. The grammatical units are 
familiar - for example, adjectives, finites and sub-
stantives abstract and animate. Syntactic groupings and 
functions too are singled out. Being categories, they 
are typically understood as units; there is no 
unconvincing straitjacketing as occurs in Greimas' 
attempt (similar to Katz's - see Appendix A below> to 
segment the semantic level of language (for a detailed 
exposition and criticism, see Culler (1975), ch. 4). 
Nevertheless ~ though this is perhaps slight criticism -
J 
recourse to grammatical categories entails a dependence 
on contingencies within the discipline of linguistics, a 
discipline far from settled at present. Rival termin-
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ologies, resultant from the linguistic phenomenon being 
sliced in different ways, would, when applied to the 
same poem, produce different structures. Cit is perhaps 
. significant in this regard that Jakobson uses for the 
mos t pa r t a " n e u t r a l " t e rm i no l o g y , one t h a t w o 9· l d be a t 
home in traditional grammar.) With this possibility of 
a plurality of structures, gathered from co-existing 
linguistic systems, the interest in any one structure 
revealed by a single type of grammatical analysis can 
only be slight. With the larger formal units - hemistich, 
verse, distich and strophe - Jakobson is on safer ground, 
for the concepts and terms are relatively stable. But 
still, the incorporation into the structure of solely 
formal features must raise the question: What of 
"content" Cas traditionally understood)? And perhaps 
the further question: What is the validity and useful-
ness of maintaining the distinctions as rigidly as 
Jakobson's analyses do? The emphasis on grammatical 
analyses is usefully apprehended against the background 
of Wetherill's warning that "words are much more complex 
than the grammatical categories to which they belong ..... 
CWetheri l l, 1974, p. 72). 
Again the choice of relatjons is apparently 
innocuous. In the attempt to grasp the nature of any 
complex object, perception of similarities and 
differences among the component elements is the obvious 
procedure. And if the poem is identified at the level 
of grammatical texture, it is a perception of these 
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relations that will reveal the particular constitution 
of the poem. So the method (if the nature of a poem is 
not reflected upon too deeply) is plausible. A 
description of the method might be as follows. The 
larger units of verse-form are isolated and sub-div4ded. 
Each is potentially functional in the poem, that is, 
each may be potentially distinguishable as similar or 
contrasting with another unit of the same order. What 
brings their function into play, are the grammatical 
forms these units contain. Thus the next step is a 
description of the grammatical features of the poem and 
their location, or, to put it another way, their 
distribution with relation to the units of verse-form. 
Thus, in the analysis of "Th'Expence of Spirit", 
Jakobson can write: "The terminal couplet[one of the 
verse-form units which may be distinguished from the 
rest of the poem]ppposes concrete and primary nouns to 
the abstract and/or deverbative nouns of the.~uatrains" 
< p • 2 7) • S i mi l a r l y , the fun ct i on i n g of '~em i st i ch s 
within the lines is marked by a parallelism of features 
~bout the caesura. Further, he finds such parallelism 
in all lines of the sonnet but the central two - thus 
noting the central distich as ~et apart from the.six 
lines on either side of it Cp. 29). 
But this sort of approach to "discovering" the 
structure of the poem is not without its inherent weak-
ness, as has been pointed out. And this is compounded 
by a more serious weakness that Culler has described 
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well. He is worth quoting and at length. 
One.can produce distributional categories almost 
ad libitum. One might, for example, begin by 
studying the distribution of substantives and 
distinguish between those which were objects of 
singular verbs and those which were subjects. 
Going one step further, one might distinguish 
between those which were objects of singular verbs 
and those which were objects of plural verbs, and 
then one might subdivide each of these classes 
according to the tense of the verbs. This process 
of progressive differentiation can produce an 
tlmost unlimited number of distributional classes, 
and thus ••• if one wants to show, for example, 
that the first and last stanzas of a poem are 
related by a similar distribution of some linguistic 
item, one can always define a category such that its 
members will be symmetrically d~i .... $'ff.-'j!l:>uf'~d· t5'.e"tween 
thent.w.0~11stanzas. 
. ".f -
(1975, p. 58) 
The point is damaging. For though the method itself is 
quite clearly specified, it is not sufficiently restrict-
ive, allowing patterns to be found wherever looked for 
(as Culler's reductio ad absurdum demonstrates - p. 63) 
and thus calling into question the essential nature (and 
hence interest> of whichever patterns are found. 
Quite beside this internal weakness in the approach, 
there remains reasonable doubt as to whether relations· 
between words in a poem are usefully conceived of in 
this way. Wetherill's point is relevant at this level 
as well. The complexity of the word naturally effects 
the relations it contracts, a ~omplexity that surely 
involves what Jakobson has separated out as the -~here-
withal". While an emphasis on the formal may provide a 
semblance of precision, it is precision gained by 
ignoring the effective role of "content". 
This point becomes urgent when the drive towards 
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demonstrating structure via comprehensive description is 
considered. As has been suggested, this concern with 
exhibiting coherence by focusing on abstracted internal 
Cand functional) properties is an important hallmark of 
considering the investigated object as a system. 
Jakobson thus begins his analysis by abstracting the 
functional units of verse-form. The poem is an English 
sonnet, comprising three quatrains and a concluding 
couplet. These four strophes organize the poem by 
entering into contrastive relations with each other in 
four different ways. The inner two are linked in 
opposition to the outer, the even are linked against the 
odd, the first two are linked against the last, and. the 
couplet is opposed to the quatrains. These oppositions 
can be represented as: 
abba, abab, aabb, aaab. 
Presuffi~bly it is intuitively recognized that oppositions 
represented by 
abaa, baaa, aaba 
are not functional - for the question that they might 
perhaps be so is not considered. Similarly, there is no 
mention of a possible opposition between octave and 
sestet - a point that is important. He discovers instead 
that the central distich is a functional unit, disting-
uished texturally from the six lines that lie on either 
side of it. 
In the chapters following, he sets out to demonstrate 
how the system ,B;tfoppositions is actualized in the language 
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of the poem. For example, in the chapter entitled, "Odd 
against Even", he writes: "The odd strophes in contra-
distinction to the even ones abourid~i~ substantives and 
adjectives: seventeen C9 + 8> substantives versus six 
C2 + 4>, as well as ten adjectives C8 + 2) versus one 
(1 + #) •••• Only in the odd strophes do substantives 
occur as modifiers of other substantives or of adjectives 
C6 + 4)" (pp. 19-20). And, in "Outer against Inner", 
"The inner strophes are devoid of finites, but comprise 
ten C6 + 4) participles. On the other hand, the outer 
strophes are deprived of participles, but each of these 
strophes contains one finite which occurs twice in the 
coordinate clauses linked by a conjunction ••• • Cp. 23). 
Observations of this sort are collected until most words 
are assigned a function, and a complex of interrelations 
between the formal units is developed. But the lure of 
comprehensive description can result in the detailing of 
somewhat uninteresting patterns - laying the analyst 
open to the charge of what Pettit has dismissingly 
called, "pattern-picking" (1975, p. 41). An example is 
the following: "The anterior strophes show an internal 
alternation of definite and indefinite articles, one~ 
followed by an A in I and one A followed by one the in 
II, whereas the posterior strophes contain only indefinite 
articles (four in III) or only definite <two in IV)" 
Cp. 25>. A fair portion of Chapter Nine ("Couplet against 
Quatrains") is of this sort. Jakobson would no doubt 
reply that while such details might appear uninteresting 
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to the critic, "objective scholarly analysis" reveals 
their role in filling out the design of the poem. And 
this may be so. 
H 0 we v er. i t d 0 es ca l l i n t 0 6'~ e S;S\t,i~rd:·~·b~~ v~.fu~ti:J~.:i.t> 
of the design so discovered. Leishman, in another but 
r~lated context, has remarked: 
There are ••• literally hundreds of places in 
Ronsard where he is imitating particular passages 
in particular poets, ancient and modern, but I 
doubt whether he carried in his ~ead and habitually 
tried to exemplify all the innum~~ible classifica-
tions of formal rhetoric. It seems to me much more 
likely that he said something like: "Here I'll do 
the sort of thing that so-and-so does at so-and-so" 
( 1962, p. 152) 
The point seems obvious, but it nevertheless seemed 
necessary to Leishman to make it. And it may be adapted 
to fit this present context. For while the poet certainly 
carries in his head, along with a general sense of 
design, both a sense of his language's potential to make 
patterns and a particular sense of poetic design provided 
by tradition, a poem is not - except when pattern is 
obviously the poet's subject - written to exemplify a 
pattern. Without developing the subject at this point, 
patterning surely functions in the service of a 
communicative intention. And it need not be deli~erately 
utilized; poets have never felt the need to asterisk 
those that they consci~usly intended. All that is 
n~cessary is that it appears functional, that it provides 
~ sense of supporting a meaning that plausibly fits in 
with the meaning of the work in its rather i LL-defined 
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totality. Of course, (as Jakobson's analysis inadvert-
ently demonstrates> not all p•tterning ne~d function in 
this way. Phonetic or syntactic correspondences do not 
in themselves give value to a piece of language <and may 
belong as much to discursive prose as to poetry - as 
Culler has demonstrated (1975, p. 63)). Jakobson, thus, 
by following lines of thought provided by the "system" 
analogy, appears to approach the topic of formal 
patterning from the wrong direction. Rattfer than 
.~,Lt 
constituting the essence of the poem, independently of 
the "wherewithal" it organizes, functional patterning is 
more sensibly conceived ~~ as dependent .on prior questions 
of significance. 
But I do not wish to give the impression that 
Jakobson ignores questions of meaning; for he does not. 
Yet the way he treats them is symptomatic. In an early 
chapter <entitled "Interpretation"), before setting out 
the system of formal oppositions, Jakobson provides a 
"tentative explanatory rewording [of the sonnetl], 
literal as far as possible" (p. 14). It is wort~ quoting 
in full. 
I In action, lust is the expenditure of vital power 
<mind and semen) in a wasting of shame (chastity 
and genitalia), and until action, lust is delib-
erately treacherous, murderous, bloody, culpable, 
savage, intemperate, brutal, cruel, perfidious; 
II no sooner enjoyed than at once despised, no 
sooner crazi Ly sought than crazi Ly hated as a 
swallowed bait that has been purposely laid (for 
fornication and trapping) to make the taker mad. 
III Mad, both in pursuit and in possession, intemp-
erate after having had, when having, and in the 
quest to have a bliss while being tried and a 
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real woe after having been ~ried, beforehand a 
proposed joy, afterwards a phantom; 
IV All this is well-known to the world but nobody 
knows well enough to shun the heaven that leads 
men to this hell. 
And the chapter continues by justifying the assignment 
of two meanings each to "Spirit" and "shame", pointing to 
the commonly recognized practice of the Elizabethans to 
pun with these words. The method he has adopted appears 
obvious. Literal "equivalents" are provided for each of 
the words separately; then these "lexical units" are 
strung together to provide the literal paraphrase. That 
this is an inadequate and artificial approach to the 
l an g u age o f a po em h a s been i n d i c a t e d 1ifn: C h a pt e r On e 
above. A sense of the usual meanings of the words is 
undoubtedly necessary, but is solely useful as an entry, 
as a guide to the exploration of the unique semantic 
world the language of the poem <with the contexts it 
carries) creates. As has been noted, the "literal" does 
not provide a restingplace for understanding. It is no 
criterion of a poem's having been understood that 
literal equivalents can be found for words that strike 
the reader as "odd". If "Spirit" is to be understood as 
.. mind [?] and semen", the question to be asked is~ is 
"Spirit" used in this way in this context? What is the 
effect? And if "lust" is its "expence ••• in a waste of 
shame",~ is it so described? Does the rest of the 
poem provide any indication? Does the rest of the poet's 
oeuvre? Does the cultural mi lieu he inhabited? These 
are questions, necessary in the quest for understanding, 
146 
that Jakobson's method is not equipped to answer. 
Criticism can also be levelled at a lack of 
consistency in carrying out the literal paraphrase. If 
two meanings are assigned to "Spirit" and "shame", why 
• 
is the same not done for "waste"? That "waste" may not 
have been generally used in this way is of little 
interest and of no importance. The context allows 
"waste" to be understood both in the sense of "expen-
diture without compensatory, equivalent gain" and of 
"desert", senses which act as illuminating commentaries 
on each other (especially if Shakespeare's use of 
"husbandry" in some of the other sonnets is held in 
mind). There seems, moreover, no reason for limiting 
"lexical ambiguities" to obvious instances of punning; 
as there is none for limiting ambiguity to simply 
lexical ambiguity. The first line of this sonnet is in 
fact a wealth of significance; which Jakobson's 
"translation" does nothing to capture. To begin with, 
"Spirit" <in one of its senses) cannpt be understood 
simply as "mind". Certainly, something like "intelligent 
being" is intended; but this meaning is fused with that 
of "affective being". "Spi~it" Cin, for example, its 
conventional opposition to "the flesh") is the centre of 
moral life, the location of "humaneness"; and along with 
this significance from the language of morality, there 
is no doubt an overtone drawn from the language of 
religion - "spirib" as "soul". Rosen C1971, p. 37) has 
pointed out that "expence can mean not only "expend-
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iture" but also something like "loss" (see Sonnet 30, 
"And moan th'expence of many a vanish'd sight"). "Waste", 
as has been noted, admits of two readings: one that 
involves "expenditure" but denies any equivalent gain, 
and one that may be stated as "desert". "Shame", as 
Jakobson points out, has the sense both of emotional 
experience and the "parts of shame", the genitalia. And 
the complex of significance the line as a whole has on 
the textual level may be suggested by the following 
<taking the line as it functions in the sonnet, as the 
predicate of "lust in action"): that lust is the 
expenditure <carrying the idea of intention)/the loss 
<carrying the idea of the consequence of spending) of 
both the best in man (the seat of his nobility, his 
reason, emotions and affections)/the seminal fluid, in 
an arid, unfruitful atmosphere of shame/ in a wasteful 
use of the genitalia; that (for this is implied by the 
manner of statement) there is an "expence of Spirit" 
which i.§. fruitful, where there is gain equivalent to 
the loss, and that this is something other than "lust". 
Deepening this significance, but not developing it in 
any way, is another possible reading of the "th'expence 
of Spirit" as "the moment of death" ("the loss of the 
spirit/soul at the moment of death"), which brings into 
play the common Elizabethan (and it is not only theirs) 
identification of the moment of death with that of 
ejaculation (death as "expiry" and as the emission of 
"spirit"/semen). It is this complexity, this semantic 
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resonance that (along with its sonority and lack of verb) 
gives the line its force, and the sonnet, with its loose 
syntax, its momentum. And it is from this awareness of 
semantic complexity <rather than from an artificial 
"literal paraphrase") that, in the development of under-
standing, further questions are asked of thetext. 
But Jakobson does, in later chapters, make obser-
vations of interest. Even so, he studiously avoids 
drawing conclusions that might affect his interpretation. 
It (no. 129] is the only one among the 154 sonnets 
of the 1609 quarto which contains no personal or 
corresponding possessive pronouns. In Sonnets 5, 
68, 94 only third-person pronouns occur, while the 
rest of the sonnets make wide use of the first-
and second-person pronouns 
(p. 16) 
is offered baldly. This point could be profitably used, 
in parenthesis perhaps, to underscore a comment on the 
impersonality sensed in the poem. But this sort of 
detail on its own is worthless, gaining worth, as has 
been pointed out, only in support of some judgement of 
significance or effect. The same might be said for 
another linguistic detail he notices: 
Both animates of the sonnet, the two which pertain 
to the personal <human) gender, function as direct 
objects ••• 
But here he does continue: 
Both personal nouns of the poem characterize human 
beings as passive goals of extrinsic, nonhuman and 
inhuman actions. 
(p. 20) 
The exact statement of the interpretation may be 
disagreed with, but at least t~ere has been a move 
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beyond the mere listing of linguistic detail. 
In assessment, the major fault of Jakobson's work 
Cin this essay - which is not, however, inconsistent 
with his analysis of "Les Chats" and his theoretical 
writings) lies in the impression offered that he 
believes a poem to be merely meaning - a "semantic 
layer", unproblematically reducible to simple' literal 
statement - "dressed up" in albeit splendid symmetries 
of form. One seems to be returning to a variant of the 
Literalist idea of form as decoration - as against 
l
. . 2 comp 1cat1on • With this idea of an arbitrary relation 
between "form" and "content", Jakobson is ill-equipped 
to enter the critical arena - as his last chapter 
("Concluding Questions") demonstrates. He takes Ransom 
to task for complaining that this is no true sonnet, 
that it is merely a fourteen line poem with a concluding 
couplet, that it has "no logical organization at all" 
(1938, p. 535). His reply that it~ a true sonnet 
because it possesses "amazing external and internal 
structuration palpable to any responsive and unprejudiced 
reader", (while containing an element of truth) misses 
Ransom's point. For Ransom bases his claim on a 
perceived feature of the traditional sonnet - its 
argumentative structure, its sense of controlled, 
logical movement; and the presence of grammatical design 
2 This is not entirely fair if Jakobson's 
(inconsistent?) invocation of pertinence is borne in 
mind. 
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in language certainly does not imply the presence of 
logical structure. A proper reply might be that 
Shakespeare has usefully exploited just that fact, that 
he has filled out the sonnet form with grammatical 
design alone, but that that is no fault. For the lack 
of logical structure is appropriate to (or rather, 
supportive of) the significance of a poem exploring a 
force of life that exists "past reason". A similar 
criticism can be made of all Jakobson's "answers" to 
Shakespeare's detractors. And when he writes, "And is 
it believable that 'collapse recurs when a very wo 
fades into a dreame for the rime's sake' <Robertson, 
1926, p. 219)", one is entitled to retort that according 
to Jakobson's style of analysis, every word is chosen 
"for the rime's sake". Weakness is again apparent in 
his criticism of Graves and Riding for their "surmise 
of the free and infinite multiplicity of semantic load 
attributed to Sonnet 129". Some of their readings are 
certainly far-fetched; but ~eference to "poetic texture", 
as Jakobson understands it, can neither corroborate or 
deny their "surmise". Only an attention to language in 
its potential to create meaning in more or less 
controlled fashion can do that. It is this last chapter 
of the essay that reveals best the impotence and manner 
of irrelevance of Jakobson's appro~ch. 
And it is to the primal analogy with "system" that 
much of the inadequacy in Jakobson's analysis can be 
traced - and, I suggest, the same might be said of any 
151 
sensed inadequacy in the work of other Structuralist 
writers. The defects can be related to the two main 
points in criticism of the use of the analogy in 
language-study. Conceiving of language as a formal 
system cannot account, first, for the creative play 
within language that takes place in the grasping and 
production of meaning, and, second, for language as a 
cultural (as opposed to a merely social) phenomenon. 
While it may be argued that this is not of serious 
consequence to linguistics - in that its objective is 
scientific, and hence its procedure is necessarily 
selective - the same case cannot be made for the study 
of literature. If there are problems with conceiving of 
linguistics as scientific Cas I believe there are), the 
idea of attempting to fit the conceptualaaparatus of the 
successful sciences onto the study of literature is 
immediately absurd. The search for a "system of laws" 
underlying the phenomenon of literature cannot result in 
anything convincing - and the claim that any tendencies 
discovered are "laws" is to use language too loosely. 
Thus, there is all the more reason to stress any features 
of the full experience of literature that are ignored in 
the pracess of conceiving it as "system". 
As I have suggested, the first stage in thinking in 
terms of "system" would be to isolate units in terms of 
which the system and its structures are to be "recon-
structed" (cf. Barthes (1964), pp. 214-215). This would 
amount to the abstraction from the experience of the 
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literary work of properties usually of a single type 
believed essential, that is, in terms of which it is 
believed the internal coherence of the work can be 
revealed. This process has been pointed to in the work 
of Jakobson, and the price of abstraction noted. The 
approach of Greimas is similar (cf. Greimas (1970) and, 
for criticism, Culler (1975), ch. 4), and can, on 
similar grounds, be criticized. Though he does concern 
himself with the "semantic layer" of the work, the 
definition of lexical units, as has been suggested a 
number of times above, tends to be arbitrary and 
limiting, disallowing words their potential for inter-
action. Barthes' analysis of Racine's plays in terms of 
"mythic forms" (Father, Sun, etc. - though he is not 
single-minded in his approach), while being in many ways 
different, still categorizes (using terms of the same 
kind), and then observes the interrelationship of these 
categories. In each procedure, the mind is drawn from 
the "surface" of the text by way of classification 
according to a single scheme, which thereafter becomes 
the focus of interest. 
Motivation is thus the desire to find categories of 
a type that will relate the largest possible number of 
details of the text(s) - and then to set about 
"reconstruction" in their terms. But once categorized, 
a detail is "fixed" to a single significance. Words, 
however, and the larger non-linguistic elements that 
can enter a literary text (such as action, event, 
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characters and their utterances), do not enter the text 
with a single precise meaning. As has~been pointed out, 
this is one crucial difference between a literary text 
and formalized discourse. And, were words thought of 
<unrealistically) as such, there would still be no way 
of charting precisely their transformation within the 
ling~istic context. On both counts, to "fix" the 
significance of a detail with a single category is to 
misrepresent the true state of affairs in which words 
(and the larger non-linguistic elements) enter a text 
"trailing clouds of meaning", which, once in the 
environment of the text, interact and fuse in ways that 
are not precisely specifiable. To this, the 
Structuralist might reply that he is not interested in 
this sort of meaning - that it is the functional 
significance of a detail that he concerns himself with 
(cf. Todorov (1970), p. 130). Details enter a text and 
become significant by reference to the role they play 
in contributing to the coherence of the text. It is 
this role that gives the detail meaning within the work. 
But, at worst, this accent on functional significance 
can result in the sort of irrelevancies noticed in 
Jakobson's analysis; and, at best, the sort of partial 
study evidenced by Barthes' analysis in terms of mythic 
forms. Elements of a literary work have, in general, 
the potential to function multiply. Primari Ly though, 
their function is to recall the ~ontexts from which they 
gain their intelligibility. And any reader, before he 
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seeks to determine what other functions they may have, 
has necessarily to take this one into account. To 
consider any element solely in terms of its function in 
contributing to coherence is to limit its significance. 
The result is, of course, a simplification of the 
literary work. In the case of Jakobson's analysis the 
simplification is obvious and serious; in Barthes' and 
the narrative theorists' <who seek unity at the level 
of plot) simplification is less drastic, but still 
noticeable. 
For the question that must be asked is: What 
value or interest have the patterns or structures that 
are revealed if they are based on a deliberately 
restrictive approach to the~language of the work? The 
analogy with "system" invites a procedure ~hat combines 
systematic abstraction from the numerous aspects of a 
work with the work's reconstruction in terms of the 
formal properties chosen. In mathematics, as indicated 
in Chapter Two above, this mode of thought has proved 
extraordinarily enlightening and fruitful. The same 
may be said of its role in the physical sciences, where 
methods of confirmation validate the abstraction. But 
in the study of literature it would appear to be of 
dubious value. The literary work is accessible only 
through language <obviously), but more importantly, 
through a reading of its language. And the reading of 
any text involves, from the outset, the exploration of 
any significance its language permits. At all times in 
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an attentive reading, one is engaged in relating any 
potential for significance details of the text might 
have. The process begins with the very first sentence, 
with the tentative grasp of its possible meanings, and 
then continues through expectations of how the meanings 
are to be developed, arid, when those expectations are 
denied or confirmed, through a modification or consol-
idation of significance already discovered, till at the 
end of the work a sense of gestalt is achieved~- The __ ,, 
movement of attention is always, under pressure of a 
continually changing context, moving backwards, forwards 
through the text, retaining details that fit the emergent 
gestalt and, more or less unconsciously, discarding those 
that do not. Yet these details, especially in larger, 
more complex works, retain their potential to signify, a 
potential actualized perhaps by an alternate reading. As 
Iser remarks: "The semantic possibilities of the text 
will always remain far richer than any configurative 
meaning formed while reading" (1971, p. 290). And this 
would appear to be so because the significance of any 
detail of a literary work is not precisely definable, 
because in literature one is dealing with an accumulation 
of nuances, of suggestions of meaning that may be validly 
organized in different ways. An approach, viewing the 
work in terms of "system", that, while operating at a 
3 I · h" . k l d t 1s necessary at t 1s po1nt to ac now e ge a 
debt to an excellent analysis of the reading process in 
Iser (1971>. 
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sufficiently high level of abstraction, "fixes" a 
detail (thus terminating the process of suggestion 
4
> 
in terms of what it shares with other details in the 
work, must necessari Ly ignore this fact of literary 
language. And an approach that searches for structure 
in this.way may in this regard be considered inadequate. 
The second ·type of objection can, as has been 
suggested, be related to the ,i:nabi lity Cor, more 
accurately, the argued policy of ignoring) of structural 
linguistics to account for language as a cultural 
phenomenon, as a richly textured world of symbols, and 
not merely a system of signs. S e e pp • 1 21 - 1 2 ·6~~1i'f>o v e • ) ~ -~- ·~-
This objection is not altogether distinct from the one 
just detailed. For thinking of a work Cor "corpus" of 
works) in terms of "system" bases a discovered coherence 
on a systematic limitation of the significance of indi-
vidual details. In this sense, it is untrue to the 
language and signifying power of the work. At the same 
time Cand as will be seen, partly for the same reason), 
4 Not all Structuralist writing can be criticized 
in this way. For example, in that most interesting of 
developments in Structuralist thinking, '§1.1,., Barthes 
turns his back on "the first analysts of narratives ••• 
who sought to see all the world's stories ••• in a single 
structure", complaining justly that "the text thereby 
loses its difference" <1970, p. 3) •. The notion of 
internal coherence t9o_is modified somewhat. Details of 
the text are admitted to function multiply in terms of a 
limited number of codes that interlace, and thereby give 
a sort of coherence to, the text. A detail may, and most 
do, function within more than one of these codes at a 
time. 
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the concern with a purely internal coherence, with the 
purely functional role of its elements, isolates the 
w o r k f r om t h e cu l t u r a l cont ex t ( i n t h e b .:r. O,·a d e s t s ens e) 
in which it gains life. Questions of the way in which 
it uses language in the evaluation of experience are 
ignored; as are questions of i~s particular relations 
to its author, to tradition (including both a 
specifically "poetic" tradition of literary forms, 
and also modes of thought and evaluation made available 
in a culture to an author>, and, perhaps most important, 
to its reader. For, in taking up a Structuralist stance 
towards a work, the reader (as ~nalyst", isolating 
essential, formal "properties", revealing the constitution 
of the work in terms of these with their invariably 
abstract, categorizing names and the relations that 
hold between them) adopts the acultural pose of the 
natural sciences (and the mathematics on which they are 
based), a pose which has, in the past, been the source 
of their strength C.ru::u;! ability to threaten, since this 
strength inhe.res in knowledge ideally beyond cultural 
control). That this attitude is acknowledged - and 
valued - is apparent from the numerous claims to 
"objectivity" and "being scientific" (cf. the quotation 
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from Jakobson above Cp. 133), and Todorov (1969, 1973> 5 
However, if, on the other hand, the reader turns his 
attention from the "objective" search for a purely 
formal, internal coherence, and, in the process, allows 
language its full signifying power, it is difficult to 
imagine how questions of the work's cultural "situation" -
and equally the reader's "situation" in response to the 
complex experience the work provides - can be avoided. 
An illustration of this point will be the concern of 
what follows, with, for convenience, the language of 
Sonnet 129 providing the point of entry. There will be 
no attempt to develop a comprehensive statement, as the 
~:;.f 
intention is merely to suggest aspects of one way in 
which the Structuralist vision limits the nature of the 
literary work. 
As was suggested earlier in this essay, language 
gains intelligibility from its use in all the various 
facets of exp er i enc e, i n the ways of q,v i n g out , and 
~oping with, existence. It is by reference to these 
5 That I believe this is an attitude merely, I have 
indicated elsewhere. It seems impossible that "poetics" 
or the analysis of single works can provide anything like 
the confirmable knowledge ideally provided by the natural 
sciences. It is at this level of acultural attitude that 
criticism would apply to someone 'like Goldmann, who does 
appear to relate the literary work to its background. 
But perhaps not only at that Level. For his "methodology" 
(reducing the work to a structure "isomorphic" with the 
social structure of its background) seems to inhibit the 
statement in any subtlety of the particular relation a 
particular author might have with his historical circum-
stances and express through his work. See, for example, 
Goldmann (1970); and for criticism in general valid, 
Doubrovsky (1966), ch. 8. 
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contexts of use, and the relative place they occupy 
within them, that words gain their meaning. The involve-
ment wi~h life is intimate, so that language, in the 
various forms it may take, naturally expresses the 
language-user's (in both the normal sense, and the 
extended sense of "community") discriminations and 
choices. Even the language of science contains an 
implicit evaluation. But the language of the individual, 
in his attempt to organize and understand experience, in 
his use of language to guide and justify his actions, is 
more or less overtly evaluative. Evalµation is built 
into the very substance of this type of language; as, in 
scientific language, it is deliberately excluded. But 
whether evaluation is overt or covert, it remains an 
element (which may or may not be relevant) of a piece of 
language's meaning, and in any full understanding of the 
language has to be taken into account. 
This becomes immediately apparent when, ~~ the 
~ 
second line of Sonnet 129, one encounters the word "lust". 
First, to underline the relation of language to life, it 
is extremely doubtful whether anyone who has not 
experienced sexual desire or the possible complexities, 
emotional and moral, involved in human sexual relation-
ships, will gather the full force of the word. The 
linguistic context (which is a series of predications on 
"lust") and a dictionary may help towards forming an 
idea of what is meant, but without that experiential 
meaning, its significance will be thin. More important, 
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"lust" is not simply ."sexual desire". It is s~xual 
desire as seen by a culture at a particular time (the 
word is singularly "un-twentieth century"). It is one 
way of understanding the phenomenon of sex, a way which 
can be understood in turn by searching out its·common 
associations ("merely animal", "belonging to the flesh, 
and so opposed to the spiritual", "excessive, unrestrained", 
etc.), and by seeing it in contrast with words related 
to the same phenomenon (for example, "love" and its 
assoc~ations), and by arriving at a sense of its eval-
uative content by seeing it in its place in the network 
f l l . d" d 6 o cu tura mean1ng so 1scovere In this, the 
immediate linguistic context is of little assistance. 
The word on arrival in the context is already permeated 
with cultural meaning, a meaning that it is the context's 
task to elucidate, develop or deny. 
That the meanings of words may be transformed by 
their context does not need to be stressed. But perhaps 
what does, is that this transformation is itself signi-
ficant. For, as in the case of metaphor, the original 
meaning is not altogether lost; there remains a "tension· 
between old use and new. "Heaven" and "hell'' in the last 
6 And the question of the value of this way of 
responding to the phenomenon cannot be ignored, as, by its 
very difference, it calls into question contemporary 
attitudes. What is the relation between the positive and 
negative aspects of the response? What is the difference 
between this polarizing attitude .and one typically 
contemporary? What has been lost/gained in the historical 
transformation? These are all questions a full response 
to the language sooner or later demands. 
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line of the sonnet recall the original context of 
Christianity; but the use to which they are put in the 
poem is far from customary - indeed it verges on the 
blasphemous. "Heaven" in the poem refers solely to the 
"blisse·, the "joy" in consummating the sexual act; and 
"hell", similarly stripped of its otherwordly connota-
tions, not only to what feelings of disgust and degra-
dation follow immediately after, but also to the 
experience of acute mental turmoil and instability in 
the clutches of "lust" in all its stages, and the 
sensed loss of human dignity this implies. And ulti-
mately, "hell" refers to the "world", characterized by 
a treachery, savagery, cruelty, etc., for which, it is 
implied, a part of the cause can be found in men's 
slavery to the sexual impulse. But the original context 
of "heaven" and "hell" is not forgotten, thus raising 
7 questions of Shakespeare's relation to Christianity 
and, in general, to the thought of his time. For 
certainly, one interpretation of this transformation of 
meaning is that for Shakespeare as he expresses himself 
in this sonnet, Christianity with its ascetic ideals, 
its call for the "renunciation of the flesh", is 
(bitterly> without hope of efficacy, without meaning in 
a world of men irredeemably "savage" (can the meaning 
"natural" via that of "wood" be ignored?), incapable of 
7 
Questions that have, for example, been provoc-
atively raised in Kaufmann <1959), especially ch. 1. 
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sexual restraint (or any other kind? for sex works here 
as something of a symbol for general baseness). And 
plausibility could be increased by discovering similar 
attitudes in other works (on the assumption of a certain 
coherence in Shakespeare's thought - King Lear and 
Hamlet, for example, would be relevant). At the same 
time, contrast with the particular attitudes of, say, 
Herbert, Donne and Milton <and, of course, Dante) would 
help in clarification and particularization. 
The language of the poem naturally invites questions 
and investigations such as these. There is, in the 
process of understanding, a continual movement from the 
immediate Level of the text, from the surface of 
dictionary meaning. And because understanding moves via 
the i LL-defined suggestive power of Language, because, 
in Literature, even choice of form is significant and 
calls to be interpreted, and because, ultimate~y, both 
Language and Literary form are pressed into the service 
of an interpretation of aspects of existence <which has 
meaning only through such interpretation), there is no 
point at which one can say understanding is complete 
(though there are obvious degrees of incompleteness). 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that no 
work has significance on its own - understanding can 
only be gained in a consideration of its "notness" 
~ 
(Leishman, 1971, p. 174). And, of course, none of this 
signi!icance is clearly defined. Yet it all plays its 
part in qualifying the Language of the work as it 
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appears at the surface. And here lies an important 
difference b~tween the language·of literature and that 
of the "exact sciences". In mathematics and in the 
formalized natural sciences, the meanings of terms are 
precisely intelligible, and their suggestive power 
(except in. the context of research, ~{f, attempted meaning-
extension) is nil. Understanding operates completely at 
the surface, gathering the meanings of the terms and the 
precisely defined relations that link them.. It is when 
one stops being a scientist and searches for the larger 
significance of the language-form, of the activity of the 
scientist, when one attempts an encomp9,~_:sing understand-
ing of science itself, that one leaves the realm of 
"two-dimensional" language and enters the world of 
interpretation that the reader of literature Cby virtue 
of its language) inhabits. For the language of 
literature demands this response in the way that the 
language of the exact sciences, with their controlled 
contexts, do not. 
Given the multiple and ill-defined signification of 
the details of a literary work, and that a full response 
to these details leads to questions of what might be 
called the "cultural situation" of the work, the case 
for "internal coherence" appears slight. Rather than a 
"system", the literary work might more accurately be 
considered a junction of relations (and certainly, none 
of them "precisely definable") converging on the 
linguistic level of the text - relations between work 
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and author, and other works by the same author 8 , 
between the work and similar works by different authors, 
between its effects and its form, etc •• The list does 
not attempt to be conclusive; for it seems that the 
factors can be permuted in, if not innumerable, 
certainly a large number of different ways, and then, 
even if the same permutation, combined with different 
emphasis. While each of these "aspects" of the work may 
provide the subject of fruitful study, and would find 
its relation to the work in perceived "patterns of 
coherence" 
9
, ani revelation of the "internal coherence" 
of the total work (or collection of works) would be 
artificial, based on a limitation of the nature of the 
work. 
As has been noted, the other limitation (though 
perhaps it is mare than that) that the analogy with 
system encourages is that between the work and its 
reader. This finds expression in the claims to being 
"objective" and "scientific". But it is in some of the 
writings of Barthes that it is most eloquently developed. 
-
(See, for example, Barthes (1963, 1964).) Barthes talks 
8 
For example, L. c. Knights has interestingly 
argued that as a group "the Sonnets yield their proper 
significance only when seen in the context of 
Shakespeare's development as a dramatist" (1946, p. 65); 
and, as has been pointed out, a fuller understanding of 
"lust" in ~onnet 129 can be gained by examining the 
exploration of "love" in the other sonnets - and the 
plays are not irrelevant either. 
9 
For a development of the idea of "aspect", see 
Jones C197S>, ch. S. 
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of criticism as functioning as a "metalanguage". This 
is a term borrowed from logic, where it marks an 
important distinction. Very roughly, it means "language0 
about language". Having constructed a system of logic, 
say, one would need a terminology with which to under-
stand it, in which to discriminate its properties, and, 
perhaps, to prove theorems about it in turn. Criticism 
then (as metalanguage) faces the work (as a coherent 
system) and seeks out the functional meaning of its 
elements and their rules of combination, thus 
"reconstituting" the "language" of the work in its 
(criticism's) own terms. This metalanguage is not 
specifically technical, "scientific". A critic may use 
any of the "languages of the day" CBarthes lists 
Existentialism, Marxism and psycho-analysis). All that 
is needed is that it be "homogeneous" and that it 
"saturate the entire object of which it speaks". And 
he bolsters this idea by somewhat loose talk of the 
critic's "absolute freedom" (though he does remark that 
the work itself may suggest which "language" may best 
reveal its coherence). It is not clear whether Barthes 
intends his analysis of criticism to be a statement of 
how things are, or of how they ought to be, but on 
either count it can be found wanting. Problems with 
regarding the work as a system have already been suggested 
<what value or interest is a coherence "established" by 
the mere fact that one has imposed a "homogeneous" 
language onto as many details as possible?). What .j~~s of 
~~--------------------..................... ._ 
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concern now is the natural corollary of regarding 
criticism as "metalanguage". 
The attitude is clearly limiting in two ways. It 
simplifies the relation of the reader to the past, and 
also, as a consequence, his relation to the present. 
To b!gin with, talk of "applying" a language-of-a~alysis 
to the work as object-language (with implications of 
the approach being a more or less mechanical technique, 
a "methodology") is, whatever other objections one 
might feel are pertinent, to ignore the complex 
relevance of "extra-literary" experience Cand the 
interpretation of it) to the understanding of any work 
of literature Ca relevance that reflects the intimate 
involvement of ~nguage with the complexity of life). 
The work does more than just "suggest which meta-
language to use". The reading of literature opens up 
successive visions of how life could possibly be inter-
preted and evaluated, each work leaving its mark on a 
reader's interpretation of his life, and thus, 
potentially, on the stance he may take in the face of 
each new literary work. The point becomes clearer 
when one considers what Barthes has called the "languages 
of the day". Like works of literature, these suffer 
no "virgin-birth". Each is born out of a sensitive 
and no doubt arduously achieved response to the present 
in a modification of terms from the past. And certainly 
Existentialism and psycho-analysis would have been 
inconceivable were it not for the prior insights of 
~~--------------------------............ _ 
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imaginative literature 10 
.Ignoring the mode of genesis of such "languages", 
ignoring their relevance to the perplexities of 
existence, Barthes asserts that all that is needed for 
them to be "valid" is that they be "coherent". But 
this is surely a misinformed borrowing from the realm 
of mathematics. As was pointed out, "coherence" became 
the prime value in mathematics when it was realized that 
mathematical thought need not be tied to an experience 
of the physical world, that it could generate signi-
ff cant thought independently of such experience. But 
apprehension of facets of human existence can never be 
considered "valid" without considerations of truth •. The 
fact that there are different ways of perceiving, 
different "languages" in which to describe, the same 
phenomenon does not invalidate this claim. The value 
of a "language" (whether it be the language of a work -
for example, Shakespeare's interpretation of sex - or 
the language used in a work's interpretation - for 
example, a particular style of sociology) does not lie 
primarily in its coherence. To assert this is to rest 
too easily in relativism, a relativism that Barthes with 
10 
It is significant that both modes of perception 
can b~ traced back to Nietzsche, who continually 
acknowledges his debt to writers such as Goethe and 
Shakespeare - and of course, the G~eek tragedians. This 
is, of course, not to say that Sophocles is a proto-
Nietzsche, proto-Freud or proto-Sartre; but that cultural 
knowledge, if not cumulative in the sense that scientific 
knowledge is, is historical, in the sense of its having a 
history which is part of its significance. 
~~------------------..................... ._ 
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his talk of the "equal value" of different languages 
and the "absolute freedom" of the re~der, happily 
espouses. But this is to ignore the fact that the 
choice of a language is of cultural moment, that 
particular languages, because of their involvement 
with particular styles of living, are open to 
criticism 11 • 
In combating relativism in another context (the 
philosophy of science), Mary Hesse has, after adapting 
Habermas' idea of "historiography as dialogue", written: 
What is required is a sympathetic attempt to enter 
into seventeenth ,;c~~l'Jl:B't.:i: tb,ciu,_g ht,:fttf;io r:;Jri·U2(B!n,g.'l~'p rob l ems 
without abandonment of the criteria provided by 
subsequent developments. History of science, like 
all history, is in principle written anew in every 
generation. Historical interpretations are 
irreducibly relative to the historian and his time, 
but it does not follow that they are relativist, if 
by this is meant that there are .Q.Q external 
criteria for the evaluation of past science. On 
the contrary, there are our criteria as they have 
emerged in the course of history. 
(Hesse, 1972, p. 287) 
11 
It is significant that when Structuralism was 
~harged during May 1968 with being a reactionary force 
in French intellectual life, L~vi-Strauss (rather 
damningly) replied that this was untrue, for Struc-
turalism lacked any political relevance whatsoever -
that it was a scientific method that could be used by 
any political persuasion in the study of another <cited 
in Gardner (1972), p. 223). Equally, of course, it 
could encourage the sort of fatalism that Barthes' talk 
of "equal value" implies, and that the following remark 
by L~vi-Strauss <made during an interview later published) 
exemplifies. In response to the question, "What 
significance do you attribute to your research?", he 
replied, • ••• one can only hope for a little improvement 
in our understanding of things .••• still knowing well 
that neither we nor anyone else will ever understand 
them. After all, the only way to reduce life's boredom 
lies in our pursuit of knowledge" (L~vi-Strauss, 1971, 
p. 44). 
169 
This passage as it stands is pregnant with thought 
relevant to the criticism of literature. But restricting 
attention to the matter at hand, one might say that 
criticism is a "dialogue" between, on the one hand, an 
interpretation of a literary work (based on a cognizance 
of the full signifying richness of language and literary 
form> and the reader's interpretation of experience on 
the other (which too is a kind of "dialogue"). And 
even though each interpretation is "irreducibly relative" 
to the critic and his time, there do remain grounds for 
"external criteria". The language of the work, in a 
full response, naturally involves the reader in questions 
of interpretation •nd evaluation of life - unlike the 
12 languages of mathematics and the sciences The 
selection of a "language" with which to elucidate a 
work thus becomes more than mere selection according 
more or less to whim or personal taste (languages pre-
packaged and labelled "Existentialism·, etc.). For the 
reader does not exist, act and interpret in isolation ,,. 
12 
Hence ideas of th~ subversiveness of literature. 
See, for example, Kaufmann (1959); and the following 
remark of Trilling's is relevant. • ••• Structures of 
words they [authors] may indeed have created, but these 
strucr~res were not pyramids or triumphal arches, they 
were manifestly contrived to be not static and commem-
orative but mobile and aggressive, and one does not 
describe a ••• howitzer or a tank without estimating 
how much damage it can do" (1963, pp. 26-27). Of course, 
this estimation of the effect of literature is 
particularly modern, but this in itself does not 
invalidate the point that effect is relevant in dis-
cussi~n of literature. 
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("integrity" is not the prime moral value>. The choice 
of a language is a matter for responsible and reasoned 
thought, for its dissemination necessarily has its 
effect on the intellectual and cultural life of the 
community. And it is in this responsibility to the 
cultural needs of a community that, ultimately, 
"external criteria" for the choice of a critical 




With each of the previous chapters being to a 
certain extent self-contained, each devoted to subjects 
(and ways of treating them) usually kept distinct, there 
is perhaps the need to draw together the connecting 
strands. Only a summary which is simply schematic will 
be necessary, as the topics in each of the chapters have 
<I hope) been treated sufficiently exhaustively. 
As was suggested, many of the reasons for whatever 
dissatisfaction may be felt with the products of 
Structuralist analyses of literature can be traced to 
the basic metaphor of system (and thus also structure). 
The "system" here, of course, is the system of language; 
and many dissatisfactory features of this metaphoric 
extension may be seen as already inherent in the original 
predication. For, as problems attached to Chomsky's 
attempt to establish linguistics as a respectable science 
indicate, the use of "system" (and "structure") in 
language-study can not be accepted as literal. As a 
basic metaphor, it may provide some illumination of a 
part of the phenomenon; but then what remains ..!lQ.1 
illuminated may well be of equal interest, and perhaps 
more deserving of attention <as, I suggest, for the 
study of literature, it is). 
The idea of the basic metaphor, apart from providing 
a framework within which to understand the use of the 
"system· idea in the Structuralist study of literature, 
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brings with it as well an ideological history which 
suggests what those unaccounted-for aspects ofilanguage 
(and hence literature) might be. For it is at home with 
a view of metaphor that is, in turn, the most compatible 
with the distinctively modern ideas of language as 
naturally fluid, ideas that accept as natural, and 
account fo~ the continual process of meaning-change 
(amongst other sorts of change) in a language. Crucial 
to this view is the idea of "context" Call its different 
types) for the role that it plays in helping to account 
for this continual transformation and extension of 
meaning. And it is largely against this background of 
a recognition of the fluidity of language and the role 
the various ill-defined contexts play in maintaining 
this fluidity, that the inadequacy of ·the basic metaphor 
can be viewed. 
A glance at the way "system" is used in mathematics 
shows that to treat an object of study as a "system" is 
to search for a description of the object's internal 
coherence, a descr,,i~.Ption that is as comprehensive as 
necessary or as possible. More important, according to 
the procedure of mathematical thought, this description 
is made after a process of abstraction in terms of a 
limited number of formal properties which, it is assumed, 
will reveal the essential "design" of the object. In an 
empirical science, the particular abstraction chosen is 
either confirmed or disconfirmed experimentally. Problems 
with the notion of evidence in Chomskyan linguistics 
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indicate that what might, following the natural sciences, 
have been called a "legitimate idealization" of the 
object, is perhaps after all only a rough approximation. 
And in the case of literature, it might well be asked 
what the value is of the sort of abstraction so 
important in mathematics and the mathematically based 
sciences. Surely it is the"burdensome and irrelevant 
detail" so fruitfully avoided in mathematics which 
constitutes the complexity and value of the literary 
text. A claim that any detail is "burdensome or 
jrrelevant" in an effective work must surety be mis-
guided. 
The concern with "system" invites as well a 
description of the properties and relations, of the 
internal coherence, that is completely explicit. The 
value of comprehensive and explicit description in 
language-study is dubious (that is, if its achievement 
were ever to be possible, were it to escape collapse 
under the weight of its own complexity>; and is even 
more certainly out of place in literary studies. If a 
telling phrase can express an intuitive grasp of the 
work, what is the point of making explicit the grounds 
of that intuition in the structure of the work? In 
mathematics, "systematization" served, and still serves, 
a purpose beyond mere "making explicit".~t is hard to 
imagine what that further purpose might be in literary 
studies. 
Related to. this concern with a purely internal 
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coherence is the lack of concern with questions about 
relations to an "external reality" Ca lack of concern 
understandable, as was demonstrated, in the context of 
mathematics). This has been shown to manifest itself 
in an interest in language as constituted by signs 
rather than symbols; and what is left unaccounted for 
~as been suggested. Put perhaps over-succintly, this 
/ 
' may be described as the meaning an i LL-defined but all-
important experience of life infuses into language, a 
life, of which, to make the matter perhaps inextricably 
complicated, language in its discriminating power is a 
crucial part. 
I 
In the study of literature, this limitation / 
manifests itself in ways more pronounced, and I believe, 
tends to make the products of the use of the basic 
metaphor less than interesting. Questions of the 
reader's situation are ignored, as are those of the 
author with relation to his culture, to both his 
specifically literary tradition and the more general 
bodies of thought available to him at his time, and also 
to the prominent and perhaps universal features of 
human experience. It would seem unlikely, moreover, 
that these contexts (~ Goldmann) could be precisely 
specifiable, so that the search for a definition of 
these relations in particular instances is B question of 
delicate judgement, rather than a description of "iso-
morphisms". The part played by "context" in making this 
seem the case is of obvious importance. 
But apart from turning attention from questions such 
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as these, the use of the metaphor also invites a limita-
tion in the response to the language of the work (though, 
no doubt, the larger limitation is a result of the 
limitation on the level of language). This point may 
again be made by referring to the idea of "context". 
In formal systems, meanings ..!!ll!.l. be considered unitary 
<with the result that only formal aspects need be 
examined), since semantic ambiguity and alt vagueness 
of outline have been removed by deliberately and 
rigorously controlling the context in which any element 
is to be understood. This is obviously not parallel to 
the situation of language in the literary work, where 
words bring ambiguities they have developed in past use 
and which the new context may well add to, rather than 
limit. Put very brief Ly, the contexts which any element 
of language in daily use or in literature may enter into 
or evoke are far from being clearly-defined. 
Finally, as this essay has concerned itself solely 
with the limitations and inadequacies of the "system" 
metaphor in literary studies, perhaps something ought to 
be said to reli~ve this sense of absoluteness. There is, 
no doubt, a place for thinking of a literary work in 
terms of "system" and "structure". Any mental grasp of 
a work will be in terms of patterns perceived, and any 
gestalt so formed will have its skeletal structure. And 
detailing this structure (for which t~e language of the 
formal system is admirably suited) is no doubt a useful 
aid to both understanding and memorizing. But 
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hypostasizing what is merely a record of a temporally 
contingent attempt at understanding, or what is an 
ad hoc device useful in the search for a fuller under-
standing of the work, seems to be of little value. 
Related would be an answer to questions about an 
envisaged alternative. Black has written on the subject 
of analyzing metaphor: 
I have no quarrel with the use of metaphors (if 
they are good ones) in talking about metaphor. But 
it may be as well to use several, lest we are misled 
by the adventitious charms of our favorites. 
(1954, p. 286) 
And the same, I beli~~e, may be said about the language 
best used in referring to a literary work. A work surely 
does have its "structural" aspect, along with its 
organic" aspect and others. But the error, I believe, 
comes with treating one aspect as true of the work to 
the exclusion of others. Which amounts to treating one 
metaphor for the work (to the exclusion of others) as 
providing a literal vocabulary with which the essence of 
the work can be revealed. Perhaps, with regards to this 
language of referring, what is best, in the last analysis, 
is a language sensitive to the inadequacies of each of 
its metaphors, a language which does not take its 
metaphors solemnly as literal truths, one, in other words, 
which does not let any one of its metaphors "harden" 
into implying serious ontological commitment. 
APPENDIX A 
A few points can usefully be made concerning the 
semantic component of a generative grammar - in this 
case, as conceived of by Katz. CSee especially Katz 
(1972>.> The approach is in harmony with the general 
approach characteristic of Chomskyan linguistics. A 
language comprises a set of (unitary) sentences. These 
are in turn composed of what can in the last analysis 
too be conceived of as units. In the case of Katz's 
semantic component, the consfikQents immediately 
involved in the formation of a sentence are meanings, 
which can in turn be analysed into senses, which in 
turn can be analyzed into what are represented as 
semantic markers (cf. for example, Katz (1972), pp. 
36-37). The meaning of a sentence is thus (ultimately) 
simply itfunction of these basic units· of which it is 
composed. Of course, it would be unlik~ly that there 
would not have been objections to this account; and 
certainly the following questions (among others) are 
going to have to be answered satisfactorily before the 
idea of the "semantic component" becomes credible. Is 
it possible to avoid verbal context in an account of a 
word's meaning? On this count, Cohen and Margalit (1972) 
provide a neat and exact argument demonstrating that 
according to the componential analyst's view of language, 
metaphor is impossible. Second, is it possible to ignore 
situational context in an account of a word's meaning? 
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This can be related to the question: What non-arbitrary 
distinction can be made between "knowledge of a language" 
and "knowledge of the world"? Martin C1975, especially 
ch. 5) gives a good account of some of the problems 
involved here. To illustrate, one might ask what 
semantic features, apart from the most obvious <such as 
"human", "female", etc.), are to be assigned to "woman" 
in order to ensure that the following sentence is, in 
Katz's sense, "anomolous": "That woman over there - she 
swam 120, 000 miles this morning". And while on the 
subject, one cannot help noticing that none but the most 
banal words are used in illustrations of componential 
analysis: an analysis into semantic features of the 
phrase "semantic features" would perhaps be revealing. 
And in the light of the problems pointed to in these two 
questions above, one might ask the third: In what non-
arbitrary way may meanings be precisely defined? 
Bolinger <1965) asks this question and criticizes 
(reasonably, I believe) some of Katz's theoretical 
vocabulary as upholding impossible distinctions. 
Weinreich (1966) is quoted in Katz as making a similar 
criticism~ Katz's reply Cp. 60) is as unsatisfactory 
as it is extraordinary. He writes, "By parity of 
argument, one might hold that the distinction between 
virtue and vice, truth and falsehood, beauty and ugliness 
are of rather dubious theoretical usefulness since these 
are notoriously difficult to validate empirically". 
While "beauty" and "ugliness" may be the objects of 
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theoretical (scientific?) discussion, it is surely 
absurd to think of them as ever being employed as terms 
in the body of a theory Cscientificl) attempting to 
account for some or other phenomenon,~ 
APPENDIX B 
Following is the modified version of the 1609 Quarto 
text of Sonnet 129 that Jakobson uses in his analysis. 
The two important emendations are marked, as in his 
text, with square brackets. 
Th'expence of Spirit in a waste of shame 
Is lust in action, and till action, lust 
Is perjurd, murdrous, blouddy full of blame, 
Savage, extreame, rude, cruel, not to trust, 
Injoyd no sooner but dispised straight, 
Past reason hunted, and no sooner had 
Past reason hated as a swallowed bayt, 
On purpose layd to make the taker mad. 
Mad [e] In pursut and in possession so, 
Had, having, and in quest, to have extreame, 
A blisse in proofe and proved a~d] very wo, 
Before a joy proposed behind a dreame, 
All this the world well knowes yet none knowes well, 
To shun the heaven that leads men to this hell. 
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